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Abstract 
Research has shown that theory of mind tends to develop in typically-developing 
children at about the age of 4 years.  However, language appears to play a great role in 
this, particularly as deaf children, particularly those born to hearing parents, display 
extreme delays in theory of mind development, while bilinguals have been found to 
develop at a somewhat faster rate than monolinguals.  Additionally, effects of culture 
on theory of mind development remain somewhat unclear, as there have been mixed 
results in past research. Theory of mind has also been correlated with metalinguistic 
ability and executive functioning skills, leading to multiple hypotheses regarding what 
drives theory of mind development. 
The aim of this doctoral thesis was to examine the relationships between theory of 
mind, metalinguistic awareness, and executive functioning, as well as to evaluate how 
language and culture play a role in these relationships.  Four studies were conducted in 
an attempt to seek answers to six research questions surrounding this aim.  Study1 
evaluated theory of mind, metalinguistic awareness, and executive functioning among 
hearing nursery children in Central Scotland.  Study 2 was aimed at evaluating these 
same skills among deaf children in the U.S. and U.K., as well as developing a scaling of 
theory of mind abilities among deaf children.  Study 3 assessed these skills among deaf 
Ghanaian children, as well as evaluating theory of mind abilities among a group of 
hearing Ghanaian children.  Finally, Study 4 compared monolingual and bilingual 
children on theory of mind, metalinguistic awareness, and executive functioning. 
Results show that there is a strong link between theory of mind and metalinguistic 
awareness among hearing children that is not explained by executive functioning skills.  
This relationship was not apparent among deaf children, who struggle more with theory 
of mind than metalinguistic awareness.  The deaf children in Ghana were delayed 
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compared to their Western peers; hearing Ghanaian children were delayed compared to 
their Western peers as well, but only slightly.  Bilingual children and monolingual 
children performed similarly on false belief and set-shifting tasks; however, 
monolingual children outperformed bilinguals on metalinguistic awareness and 
inhibition tasks, possibly due to low verbal mental age among the monolinguals.   
Results of the four studies suggest that language does play a part in the relationship 
between theory of mind and metalinguistic awareness.  Due to limited data, cultural 
effects remain unclear.  It is proposed that deaf children’s struggle with theory of mind 
stems from their difficulty with abstract concepts.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 Scientists have long been interested in the process of early childhood 
development, with systematic studies of infant behaviour spanning back to the early to 
mid-19th century (Shonkoff & Phillips, 2000).  The importance of early life experiences 
has been of increasing interest given the media attention regarding the malleability of 
the developing brain (Shonkoff & Phillips, 2000).  Early learning is essential for 
preparing for formal education, resulting in long term effects not only for the children 
as they grow into adulthood, but also on a larger scale in terms of social well-being and 
a well-prepared workforce (Ball, 1994).  Given the importance of development of vital 
skills in early childhood, understanding what experiences and backgrounds lead to 
effectual development, or alternatively, delayed development, is crucial to ensure 
children are given the best chances to succeed.  
 Theory of mind, metalinguistic awareness, and executive functioning are key 
cognitive and social skills that typically show significant development by around 4 to 5 
years of age (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Doherty & Perner, 1998).  There is some 
evidence, however, that children who lack critical early life experiences, such as 
language input, develop some skills at a delayed rate in comparison to the majority of 
children (Peterson & Siegal, 1995; Wood, Wood, Griffiths, & Howarth, 1986).  The 
purpose of this thesis was to investigate how early life language and cultural 
background interplay with the development of these skills in the hopes that early 
interventions may be designed to support children that are at-risk for delays. 
Theory of Mind 
The introduction of the phrase ‘theory of mind’ by Premack and Woodruff in 
1978 stimulated a wealth of research into whether young children have a theory of 
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mind, and how and when it develops.  Simply put, theory of mind is the ability to 
impute mental states, such as beliefs, feelings, desires, and intentions, to oneself and 
others. The term is now widely used to represent how children come to understand the 
mind and mental states, with belief considered by many to be of primary focus.  A full 
understanding of beliefs implies that one can understand that beliefs are not always true, 
and can indeed sometimes be false.  It is this reasoning that has led to the development 
of what some consider the litmus test for assessing theory of mind – the false belief 
task.  This task has been extensively used in research involving both typically 
developed and atypically developing children, with general acceptance of the fact that 
typically-developing children begin to consistently demonstrate success on the task at 
around 4 years of age.  
Some researchers have argued that the false belief task only measures explicit 
theory of mind, and that implicit false belief reasoning develops in infancy, rather than 
around 4 years of age (e.g., Neumann, Thoermer, & Sodian, 2008; Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007).  Onishi and Baillargeon (2005), 
using a violation-of-expectation task (one in which the protagonist looks for the object 
in the correct location, rather than a location he or she falsely believed it to be) found 
that 15-month-old infants looked significantly longer at a scene that violates 
expectation.  Using eye-tracking, Southgate et al. (2007) found that most 25-month-old 
children correctly anticipate where the protagonist with a false belief will search for an 
object, while Nuemann et al. (2008) fold similar results among 18-month-olds.  Other 
studies have suggested false belief understanding among children as young as 7 months 
of age (Kovács, Teglas, & Endress, 2010).   
Additionally, while studying a group of criminal offenders with psychopathic 
tendenceies, Shamay-Tsoory, Harari, Aharaon-Peretz, and Levkovits (2010) created a 
 
 
19 
 
model of theory of mind that includes two components: “(1) affective ToM 
encompassing inferences about emotions (i.e., “hot” aspects) and (2) cognitive ToM 
encompassing inferences about knowledge and beliefs (i.e., “cold” aspects of ToM)” 
(Vetter, Altgassen, Phillips, Mahy, & Kliegel, 2013, p. 115).  Cognitive theory of mind 
is a prerequisite for developing affective theory of mind (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010), 
supported by the fact that evidence suggests cognitive theory of mind develops prior to 
development of affective theory of mind (Ruffman & Keenan, 1996, as cited in Vetter 
et al., 2013).  This is in line with the fact that children must gain a basic understanding 
of others’ beliefs prior to being able to appreciate that beliefs guide others’ emotions 
(Vetter et al., 2013).   
However, despite the growing interest in implicit measures of false belief 
understanding and the current debate about their relationship to explicit later abilities, 
as well as growing interest in the second tier “affective” theory of mind, this thesis is 
concerned with explicitly demonstrated understanding through the standard false belief 
task, the validity of which has been shown through meta-analysis (Wellman, Cross, & 
Watson, 2001).   
False belief reasoning is typically assessed with two commonly used tasks: the 
unexpected transfer task and the unexpected contents task.  The unexpected transfer 
task is also sometimes referred to as the unexpected location task, the transfer task, the 
Maxi task, and the Sally-Ann task.  In this task, a character (acted out in pictures or 
with dolls) places an object in one location, and the object is moved while the character 
is absent.  Children are then asked where the character will look for the object upon his 
or her return – the original location or where the object is currently located.  Typically 
children are also asked control questions, such as where the object was originally placed 
(memory question) and where the object is currently (reality question) (Doherty, 2009).  
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The unexpected contents task is also referred to as the contents task, Smarties 
task, or deceptive box task.  In the task, the child is shown a box or a container that 
contains something other than the presumable contents.  A classic version of the task 
involves showing the child a Smarties chocolate tube that is actually filled with pencils, 
rather than Smarties.  Children are asked what they think is in the container and then 
shown what is actually inside.  After being shown what is inside, children are asked 
what they originally thought was inside the container (own belief question) and what 
someone else who has not been shown the contents will think is inside upon first 
viewing the container (other belief question).  Hogrefe, Wimmer, and Perner (1986) 
originated this type of task (Doherty, 2009).  
Theory of mind and executive functioning. Executive functioning, or the set 
of skills related to impulse control, attention, and working memory, has been repeatedly 
shown to correlate with performance on the false belief task.  The nature of the 
relationship between executive functioning and theory of mind abilities, namely, the 
role executive functioning has in the explicit indication of a theory of mind, has been 
debated (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; Hughes, 1998; Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 2002; 
Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006).  Several theories have been posed to 
explain the relationship, although evidence is still somewhat weak for definitively 
differentiating between them.  One theory for this link that grew in popularity in the 
1990s was that false belief tasks place strong executive demands on the child. The 
arguments were made that the false belief task does not solely depend on the ability to 
understand another’s false beliefs, but also required sufficient working memory, the 
ability to switch between the child’s and another’s perspective of a situation, and 
inhibition of the true nature of the situation.  If this was indeed the case, one would 
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expect that lowering the executive demands of false belief tasks would result in an 
increase in performance.   
The primary executive functioning skills are inhibition, working memory, and 
set-shifting.  Inhibition is formally defined as the ability to deliberately inhibit a strong, 
automatic response (Miyake et al., 2000).  The classic Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) and 
subsequent Stroop-like tasks (e.g., Day/Night Stroop-like Task; Gerstadt, Hong, & 
Diamond, 1994) are designed to elicit such strong automatic responses and therefore are 
often used to test inhibitory skills.  Working memory, according to Baddeley (1992), 
refers to “a brain system that provides temporary storage and manipulation of the 
information necessary for such complex cognitive tasks as language comprehension, 
learning, and reasoning” (p. 1). Simply put, working memory involves the ability to 
hold and mentally manipulate information relevant to a task.  A task typically used to 
assess working memory is the backwards digit span task.  Set-shifting involves the 
ability to shift between two sets of rules, with a commonly used task for assessing set-
shifting abilities being the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS; Frye, Zelazo, & 
Palfai, 1995).  While these tasks are largely aimed at assessing one aspect of executive 
functioning at a time, there is undoubtedly some overlap, given that “executive 
functions are correlated, but separable” (Friedman et al., 2008).  This results in some 
ambiguity in terms of interpreting task performance results; Miyake et al. (2000) 
highlights this fact by reporting that the Wisconson Card Sorting Task (upon which the 
DCCS was based) “has been suggested by different researchers as a measure of ‘mental 
set shifting,’ ‘inhibition,’ ‘flexibility,’ ‘problem solving,’ and ‘categorization,’ just to 
name a few” (p. 53). 
Despite this somewhat vagueness, performance on theory of mind tasks and a 
variety of executive functioning tasks have been found to correlate beyond age.  
 
 
22 
 
Carlson and Moses (2001) evaluated children’s inhibitory control and theory of mind 
abilities by using a battery of tasks.  Children were given tasks aimed at assessing both 
inhibitory control and theory of mind.  The PPVT-R (Dunn & Dunn, 1981) was also 
administered to each child as a measure of verbal ability.  The theory of mind battery 
included an unexpected transfer task, an unexpected contents task, a deceptive pointing 
task, and an appearance-reality task.  Two mental state control tasks, designed to mirror 
two of the theory of mind tests but less any reference to mental states, were also 
conducted.  The inhibitory control battery included ten tasks, including two Stroop-like 
tasks - the Day/Night task designed by Gerstadt et al. (1994) and a similar Grass/Snow 
task - a spatial conflict task, the DCCS, a Simon-says like task called the Bear/Dragon 
task, and several other tasks measuring inhibition.  
Carlson and Moses (2001) found that the unexpected contents, unexpected 
transfer, deceptive pointing, and appearance-reality tasks all correlated moderately (.36 
≤ r ≤ .58).  These significant correlations persisted when controlling for age, gender, 
and verbal ability, although they were reduced to low-to-moderate correlations (.18 ≤ r 
≤ .35).  Four-year-olds generally outperformed three-year-olds on both theory of mind 
measures and on inhibitory control measures.  As the ten inhibitory control measures 
were moderately intercorrelated (α = .76, average item-total r(92) = .47), a composite 
score was calculated.  After partialling out the effects of age, gender, and verbal ability 
were partialled out, the majority of the inhibitory control measures correlated with the 
theory of mind battery, and all theory of mind measures correlated with the inhibitory 
control battery.  The two battery scores were significantly, moderately correlated, r = 
.41, p < .001.  These batteries remained related when also controlling for other 
extraneous factors: family size and performance on mental state control, motor 
sequencing, and pretend action tasks.   
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Despite the interrelatedness of inhibitory control and theory of mind batteries, 
the fact that some individual measures, such as the deception task and the two false 
belief measures, did not correlate indicates that these remain two separate, although 
apparently related, abilities.  While Carlson and Moses’s (2001) findings suggest that 
developing inhibitory control facilitates and is possibly necessary for theory of mind to 
fully develop, they support the notion that it is not the sole factor involved in this 
development. 
Perner, Lang, and Kloo (2002) followed up Carlson and Moses’s (2001) study 
by further examining the relationship between theory of mind and self-control.  They 
found that performance on the dimensional change card sort task (DCCS) correlated 
well with performance on both the usual false-belief unexpected transfer task and a 
false-belief “explanation” task.  The explanation task involves a story of twins, based 
on the procedure used by Robinson and Mitchell (1995).  Perner, Lang, and Kloo 
presented four versions of the twin scenario in which children ultimately have to answer 
why one of the twins mistakenly looks in the wrong location for something (the twin 
holds a false belief about the location).  A go-nogo task was included as a measure of 
inhibition.  The researchers found that performance on the DCCS correlated strongly 
with both the unexpected transfer task and the explanation task (rs = .65).  Performance 
on the go-nogo task only reduced correlations by .02 at most, showing that the 
relationships between performance on the belief tasks and the DCCS were not due to 
the ability to inhibit strong response tendencies.  Also, as the explanation version of the 
false belief task is described as minimizing executive function demands that the typical 
version places on the child, yet is correlated to the same extent as the typical task, this 
further suggests that inhibition is not the key to developing theory of mind 
understanding.   
 
 
24 
 
Perner, Lang, and Kloo (2002) reviewed four of the prominent theories as to 
why executive function and theory of mind tasks correlate, as well as how their data fit 
in with these theories.  The first theory, that “children gain better self-control with a 
better understanding of their mind” (Perner, 1991; Wimmer, 1989; both as cited by 
Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 2002), while not completely disputed by Perner, Lang, and 
Kloo’s results, was not supported in terms of executive inhibition specifically.  Perner, 
Lang, and Kloo (2002) suggest that “the present finding that performance on the go-
nogo task was not substantially related to the link between false-belief understanding 
and card sorting speaks against this particular application of the more general idea that a 
better understanding of the mind leads to better self-control” (p. 764).   
Perner, Lang, and Kloo (2002) did not argue against the argument made by 
Ozonoff, Pennington, and Rogers (1991) that theory of mind and executive functioning 
abilities arise from the same brain region, and as such are similarly impaired among 
children on the autism spectrum and go through normal development through 
maturation for typically developing children.  However, Perner, Lang, and Kloo’s 
findings did not help to distinguish the plausibility of the theory.  Contrastingly, Perner, 
Lang, and Kloo’s findings did appear to support the proposition made by Frye, Zelazo, 
and Palfai (1995) that the ability to reason with embedded conditionals (e.g., if, if, then) 
accounts for the developmental correlation between theory of mind and inhibition tasks.  
Perner, Lang, and Kloo stated that the fact that the go-nogo task was easier than the 
DCCS for children in their study supported that theory; however, Perner, Lang, and 
Kloo still found the theory problematic for reasons as highlighted in other studies (e.g., 
Frye, Zelazo, Brooks, & Samuels, 1996; Perner & Lang, 1999).  
Finally, Perner, Lang, and Kloo (2002) discussed a theory put forth by Russell 
(1996, 1997, as cited in Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 2002) that the ability to monitor one’s 
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actions and act at will are requirements for the development of a ‘pretheoretical’ form 
of self-awareness, and that it is this self-awareness that is necessary for individuals to 
fully grasp mental concepts (p. 764).  Perner, Lang, and Kloo contended that their 
findings did not rule out this theory, as they did not rule out the other theories 
discussed, but that they did provide strong support against the argument that the 
relationship between performance on theory of mind tasks and executive functioning 
tasks arises merely due to problems with inhibition.   
Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, and Lee (2006) expanded on the inquiry into the 
relationship between executive functioning and theory of mind by including culture as 
an additional factor.  Sabbagh et al. assessed whether the relationship found between 
theory of mind and executive function was also found among Chinese preschoolers.  
They tested a sample of 109 Chinese preschoolers and a sample of 107 U.S. 
preschoolers on a battery of theory of mind and executive functioning tasks, the same as 
those used by Carlson and Moses (2001).  While they found that the Chinese children 
outperformed their American counterparts on the executive functioning tasks, they did 
not see a similar difference on the theory of mind tasks.  However, despite this 
difference in performance trends between children from the two countries, theory of 
mind and executive functioning were once again found to correlate significantly and 
positively, even after controlling for age, sex, and verbal ability.  This relationship was 
evident for both the U.S. and the Chinese sample, suggesting that the relationship 
between executive functioning and theory of mind is robust across the two cultures.   
Theory of mind and metalinguistic awareness.  Doherty and Perner (1998) 
argued that metalinguistic tasks and the false belief task are both “based on a common 
conceptual understanding that one and the same state of affairs can be conceived in 
different ways” (p. 303).  Indeed, the ability to hold more than one representation of 
 
 
26 
 
events in mind at one moment is a crucial aspect of being able to pass the false belief 
task.  The child must be able to hold not only his or her own (true) representation of the 
situation, but also the (false) representation being held by the character in the task in 
mind.  As such, it involves metarepresentation, the ability to differentiate between 
representations.  Metarepresentation is also a critical component of metalinguistic 
awareness, given that metalinguistic awareness involves the understanding that 
language is representational.   
The link between theory of mind development and metalinguistic awareness 
development was shown in Doherty and Perner’s 1998 paper and followed up by 
several others (e.g., Doherty, 2000; Farrar & Ashwell, 2012; Farrar, Ashwell, & Maag, 
2005).  Doherty and Perner (1998) tested a group of preschool-aged children on a 
traditional unexpected transfer false belief task and a metalinguistic task involving 
synonyms.  The metalinguistic task was administered in two versions – the judgment 
version, in which children had to monitor the use of an appropriate synonym for an 
object by another person, and the production version, in which children had to produce 
the synonyms themselves.  The researchers found that the traditional false belief task 
correlated strongly (rs ≥ .60) with both versions of the synonym task, even when 
accounting for verbal mental ability and performance on a control task.  Doherty and 
Perner suggested that these findings support the existence of an underlying mechanism 
involving representations that drives the development of both theory of mind and 
metalinguistic awareness.  They argued that, while strongly and specifically related, 
metalinguistic awareness and explicit false belief understanding are not the same thing; 
however, they argued that “both are based on a common conceptual basis” (p. 298), 
providing evidence for a metarepresentation theory.  
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Doherty (2000) sought to follow up the finding that understanding of synonymy 
was related to false belief understanding by expanding the concept to homonymy.  
Doherty found that performance on a homonym task was strongly and significantly 
associated with performance on the synonym task.  Additionally, performance on both 
the synonym and homonym tasks were significantly related to performance on the 
typical unexpected transfer task to at least a moderate degree, even after partialling out 
verbal mental age and age (.35 ≤ rs ≤ .66).  Doherty once again argued these findings 
were in support of an underlying metarepresentation development, although he 
acknowledged that, while not as supported, a one-to-one mapping or mutual exclusivity 
bias account could not be entirely ruled out without additional investigation.   
Farrar, Ashwell, and Maag (2005) also examined the relationship between 
metalinguistic awareness and theory of mind development, albeit by examining 
phonological awareness rather than homonymy and synonymy.  Phonological 
awareness represents one aspect of metalinguistic awareness, as it “refers to an 
awareness of the sound structure of language” (Farrar et al., 2005, p. 158).  In their 
longitudinal study, Farrar et al. examined the relationship between phonological 
awareness and early language development and the relationship between phonological 
awareness and theory of mind.  They examined whether language ability at 2 years of 
age predicted children’s abilities on two phonological awareness tasks, one involving 
rhyming and the other involving deleting a syllable from a two-syllable word, at 4 years 
of age.  They found that this was indeed the case, that early language ability was 
significantly, positively related (rs ≥ .49 ) to phonological awareness performance; this 
relationship remained (rs ≥ .45) when controlling for their performance on the Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT; Dunn & Dunn, 1981, as cited in Farrar et al., 2005).  
Additionally, performance on the phonological awareness task was significantly and 
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positively related (rs ≥ .64) to performance on measures of theory of mind.  The 
relationships between the rhyming phonological awareness task and theory of mind 
tasks remained when controlling for performance on the PPVT and age (rs ≥ .57).   
While Farrar et al. (2005) indicate that “both tasks may require the child to 
focus on conflicting or different representations of a situation” (p. 169), as consistent 
with the metrapresentation theory, they also state that “executive functioning ability 
may underlie this relationship between ToM and phonological awareness, rather then 
[sic] conflicting representations per se” (p. 169).  That is, Farrar et al. argued that 
developing executive functioning may be the underlying cause for the relationships 
found between theory of mind and metalinguistic awareness abilities, rather than a 
developing metarepresentational understanding.   
To follow up their 2005 study, Farrar and Ashwell included measures of 
executive functioning, primarily inhibition, in their similarly structured 2012 study.  
Their aim was to tease apart the nature of the relationship between theory of mind and 
metalinguistic awareness, with particular focus on a representational or perspective 
shifting hypothesis and an executive functioning hypothesis.  The perspective shifting 
hypothesis arises from Doherty’s earlier work (Doherty, 2000; Doherty & Perner, 
1998), teamed with follow-up work by Perner, Stummer, Spring, and Doherty (2002) 
and Kloo and Perner (2005).  Perner, Stummer et al. and Kloo and Perner argued that 
central to children’s ability to pass false belief and metalinguistic awareness tasks is 
their understanding that one thing or one situation can be described differently 
dependent on perspective.  That is, in order to pass these tasks, one must be able to shift 
flexibly between perspectives, focusing only on the salient perspective for a task or 
question while consciously disregarding or ignoring the other.  The executive 
functioning hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that difficulty with metalinguistic 
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awareness and theory of mind arises from still-developing executive functioning.  This 
argument, that the link between metalinguistic awareness and false belief understanding 
is due to a shared need for inhibitory control, arises from arguments made by Garnham 
and Garnham (2002, as cited in Farrar & Ashwell, 2012) and Garnham, Brooks, 
Garnham, & Ostenfeld (2002, as cited in Farrar & Ashwell, 2012).   
In an attempt to identify the underlying reasons for the relation between 
performance on measures of theory of mind and metalinguistic awareness, Farrar and 
Ashwell (2012) conducted two studies.  In Study 1, the authors tested a group of 4-year-
olds on a semantic rhyming task, non-semantic rhyming task, the PPVT, four measures 
of theory of mind, and two measures of executive functioning: the DCCS and a memory 
for sentences task.  The semantic rhyming task included a distractor object in each trial 
that was semantically related to one of the rhyming (but not semantically related) 
objects.  The non-semantic rhyming task included a distractor object in each trial that 
was not semantically related to either of the rhyming (and again not semantically 
linked) objects.  Performance on the theory of mind tasks was significantly, positively 
related to performance on both rhyming tasks, the DCCS, and PPVT, although not with 
the sentence memory task, when controlling for age.  When controlling for PPVT 
scores, theory of mind performance remained related to rhyming performance on both 
forms of the rhyming task.  The relationships between theory of mind performance and 
performance on the rhyming tasks remained significant when partialling out the effect 
of the inhibitory control task, the DCCS, rs > .48.  This final correlation suggests that 
the relationship between rhyming and theory of mind did not arise due to issues with 
inhibitory control.   
In Study 2, Farrar and Ashwell (2012) included all of the tasks used in Study 1 
and added two tasks: a semantic relations task and the day-night task.  The semantic 
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relation task used the same materials as the semantic rhyming task, but instead of 
indicating items that rhyme, children were to select items that “go together” 
semantically.  This task was also administered on a separate testing day from the 
rhyming task.  The day-night task is a task adapted from one created by Gerstadt, Hong, 
and Diamond (1994) and is a measure of inhibitory control.  Similarly to for Study 1, 
theory of mind performance was related to both rhyming tasks when controlling for 
PPVT score, rs ≥ .36.  The link between theory of mind and rhyming remained 
significant after controlling for memory for sentences and a composite inhibitory 
control measure, rs > .33.  A hierarchical regression in which age and PPVT were 
entered as control variables, inhibitory control measures and memory for sentences 
were entered in step 2, and theory of mind performance was entered in step 3, showed 
that even after accounting for the effects of control and executive functioning variables, 
theory of mind contributed significantly to predicting rhyming performance.   
Farrar and Ashwell (2012) argued that support for the executive functioning 
hypothesis was limited based on their findings.  They found that the measures of 
inhibitory control they used, the DCCS and the day-night task, did not correlate with the 
rhyming tasks and in fact did not even correlate with each other.  They suggested that 
the DCCS may actually be assessing perspective or set shifting rather than inhibitory 
control and suggest future researchers use other measures of inhibitory control than this 
task.  They concluded by stating that their “studies suggest that ToM is related to the 
emergence of metalinguistic development because it reflects children’s ability to 
flexibly shift between perspectives” (p. 88), in line with the perspective-shifting 
hypothesis put forth by Perner, Stummer et al. (2002).  Given the results of these 
studies, it appears that perspective taking and shifting abilities are key to the 
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development of both theory of mind understanding and metalinguistic awareness, above 
and beyond executive functioning skills.  
Theory of mind and culture.  Theory of mind has been investigated in 
populations around the world, although a large percentage of these investigations have 
been conducted with children in developed countries.  Wellman, Cross, and Watson 
(2001) conducted a meta-analytical study of 178 separate studies including versions of 
the false belief task.  While Wellman et al. (2001) conducted an analysis regarding 
whether the country of origin influences performance on the task, the countries included 
aside from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia were very 
limited: Korea, Japan, and Austria.  While in more recent years, a rise has been 
witnessed in studying populations in East Asian countries (e.g., Ahn & Miller, 2012; 
Barrett et al., 2013; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006; Wang, Low, Jing, & 
Qinghua, 2012; Wellman, Fang, Liu, Zhu, & Lin, 2006), there are still relatively few 
studies of populations outside of North America, Europe, Australia, and Asia.   
Asian cultures make up the primary non-Western group receiving attention 
regarding theory of mind development.  Wellman et al. (2006) compared the 
performance of Chinese children living in Beijing with English-speaking children in the 
U.S. and Australia on a theory of mind scale consisting of six tasks.  The researchers 
found that Chinese children showed a consistent sequence of development that was 
similar in many ways to those found for American and Australian children.  Sabbagh et 
al. (2006) similarly assessed theory of mind development among Chinese and U.S. 
preschoolers, as discussed in the section on theory of mind and executive functioning, 
and found similar performance between groups.  More specifically, Sabbagh et al. 
found that while Chinese preschools out-performed the U.S. children on measures of 
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executive functioning, they did not perform significantly differently on theory of mind 
tasks.   
Wang et al. (2012) also assessed false-belief understanding among Chinese 
children, although no comparison Western group was included in their analyses.  
However, in addition to evaluating behavioral performance on unexpected-transfer and 
unexpected-contents tasks, Wang et al. also assessed implicit theory of mind 
understanding using anticipatory looking when there was a violation of expectation.   
They found that, similarly as to has been found recently in studies of Western children, 
Chinese children also showed accurate anticipatory looking across a range of false-
belief tasks, despite erring on verbal responses to direct questions.  This suggests a 
similar developmental trend in terms of implicit to explicit theory of mind 
understanding among Western and Chinese children.  Barrett et al. (2013) also 
evaluated Chinese children using gaze-analysis, as well as children from Ecuador and 
Fiji.  All children were from traditional, non-Western societies.  Barrett et al. 
administered three spontaneous-response false-belief tasks that had previously been 
used with Western children.  The tasks assessed preferential-looking and anticipatory 
looking during two modified unexpected-transfer tasks and a violation-of-expectation 
task.  They found that children tested similarly to Western children across tasks, 
indicating “a remarkable degree of convergence between early false-belief 
understanding in Western and non-Western populations” (p. 5).    
One notable contrast to these previous studies is that from Ahn and Miller 
(2012).  Ahn and Miller compared children from Korea with children in the U.S. on 
false-belief understanding using three unexpected transfer tasks.  Contrasting with the 
findings involving Chinese children, Ahn and Miller found that the Korean children 
outperformed American children on the measures of false belief.  This indicates that 
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perhaps there are further intricacies and differences in culture among Asian cultures that 
may play a role in theory of mind development.  While there is some support for this 
from Lewis, Koyasu, Oh, Ogawa, Short, and Huang’s (2009) study of three Asian 
cultures (Korean, Japanese, and Chinese), a more comprehensive examination of 
performance among children from different Asian countries would have to be 
conducted in order to determine this.   
Avis and Harris (1991) conducted one of the few studies involving children in a 
unique population – Baka children living in the rain forests of southeast Cameroon.  
Avis and Harris administered a form of the typical unexpected transfer false belief task 
to a group of 34 Baka children.  In the task, the children were invited to move a portion 
of desirable food from a container to a hiding place while the adult preparing the food 
was absent.  The children were then asked to predict where the adult would look for this 
food upon his return.  The majority of older children (mean age = 5 years) and a 
minority of the younger children (mean age = 3.5 years) correctly predicted that the 
adult would look in the incorrect, original location.  Avis and Harris’s results suggest 
that as the children were able to demonstrate false belief understanding at an age similar 
to Western children, this supports the notion that theory of mind reasoning develops 
universally among children.   
Vinden (1996) also studied theory of mind development among a unique group, 
Junín Quechua children in Peru.  Vinden used a false belief location task also modeled 
on the unexpected transfer task, as well as an unexpected contents task and an 
appearance/reality task.  Despite the tasks being administered by a native Quechuan 
collaborator, children between the ages of 4 and 8 years performed poorly on all of the 
tasks.  This suggested that either the Quechuan children did not understand false belief 
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even by the age of 8 years, or that possibly the tasks did not translate well into their 
culture.   
In a second study, Vinden (1999) adapted the task used by Avis and Harris 
(1991) to assess theory of mind in four cultural groups: Mofu schooled children from 
Northern Cameroon, Tolai schooled children from Papua New Guinea, Tainae 
unschooled children from a remote jungle village in Papua New Guinea, and Western 
children of European descent also from Papua New Guinea.  The Mofu children were 
attending French immersion schools and the Tolai were attending English preparatory 
schools.  Ages of the Mofu and Tainae children had to be estimated as the children in 
these groups did not know how old they were.  Vinden noted that it was extremely 
difficult to obtain participants under 5 years of age, and that very few female Tainae 
children were willing to participate, leading to a Tainae sample that was 80% male.   
Vinden (1999) found mixed results among children from the different cultures, 
indicating that “some areas of emotional development in children may be quite stable 
across cultures, whereas others may not be” (p. 39).  Specific to false belief 
understanding, she suggested that “children in a variety of non-Western cultures 
eventually come to understand that another person can have a false belief, and will act 
on that belief rather than merely reacting to the way the world is” (p. 40).  Additionally, 
despite having few 4-year-old and no 3-year-old children in the sample, her results 
suggest that there is a clear trend toward understanding false belief, though potentially 
at later ages than found among Western cultures.  The Western sample in the study 
followed the typical trend of development, although slightly later than found among 
similar children in their homelands.  Due to issues with collecting a representative 
sample (including children under 5 years of age and females), as well as some issue 
Vinden reported with the translation of questions relating to thinking, the findings are 
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not entirely clear, although they do provide some initial data on children from distinctly 
non-Western cultures.   
Callaghan et al. (2005) conducted a cross-cultural study measuring false-belief 
understanding in five cultures: Canada, India, Peru, Samoa, and Thailand.  Callaghan et 
al. used a simplification of the naturalistic task used by Avis and Harris (1991) and 
Vinden (1999) to assess false belief understanding.  Unlike in its previous uses, 
Callaghan et al. did not ask questions about the protagonist’s thoughts and emotions, 
only about his or her behavior.  This was done in order to minimize issues of 
translation, as was seen in Vinden’s (1999) use of the task.  Results showed that, 
consistent with general results among Western children, few 3-year-old children passed 
the task, 4-year-olds passed and failed in approximately equal numbers, and the 
majority of 5-year-olds passed the task.  This pattern was consistent across cultures, 
indicating “synchrony in the age at which children of diverse cultures pass the false-
belief task” (p. 381).  The authors do report that whether such synchrony occurs due to 
biological maturation or from experiences universal across cultures, or both, remains 
unclear.  As all of the children included in their samples were schooled, it makes it 
difficult to rule out the possibility of schooling and social interaction as a key toward 
development.  Pointing to delays experienced among deaf children, the authors suggest 
conversation may be a crucial mechanism toward theory of mind development, as 
“conversation brings other individuals’ mental views to light and brings a vocabulary 
necessary to the transaction of mental states” (p. 382).  They highlight the fact that, 
apart from deaf children born to hearing parents, all children are exposed to 
conversation through their lives, making it particularly difficult to tease apart the effects 
of this exposure and those of biological maturation.   
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Finally, Chasiotis, Kiessling, Hofer, and Campos (2006) examined inhibitory 
control as well as theory of mind among children in three different cultures: Germany, 
Costa Rica, and Cameroon.  Chasiotis et al. tested the relationship between false belief 
understanding and inhibitory control among these children, all of whom were 3- to 5-
years of age.  In addition to using batteries to test for inhibitory control and theory of 
mind, they also evaluated age, gender, siblings, language understanding, and mother’s 
education as control factors.  Results of regression analysis show a relationship between 
conflict inhibition and false belief understanding that was culture-independent.  
However, delay inhibition had no significant relationship to theory of mind either 
before or after controlling for interaction effects with culture.  This provides support for 
a strong correlation between false belief and conflict inhibition tasks, while also 
providing evidence against a relationship between false belief and delay inhibition 
tasks.  The researchers suggest that higher working memory demands inherent to 
conflict inhibition and theory of mind tasks, but not delay inhibition tasks, may be the 
underlying reason for this difference.  Additionally, their results provide further 
evidence for similarity in development of theory of mind across cultures.   
While this works toward expanding the current knowledge on cultural 
differences in development, there still remains a large gap in the literature in evaluating 
children in developing countries, specifically with African children.  However, the 
evidence from these studies suggests that there may be more similarities than 
differences in theory of mind development among children around the world.  
Differences in theory of mind development due to culture appear to be related to age of 
explicit understanding, although this is likely constrained to within a couple of years’ 
difference, and the middle order of scaling, as suggested by Wellman et al. (2006).  
While tasks continue to be modified to best suit cultures and more diverse cultures are 
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examined repeatedly to establish reliability of findings, these subtle differences will 
become more clear.   
Deafness and Theory of Mind 
A group of children that sparked particular interest in terms of theory of mind 
development was children with autism.  Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985), as well 
as subsequent studies, showed that autistic children display unusual difficulty in tests of 
false belief understanding.  Following this, children with other developmental 
disabilities were similarly tested in order to determine whether this was a common 
problem amongst special populations.  Children with Down’s Syndrome, intellectually 
handicapped children, emotionally disturbed children, and children with severe specific 
language impairments did not demonstrate similar deficiencies, suggesting specific 
difficulties with false-belief tasks are unique to children with autism (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1989; Leslie & Frith, 1988; Siddens, Happe, Whyte, & Frith, 
1990).   
 While several developmental disabilities apart from autism had been explored in 
relation to mastery of theory of mind, little was yet known about the effects of other 
sensory, physiological, or social handicaps (Peterson & Siegal, 1995).  Of particular 
interest to Peterson and Siegal (1995) were children who experienced profound, 
prelingual hearing loss.  Given that most deaf children are born to hearing parents and 
do not join a community of native signers until in primary school, these children are 
likely to have limited access to conversation in their formative years, particularly about 
unobservable mental states (Wood, Wood, Griffiths, & Howarth, 1986).  Theoretically, 
this impairment could severely limit the child’s exposure and access to information 
about other people’s mental states, a similar restriction as experienced by autistic 
children, although for different reasons.  Alternatively, these children may have access 
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to this information, but due to the nature of their limited exposure they may not have 
developed the ability to exploit that access.  In either case, this theoretical reasoning, 
along with the results from Peterson and Siegal’s 1995 study, sparked a wealth of 
studies on deafness and theory of mind.   
Early theory of mind and deafness research.  Peterson and Siegal (1995) 
tested 26 signing profoundly deaf children with normal mental ability (aged 8-13 years) 
using two trials of the typical unexpected transfer false-belief task.  It was not specified 
whether any of the children were native signing, but based on general proportions it is 
reasonable to assume a large portion of the sample were late signing.  In order to test 
the idea of using a conversationally-supported question (Siegal & Beattie, 1991), the 
children were split into two equal groups.  Group 1 was asked the belief question, 
“Where will Sally look for her marble?”  Group 2 was asked the modified, 
conversationally-supported question, “Where will Sally first look for her marble?”  
Both groups received identical reality (“Where is the marble really?”) and memory 
(“Where did Sally put the marble in the beginning?”) control questions.  Children were 
required to pass both trials in order to be credited with possessing an understanding of 
false belief. 
 Each child was tested individually with two adults present: a male experimenter 
and a female professional Auslan (Australian Sign Language) interpreter.  The 
interpreter was experienced with the style of manual communication used by the 
children in their classrooms and employed this “Total-Communication” medium in 
translating the tasks to the children.  The experimenter acted out each step of the 
scenario and spoke with his lips clearly visible.  The interpreter immediately translated 
the spoken commentary into signed English.  Both adults independently recorded the 
child’s pointing responses and the interpreter supplied an ongoing oral translation of the 
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child’s signed communications.  This interpretation was recorded both electronically 
and in writing by the experimenter.  
 Seventeen percent of children in Group 1 succeeded, whilst 50% of children in 
Group 2 succeeded.  However, this difference was not significant.  There was no 
significant difference in either chronological age or intelligence between the group of 
children that succeeded on the task and those that did not.   
 A comparison between the performance of the combined deaf groups and 14 
children with Down’s Syndrome (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) showed significantly 
higher performance on the task by the Down’s Syndrome children, even despite the fact 
that these children did not have the modified “conversationally-supported” questioning 
as was used in Group 2.  A comparison between the combined deaf sample and a 
sample of 20 autistic children tested with the non-conversationally-supported question 
showed no significant difference between groups (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985).  
Similarly, there was also no significant difference between Group 2 and a group of 20 
children with autism given the same questions (Prior, Dahlstrom, & Squires, 1990).   
 Peterson and Siegal held the position that both deaf and autistic children may 
have had inadequate conversational input about mental states from family members at 
home in order to cross a minimal threshold of false belief understanding necessary for 
success on the tasks.  Further, they believed that a basic ignorance about other people’s 
belief states in deaf children results from the lack of a fluent conversational partner at 
home prior to entry into school.  They posited that in the case of autistic children, rather 
than the lack of a fluent common language amongst family members obscuring 
glimpses into their mental states, it may be due to an unwillingness of the child to 
attend to others or the inability to draw accurate inferences about other people’s 
communicative intentions (Frith, 1989).   
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 Steeds, Rowe, and Dowker’s 1997 study was designed as a follow-up to 
Peterson and Siegal’s (1995), and was intended to expand upon the original study as 
well as to assess whether similar delays were found amongst a sample of English 
children.  Steeds et al. (1997) tested a sample of 22 signing profoundly deaf English 
children with normal mental ability.  The children were aged between 5 and 12 years 
(mean 9;8).  Whilst Peterson and Siegal employed two Sally-Anne false-belief tasks, 
Steeds et al. tested children on one Sally-Anne task and Baron-Cohen’s (1991) 
adaptation of the Breakfast Cereal task (Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, & Cooke, 
1989).    
 Task 1 was the Sally-Anne task, which was presented similarly to in Peterson 
and Siegal’s study.  Task 2, the Breakfast Cereal task, assessed understanding of desires 
with two sets of desire questions, beliefs with one set of belief questions, and included 
two memory checks.  The child was shown two boxes of cereal and a doll, which was 
said to like one of the cereals, but not the other.  The child was asked whether the doll 
would feel happy or sad if presented with one box, and then the other (desire test 1).  
The doll left the scene and the child was shown that the ‘preferred’ box was actually 
empty, and the ‘disliked’ box actually contained the preferred cereal.  When the doll 
returned the child was asked again what the doll would feel if presented with either box 
(belief test).  The child watched as the doll was shown what was actually contained in 
the two boxes and once again was asked whether the doll would feel happy or sad if 
presented with either box (desire test 2).   
 Each child was tested individually with two adults present: a female 
experimenter and a female who was profoundly deaf and fluent in British Sign 
Language (BSL), which was the principal means of communication for all of the 
children.  The experimenter and Deaf storyteller manipulated the objects used in each 
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story in conjunction while the storyteller told the stories involved in each task using 
BSL.  Both adults independently recorded the responses given.   
 Children taking part in this study performed better than those tested by Peterson 
and Siegal (1995).  While Peterson and Siegal found that 35% of their deaf children 
passed the Sally-Anne task, Steeds et al. found a somewhat higher rate with 14 out of 
20 (70%) passing.  However, over one-third of children included in this analysis failed 
at least one of the control questions, and Steeds et al. did not remove these children 
from further analysis.  If the argument that children should not be counted as having a 
true understanding of false belief unless they are able to successfully pass both the 
control questions as well as the belief questions, this brings the passing rate down to 
50%.  The difference in pass rates between these two studies could be down to language 
of task presentation (Sign-Supported English versus BSL), the possibly disjointing of 
the tasks in Peterson and Siegal given that the tasks were spoken and then interpreted, 
or even variability among deaf children, especially considering the somewhat small 
sample sizes presented.  The fact that the children in Steeds et al. outperformed those in 
Peterson and Siegal’s study “should not obscure the fact that they still performed less 
well than would be expected on the basis of their chronological age” (Steeds et al., 
1997, p. 192).  Regardless of whether a strict (50%) or lenient (70%) criterion is 
applied, the deaf children in this sample performed well below the level expected from 
hearing children of the same age range.   
 It is of interest to note, however, that while the children had significant trouble 
with the belief tasks, the same difficulty was not witnessed on the desire tasks.  Indeed, 
all 20 children that took part in the breakfast task passed both desire questions.  It 
appears from this study that whatever their age, and whether or not they passed all of 
the control questions, they had no problems in understanding desire.  While this may 
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reflect a difference in the ease of task comprehension between the two tasks, it may also 
be that children with verbal communication difficulties do understand desire better than 
belief.  Desire, contrasted with belief, is more communicable by nonverbal means 
including pointing and facial expressions.  If this is the case, it may be that different 
forms of communicative experience have differential effects on the various aspects of 
theory of mind.  Additionally, desire has been shown to be understood much earlier 
than belief, as young as 18 months, by typical children as well (e.g., Gopnik & 
Repacholi, 1997); this could also explain the difference in performance on desire versus 
belief trials.  
 Russell et al. (1998) also followed on from Peterson and Siegal’s initial study, 
with two general aims.  The first aim was to examine the generality of the finding that 
deaf children have difficulty with theory of mind tasks.  The second aim was to 
examine the possibility of age-related improvement in deaf children’s theory of mind 
ability.  The second hypothesis, that improvement is age related, is based upon the 
consideration that the acquisition of proficient sign language and communication skills 
is a progressive process.  They believed that it therefore may take “some years before 
increased opportunities for learning about mental states aggregate sufficiently to impact 
upon the deaf child’s theory of mind development” (p. 905).    
 Russell et al. used the same general task procedures as used in Peterson and 
Siegal (1995) when testing 32 signing profoundly deaf children, although without the 
inclusion of the conversationally-supported questioning.  Similarly to previous 
experiments, these children were of normal mental ability, but the age range studied 
was broadened (ages 4-16 years).  Participants were split into three groups by age; the 
youngest group (n = 12) were between 4 and 8 years of age (mean = 6;7), the middle 
group (n = 10) were between 8 and 13 years of age (mean = 10;11), and the oldest 
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group (n = 10) were between 13 and 16 years of age (mean = 15;5).  Each child was 
tested individually with two female adults present: a qualified teacher of the deaf, who 
signed and enacted the story, and an experimenter who videoed the test and recorded 
responses.  
A stringent passing criterion was again employed, requiring passing of both 
versions one and two, both the false-belief and control questions.  This greatly reduced 
the likelihood of including passes obtained through guessing.  Unlike in Steeds et al. 
(1997), the pass rate of the sample would not have increased significantly had a more 
lenient pass criterion been used, such as requiring only that the child answer the false 
belief question and not the control questions correctly.   
Of the total sample of 32 children, 28% passed; this is not inconsistent with the 
17% found to have passed the standard version presented by Peterson and Siegal (1995) 
or the 20% of autistic children found to have passed in Baron-Cohen et al. (1985).  
When split into the three age groups, it becomes apparent that the ability to pass the 
false-belief test is associated with age: 17% of children in the youngest group, 10% of 
children in the middle group, and 60% of children in the oldest group passed.  It does 
not appear that cognitive level positively influenced passing rate.  In fact, the children 
passing the false-belief test had lower IQ equivalents than those failing, likely based on 
the fact that the average IQ of the oldest group was lower than those of the other two 
age groups.  However, this may be due to the fact that IQ is generally calculated relative 
to age norms, and as such the older children were not necessarily less cognitively 
advanced than the younger children.   
Results confirm both that deaf children show a delay in false-belief task 
performance when compared with hearing children in other studies which use the same 
kind of test and pass criterion, and that the older deaf children performed better than the 
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younger deaf children.  As the majority of children in the study correctly answered the 
control questions, yet failed the questions specifically testing their understanding of 
false belief, it is reasonable to conclude that there is a relatively specific difficulty in 
understanding the implications of false belief.  The fact that a significantly greater 
portion of the oldest children (13- to 16-year-olds) passed the test compared with each 
of the two younger groups provides evidence of an age-related improvement in test 
performance.  The results “suggest that the biggest improvement in deaf children’s 
performance on the false-belief test occurs after the age of about 13 years” (p. 908).  
This may explain why Peterson and Siegal (1995) failed to find a significant age effect, 
as the upper age limit of their sample was 13 years of age. 
This suggests that the difficulty in theory of mind abilities in deaf children is a 
developmental delay, and a rather marked one at that: only 14% of children 4- to 12-
years of age passed the test compared with 85% of 3- to 5-year-old hearing children in 
the study by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985).  Even amongst the oldest deaf group, aged 13- 
to 16-years-old, only 60% passed.  
Effect of language background.  Not all deaf children come from similar 
language backgrounds, even within the same cultural group or region.  While it is true 
that approximately 90% of deaf children are born to hearing parents, there is still a 
minority of deaf children that are born in households with other deaf family members.  
Often these deaf family members are sign language users themselves, creating an 
opportunity for the deaf children to be exposed to a more complex language system 
from birth than that which is accessible to deaf children of non-signing parents.  
Considered “native” signers, these deaf children experience a very different early 
childhood in regards to language, one considerably more similar to that experienced by 
hearing children of hearing parents.  In addition, not all deaf children born to hearing 
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parents are raised to be “late” signers.  There is a significant portion of deaf children of 
hearing parents that are classed as “oral”; that is, they primarily use speech and 
listening (either residual or, often, with the help of hearing aids or cochlear implants) 
over other forms of communication such as sign language.   This difference in linguistic 
backgrounds and modes of communications leads to an important question – do these 
groups of deaf children perform the same on theory of mind tests? 
Peterson and Siegal sought to provide an answer to this question with their 1999 
study.  The study’s aim was to provide a direct comparison of the performance on a 
range of tasks requiring representation of others’ mental states between deaf children 
from a variety of different conversational backgrounds and both autistic and normal 
hearing children.   
One hundred two Australian children took part in this study, each classified in 
one of three main categories: 59 deaf children (mean age = 9;5), 21 children of normal 
hearing and abilities (mean age = 4;6), and 22 autistic children (mean age = 9;6).  The 
deaf children were further classified into one of three subgroups.  Group 1 consisted of 
34 severely and profoundly deaf signers from hearing families (mean age = 9;4), Group 
2 consisted of 11 severely and profoundly deaf native signers (mean age = 10;3), and 
Group 3 consisted of 14 oral deaf children with moderate to severe hearing loss (mean 
age = 9;2).  To clarify, oral deaf children are those children with moderate to severe 
hearing loss who have grown up with spoken language input.  These children, with the 
assistance of amplifying hearing aids worn since infancy, have acquired speaking and 
listening skills in oral-aural language.  These children are sometimes referred to as 
oralists.  
Again two versions of the unexpected transfer task were administered, similar in 
procedure to that previously used (Peterson & Siegal, 1995).  In addition to the standard 
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changed-location false belief tasks, Peterson and Siegal also included one version of a 
change-appearance task, adapted from Leekam and Perner (1991), and one version of 
an unexpected contents task (Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989).  In the change-
appearance task, a mother doll comments on a girl doll’s pretty yellow dress and goes 
off to find hair ribbons of the same colour.  While the mother is absent, the girl changes 
into a differently coloured dress.  Children are asked: (1) a test question – “Which of 
these ribbons did Mum bring?”, (2) a memory control – “When Mum left, what colour 
was the girl’s dress?”, and (3) a reality control – “Now what colour is her dress?”.  The 
standard Smarties unexpected contents task was slightly simplified to reduce repetition 
of prompt and control questions.  In the task, a misleadingly familiar sweets container is 
presented to the child, and is shown to actually contain pencils.  After discovering the 
unexpected contents, the child is asked what a naïve classmate would say on first seeing 
the closed container, and what his or her own belief had been.  In order to be judged as 
passing, correct responses to both questions were required.  
Late signing deaf children performed the poorest on the three tasks.  Their 
performance was lowest on the changed-location task (38% passing), versus 59% 
passing the changed-appearance task and 47% who passed the unexpected contents 
task. The children with autism performed slightly better (50%, 58%, and 50%, 
respectively), while oral deaf children achieved 64%, 71%, and 86% passing on the 
three tasks.  Native signers (mean age 10 years, 3 months) performed roughly 
equivalently to normal pre-schoolers (mean age 4 years, 10 months): 82% of native 
signers passed the changed-location task, versus 86% of normal pre-schoolers; 100% of 
native signers passed the changed-appearance task, versus 90% of normal pre-
schoolers; and 91% of native signers passed the unexpected contents task, versus 76% 
of normal pre-schoolers.  
 
 
47 
 
Late signing deaf children did not differ significantly from the autistic group, 
but they did pass significantly fewer false-belief tasks than the native signers, the oral 
deaf children, and the normal hearing children.  No significant differences were found 
among the latter three groups.  Patterns of success on individual tasks were consistent 
with overall performance: late signers and autistic children performed similarly, and 
performed at a lower standard than the native signers and oral children.   
Courtin (2000) was also interested in the effect of language background on 
theory of mind development in deaf children.  In a similar study, 155 deaf children (5- 
to 8-years-old) of three linguistic backgrounds and normally developing hearing 
children (4- to 6-years-old) were tested on two unexpected change and one unexpected 
contents false-belief tasks.  The deaf children were divided into the same three groups 
as previously employed: deaf children of deaf parents, signing deaf children of hearing 
parents, and oral deaf children of hearing parents.  An additional fourth category was 
proposed but dropped due to extremely low numbers of oral children of deaf parents.   
Effects of hearing status were evaluated in four sets of analyses.  The first set of 
analyses compared hearing children with deaf children of deaf parents.  Results 
indicated that at 5 years of age, a marginally non-significant effect reflecting greater 
success among the second-generation deaf children was found (p = .09); this effect was 
more profound among 6 year olds (p < .05).  When data were pooled from the two age 
groups, second-generation deaf children significantly outperformed hearing children (p 
≤ .01).  
Performance of 8-year-old signing deaf children of hearing parents was roughly 
equivalent to that of hearing 5-year-olds.  When data were pooled across age groups, 
signing children of hearing parents did not perform significantly differently from 
hearing children, despite the deaf children’s higher mean ages.  An analysis of the mean 
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number of tasks correctly performed by children in these two groups did indicate 
significantly better performance among the hearing children in comparison with the oral 
children.  Deaf children of deaf parents performed significantly better than signing or 
oral deaf children of hearing parents (p < .001) across and between all age groups.  
While late signers and oral deaf children did not differ at specific age groups, the 
signing children tended to outperform the deaf oral children (p ≤ .07). 
Results confirmed previous findings that hearing children and native signers 
performed very similarly, although results from the study indicated somewhat higher 
performance by native signers, suggesting no delay among second-generation deaf 
children.  Both hearing and second-generation deaf children significantly outperformed 
both groups of first-generation deaf children.  However, contrary to results found by 
Peterson and Siegal (1999), signing and oral deaf children of hearing parents only 
performed marginally significantly differently from each other.   
 A similar study was conducted in 2005 by Courtin and Melot, with similar 
results.  In addition to three false-belief tasks (two unexpected-change tasks and one 
unexpected-contents task), the children were given three trials of an appearance-reality 
task.  In the appearance-reality tasks, the children were shown an object that looked like 
one object, but was truly another.  For example, the child was shown a piece of sponge 
that looked like a rock, and was asked “When you look at this, what is it, what does it 
look like?”  After the child responded with the intended appearance (a rock), they were 
shown that the object was in actuality a sponge.  Once the true nature of the object was 
affirmed for the child, he or she was asked two questions: “What is it really? Is it really 
a rock or really a piece of sponge?” and “When you look at this right now, does it look 
like a rock or does it look like a piece of sponge?” (p. 19).  
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Children were again divided into three groups based on parental hearing status 
and child’s communication modality, resulting in native signers, late signers, and oral 
deaf.  Consistent with previous findings, children who were native users of a language, 
whether that be hearing children using spoken language or signing deaf children of deaf 
parents, outperformed those who were exposed to language later in life (both groups of 
deaf children with hearing parents) (ps < .001).  Native signing deaf children had better 
performances than late signing deaf children (F(1, 48) = 30.26, p < .001), and hearing 
children had better performances than oral deaf children, F(1, 64) = 37.19, p < .001.  
The two groups of native language users did not differ from one another (ns); similarly, 
late signing deaf children differed from oral children, but only to a marginally non-
significant level, F(1, 54) = 2.92, p = .09.   
The effects of language modality were examined by evaluating performance on 
the false belief and appearance-reality tasks separately.  Deaf native-signing children 
outperformed hearing children on the false-belief task (p < .05), but not on the 
appearance-reality task (ns).  Additionally, hearing children significantly outperformed 
late-signing deaf children on both tasks (ps < .05).  Both oral deaf and late-signing deaf 
children did not perform significantly differently on either task (ns).  Native signers 
showed equal performance on both tasks, whereas hearing children, late signers, and 
oralists all showed better performance on the appearance-reality task. 
These results indicated that, for deaf children, the exposure to sign language 
from birth may yield a facilitative effect.  Additionally, use of oral language among 
deaf children did not improve the development of false belief understanding, as 
evidenced by the fact that hearing children significantly outperformed the oral deaf 
children.  The finding that native signers passed significantly more false-belief tasks 
than their late-signing counterparts was consistent with the findings of Peterson and 
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Siegal (1999).  However, Peterson and Siegal found no difference between the 
performance of hearing children and oral deaf children, which is inconsistent with 
Courtin and Melot’s (2005) finding.   
Meristo et al. (2007) went further to examine the effect of bilingual and oralist 
school environments on theory of mind reasoning.  In Italy, deaf children receive school 
instruction in a variety of ways, with two of the primary environments being oralist 
environments and bimodal/bilingual environments.  Some children attend mainstream 
government schools with their hearing peers, and receive instruction in spoken Italian.  
While occasionally this oral instruction is supplemented with the use of Italian Sign 
Language (LIS) or Sign-Supported Italian (SSI), Meristo et al. focused on children in a 
strict oralist environment in their experiments.  Other deaf Italian children attend 
schools that provide bimodal/bilingual instruction; that is, instruction is given in a 
combination of LIS or SSI and spoken Italian.  In this bimodal/bilingual environment, 
students receive either direct SSI instruction (spoken Italian accompanied with LIS 
signs) from their teachers, or an LIS interpreter simultaneously translates what is being 
taught.  Additionally, students receive LIS grammar and vocabulary as a subject for 
between 1 and 6 hours per week.  The interactions between students and teachers and 
among the students independently are carried out in LIS, SSI, or a combination, 
meaning deaf children are immersed in a signing environment.  
Meristo et al. (2007) found in this first experiment that deaf Italian children in 
attendance at schools with bimodal/bilingual instruction significantly outperformed 
their peers in oralist schools on theory of mind tests, even when age, nonverbal 
intelligence, and level of sign language were partialled out.  Further, performance of a 
sample of hearing children between 3 and 6 years of age was contrasted with the groups 
of students.  While hearing children did not outperform native-signing deaf students 
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receiving bimodal/bilingual instruction, they did outperform native-signing deaf 
students receiving oralist instruction, as well as all late-signing students, regardless of 
school environment.   
Meristo et al. (2007) followed up this first experiment with an evaluation of 
Swedish and Estonian deaf students, as deaf education in these two northern European 
countries places much greater focus on a bilingual environment without the use of sign-
supported teaching methods.  In Estonian non-oralist schools, Estonian Sign Language 
(ESL) is used by teachers, many of whom are also deaf, with few lessons presented in 
spoken Estonian (Meristo et al., 2007).  In Sweden, the aim is to prepare children to live 
and work in society as bilingual individuals, and as such both Swedish Sign Language 
(SSL) and Swedish are both used in instruction and taught as language courses, 
although sign-supported methods are not used.  Family members are also given the 
opportunity to learn SSL to encourage the use of functional sign language within the 
home (Meristo et al., 2007).   
The results of the second experiment indicated that native signers instructed in 
ESL in conjunction with spoken Estonian or SSL in conjunction with spoken Swedish 
outperformed both bilingually instructed late signers and native signers attending oralist 
schools.  Similarly as to in the first experiment, the native signers under bilingual 
instruction performed on par with age-matched hearing children.  It is apparent from 
these findings that the additional use of signed language, rather than just spoken, at 
school aids development in native signing children.  Yet, although the native and late 
signers were both taught in bilingual environments, the addition of signing did not boost 
the abilities of the late signers to the same level as was attained by native signers; once 
again this implies that earlier access to sign diminishes delays.  
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Effect of mental state talk.  While it was previously speculated that mental 
state talk by parents is a critical factor in the delay of false-belief understanding found 
among late-signing deaf children, Moeller and Schick (2006) employed an integrative 
approach to look specifically at its effect.  Mothers in particular were focused on, as 
they are typically the primary caregivers of small children.  This study also differs in 
another way from past studies; hearing mothers with either deaf or hearing children 
were assessed, in contrast to studies that examined deaf children with deaf or hearing 
parents.  The mother’s sign proficiency and talk about the mind were examined in order 
to evaluate the effect of these elements on child ability. 
 Mothers and children were videotaped for one hour in a playroom setting while 
participating in three play activities designed to elicit mental state talk.  In a follow-up, 
children were given a standard false-belief task and mothers were interviewed about 
family and signing background and given a sign vocabulary test.   
 The hearing children (mean age 5.0 years) had significantly higher false belief 
scores (M = 85.58%) than the deaf children (mean age 6.9 years, M = 52.27%), d = 
0.92, p = .002.  Mothers of hearing children produced significantly more mental state 
references than did mothers of deaf children, although there was no difference between 
the groups in terms of the number of utterances without mental state terms.  The total 
number of maternal utterances was significantly correlated with the use of mental state 
terms for the mothers of hearing children (r = .48, p = .02), but not for mothers of deaf 
children (r = .092, p = .69).  Mothers of deaf children who scored above 75% on the 
verbal false belief tasks used significantly more instances of mental state terms than 
mothers of deaf children who scored below 75%.  Among mothers of deaf children, a 
significant relationship between maternal talk about mental states and deaf children’s 
performance on theory of mind tasks was found, providing support for the previously 
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theorised concept that access to conversations about the mind is important for deaf 
children’s theory of mind development.  Contrary to previous work by Ruffman, Slade, 
and Crowe (2002), no relationship was found between maternal talk and false belief 
understanding in the group of mothers with hearing children, possibly due to the 
restricted age and performance range of the comparison group.  Mothers’ nonmental 
state talk and the overall transcript length were not related to the deaf children’s false 
belief understanding, suggesting that the overall amount of maternal talk was not as 
influential as talk that focused on mental states. 
 Brown (2007) agreed that it is important to measure parents’ sign language 
abilities in the development of deaf children’s theory of mind abilities.  Brown 
acknowledged that while Moeller and Schick (2006) have taken a first step in this 
direction, their study falls short, as it takes no measurement of the mothers’ nonverbal 
communication ability.  It is a common understanding among proficient users of many 
different sign languages in use worldwide that the facial expression is an extremely 
important grammatical feature, important to issues such as syntax and morphology.  
Brown therefore encouraged further studies including this additional analysis.   
 Meristo et al. (2012) focused on the role of language input for deaf and hearing 
infants in order to assess the effects of early language reception, including mental state 
talk, on implicit false belief understanding.  Meristo et al. compared the performance of 
20 17- to 26-month-old children who were hearing (mean age 23 months) or were deaf 
with hearing families (mean age 23 months), and thus delayed in access to early 
conversational input.  Of the ten deaf children, five used cochlear implants and the other 
five used hearing amplifications.  The mean age of cochlear implantation was 14 
months and the mean time since implantation was 7 months; the mean time since first 
use of hearing amplification was 14 months.  While the parents of the deaf infants were 
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acquainted with Swedish Sign Language (SSL) and communicated with their infants in 
spoken Swedish supported with signs, none of the deaf infants showed proficiency in 
SSL.  The infants watched true-belief and false-belief test trial cartoons on a monitor 
while having their gaze tracked.   Hearing infants significantly outperformed the deaf 
children in anticipating the search actions of the cartoon character with the false belief 
about where an object was located.  Performance did not differ between hearing and 
deaf children on the true-belief trial.  This provides evidence that access to 
conversational input early in life contributes to early theory of mind reasoning.  The 
importance of such early input is highlighted by the fact that all of the deaf children had 
had access to some sort of hearing assistance and had at least some conversational 
input, albeit delayed.   
Implications for limits to development from Nicaraguan Sign Language 
users.  Research among a special population of deaf people has recently offered a 
unique way to study theory of mind development in groups with delayed exposure to 
language.  In 2006, Morgan and Kegl looked at this distinctive group, users of 
Nicaraguan Sign Language (ISN).  This population is unique in that ISN first appeared 
among deaf children that arrived at special education schools in the 1970s and early 
1980s; these children developed an early form of the language.  The language further 
expanded when a second group of children arrived at the schools in the mid-1980s.  
More recent examination of the two groups shows that the second cohort displays a 
more developed form of the language than the first cohort (e.g., Senghas, 1995; 2003).  
This allows for a new way to investigate the nature of the relationship between 
language development and false-belief understanding. 
 Participants in the study by Morgan and Kegl were aged 7 to 39 years and were 
separated into two groups: participants who were exposed to ISN by 10 years of age 
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(early signers) and those who were exposed to ISN after 10 years of age (late signers).  
Participants were tested on the “thought pictures” task previously used by Woolfe et al. 
(2002) and on a non-verbal cartoon task designed to elicit mental state talk.  The non-
verbal cartoon task involved the retelling of a short non-verbal cartoon by the 
participants to a fluent adult signer.  The cartoon focuses on moral dilemmas faced by 
the main character, Mr. Koumal.  For scoring purposes, five adult fluent signers 
completed the task and transcripts were coded by the authors and trained research 
assistants with intercoder reliability above 90%.  A total of eight core mental states 
were mentioned by all five fluent adult signers, which made up the standard narrative 
content against which participants’ narratives could be compared.  The eight mental 
states used in scoring were lack of knowledge, knowledge/belief, doubt, desire, 
thinking, decision, purpose/goal, and deception.  Early sign access acted as a strong 
predictor of performance on both tasks; however, late signers were still able to 
demonstrate a general ability to use mental state expressions in a narrative.  Length of 
exposure to ISN was not related to performance on the false-belief task, but it was 
related to participants’ narrative abilities.  The amount of exposure to ISN appeared to 
influence the ability to talk about mental states in a narrative; better signers were able to 
talk more in general and about mental states than those with less exposure.  
Viewing the two tasks in conjunction, the participants that passed the false-
belief task talked more about mental states than those that failed the task.  Of the 14 
who passed, 10 mentioned all 8 possible mental state propositions in their narratives; 
this is in sharp contrast to the group of 8 who did not pass, of which none mentioned all 
8 propositions.  There appears to be a strong relationship between the two tasks for 
picking out aspects of theory of mind reasoning skills.  While this study reinforces the 
theory put forth by many researchers in this field that there is a critical relationship 
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between language development and theory of mind, it also shows that late exposure to 
language does not preclude deaf children from developing theory of mind abilities.   
Pyers and Senghas (2009) also aimed to investigate the relationship between 
language development and false-belief understanding by working with ISN signers.  
The study examined mental-state vocabulary and performance on a low-verbal false-
belief task in two cohorts of ISN users: adults and adolescents.  Mental-state vocabulary 
was assessed using an elicitation task that involved watching a set of 30-second live-
action video clips designed to elicit mental state talk (Gale, de Villiers, de Villiers, & 
Pyers, 1996).  The false-belief assessment involved a picture-completion task based on 
the unexpected transfer task.  Participants had to choose a sixth card that completed a 
story, illustrating where a character would look for an object in both true-belief and 
false-belief conditions. 
Participants were tested at two time points, 2 years apart – in 2001 and 2003.  At 
Time 1, the first cohort was comprised of 8 signers, all of whom were exposed to ISN 
before 1984 (the point in time when the language benefitted from the second cohort in 
schools).  The second cohort was comprised of 10 signers, all of whom were exposed to 
NSL in 1984 or later.  At Time 1 participants from the first cohort signed significantly 
fewer mental-state terms than second-cohort participants.  The two groups did not differ 
either on the length of their narratives or on the number of desire-state verbs, suggesting 
that the second cohort had developed mental-state vocabulary that the first cohort 
lacked.  On the false-belief trials, performance correlated negatively with age; that is, 
the younger participants from the second cohort outperformed the older, first-cohort 
participants.  At Time 2, the groups no longer differed significantly in mental-state term 
production, the result of first-cohort participants increasing their production of mental-
state vocabulary from Time 1 to Time 2.  The first-cohort participants also improved 
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significantly in their performance on the false-belief task, and at Time 2 the two cohorts 
no longer differed significantly.   
These results demonstrate a narrowing of the gap between the cohorts over the 
course of the study.  The data collection for this study was well timed; between 2001 
and 2003 first- and second-cohort signers began socializing at the deaf association.  The 
authors hypothesized that “with the increasing contact, first-cohort signers were 
exposed to a form of [ISN] that was richer than their own and that included the new 
mental-state words produced by their younger peers” (p. 810).  While there may be a 
transition from an implicit understanding of mental states to an explicit understanding 
of false belief, it appears language may enable this transition, and in certain unusual 
cases, this transition may not occur until decades later than what is typical.  It seems 
this, more than anything, truly demonstrates that the problems experienced by late-
signing deaf are indeed delays, rather than deficits in development.   
Effects of receptive language skills and executive functioning.  While many 
studies have taken chronological and mental age into consideration when completing 
analyses, Jackson (2001) also investigated the relationship between receptive language 
skills, executive functioning, and theory of mind abilities.   Children were categorized 
in one of four groups, this time including children from a hearing impaired unit (HIU) 
in addition to groups of native signers, late signers, and oral deaf children.  Hearing 
controls were also included in the study.  Three false-belief tasks, four nonverbal 
executive function tasks, and either the BSL Receptive Skills Test (Hellman, Holmes, 
& Woll, 1999) or the British Picture Vocabulary Scale were administered to all 
children.   
 Analysis showed that language ability and theory of mind ability were 
significantly and positively related.  Age was also correlated with language ability for 
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both deaf and hearing children.  However, age was an underlying factor of the 
relationship between theory of mind and language ability for both deaf children with 
signing parents and hearing children, but not for non-native signing, HIU, or oral deaf 
children.  Additional analyses showed that executive function performance in deaf 
children was not related to theory of mind.   
 Woolfe, Want, and Siegal (2002) also investigated the links between theory of 
mind, receptive language skills, and executive functioning, although they used a 
procedure somewhat different from the typical false-belief task in order to assess theory 
of mind in deaf children.  The “thought pictures” task was chosen to minimize verbal 
task-performance requirements and was administered in two studies.  Deaf children 
were tested in BSL by a deaf experimenter, a native BSL signer himself.   
In Study 1, children were tested using the BSL Receptive Skills Test (Herman et 
al., 1999), the “thought pictures” task (Wellman, Hollander & Schult, 1996), and 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1963).  In the four trials of the thought pictures 
task, the child was asked to identify what a character believed was hiding behind a flap 
and what was truly there, assessing the central character’s true beliefs and false beliefs 
in each trial.  Hearing children received the thought pictures task as a measure of age 
norms for typically developing children.  Despite being significantly younger, again the 
native signers significantly outperformed the late signers on the theory of mind tasks.  
When compared with the hearing children, the difference between late and native 
signers was comparable with the difference between performances from hearing 3- and 
4-year-olds.  This result remained even when participants in both groups of signers 
were matched for BSL proficiency and spatial mental age.   
Study 2 was designed to examine the role of executive functioning in both 
groups of deaf children, and an additional measure of false representations (in this case, 
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physical rather than mental) was included.  Again native-signing children outperformed 
late-signing children on the theory of mind tasks, although they did not differ 
significantly on tests of either false physical representation or executive functioning.  
Therefore, the differences between native and late signers do not appear to be due to 
general differences in representation or executive functioning.  
Evaluation of executive functioning among deaf children has been expanded to 
include deaf adolescents and young adults as well.  Remine, Care, and Brown (2008) 
evaluated the relationship between language ability and verbal and nonverbal executive 
functioning among oral deaf students between the ages of 12 and 16 years.  They found 
a significant relationship between expressive language and verbal measures of 
executive functioning, with expressive language ability accounting for over 40% of the 
variance in performance on an executive functioning test.  However, no significant 
relationship was found between language ability and non-verbal measures of executive 
functioning.  Further, they found that participants demonstrated age-appropriate spatial 
planning and organization skills, as well as rule learning and inhibition.   
Parasnis, Samar, and Berent (2003) found that young deaf adults of hearing 
parents showed greater impulsivity than a standard normative sample, which was in 
contrast with Marschark and Everhart’s (1999) findings of no difference in impulsivity 
between deaf and hearing children in a range of age groups.  Rhine (2002) found that 
deaf children of hearing parents received higher negative ratings on the inhibit, shift, 
and working memory subsets of the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Functions 
(BRIEF; Gioia et al., 2000, as cited in Rhine, 2002) than did hearing children.  Hauser, 
Lukomski, and Isquith (2007, as cited in Hauser, Lukomski, & Hillman, 2008) 
administered the adult version of the BRIEF to deaf and hearing college students.  They 
found no general difference between the deaf and hearing students; however, they did 
 
 
60 
 
find that deaf students with deaf parents had better ratings than deaf students with 
hearing parents.  These studies give a conflicting presentation of how executive 
functioning abilities among deaf individuals ranging in age from childhood to young 
adulthood relate to those among similarly aged hearing individuals.   
Executive functioning research evaluating skills among deaf children with 
cochlear implants paints a clearer picture.  Beer, Pisoni, and Kronenberger (2009) 
reported that analysis of BRIEF scores among children using cochlear implants showed 
problems in shifting, emotional control, initiation, working memory, planning and 
organization, and organization of materials in comparison with a group of typical 
hearing children.  Similar examination of BRIEF scores among 45 cochlear implant 
users between 5 and 18 years of age showed similar results: significantly elevated 
scores on inhibit and working memory scales (Beer, Kronenberger, & Pisoni, 2011).  
The researchers suggest that executive functioning may be impaired due to the period of 
auditory deprivation in early life.  These findings are consistent with the finding that a 
sample of deaf children with cochlear implants scored lower than a normal-hearing 
sample on working memory, fluency-speed, and inhibition-concentration, despite 
having above average nonverbal IQ (Kronenberger, Pisoni, Henning, & Colson, 2013).   
Figueras, Edwards, and Langdon (2008) assessed executive function and 
language in deaf children (aged 8 to 12 years) both with and without cochlear implants.  
Both implanted and nonimplanted deaf children performed lower on tests of oral 
receptive language and executive functioning than a group of age-matched hearing 
children.  No significant differences were found between implanted and nonimplanted 
deaf children.  A positive correlation was found between language ability and executive 
functioning in both hearing and deaf children.  The researchers suggested that deaf 
children’s disinhibition and poor working memory may have been due to poor language 
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skills, as that may have made it difficult for them to use internal speech to hold 
information in mind and use it to plan and guide their behaviour.  The authors 
concluded that “deaf children’s deficits in EF are not an intrinsic consequence of 
deafness but are linked to delayed language acquisition (in the same way that deaf 
children’s delays in Theory of Mind development are associated with delayed 
language)” (p. 374).   
Deafness and metalinguistic awareness.  McLarey (1995) stated that a deaf 
child needs “to have a certain meta-linguistic awareness which can aid in his 
understanding of what sign language is, of what Swedish [or English] is and of the fact 
that the two are different languages” (p. 14).  While there has been some research into 
the connection between deafness and metalinguistic awareness, the majority of this 
research focuses on reading and writing of a spoken language.  Knight and Swanwick 
(1999) highlighted the deficit in more theoretical research on metalinguistic awareness 
among deaf individuals:  
One particular area which needs to be further developed is our understanding of 
deaf children’s metalinguistic awareness.  Metalinguistic awareness requires a 
more abstract knowledge and understanding of language which involves the 
ability to think and talk about language, to recognise characteristics of a 
language and to see how language is structured. (p. 167) 
Miller (2013) evaluated the similarities and differences in processing of written 
text by deaf high school and university students of different reading levels that used 
Hebrew as their spoken language and Israeli Sign Language as their mode of manual 
communication.  Miller hypothesized that deaf individuals who had high reading 
comprehension levels would have higher metalinguistic awareness than their 
counterparts with lower reading comprehension levels.  Findings did not support this 
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hypothesis; results showed no link between deaf individuals’ reading comprehension 
and their metalinguistic skills.   
Bilingualism and Theory of Mind  
 Several studies have been conducted evaluating the effect of bilingualism on 
theory of mind development.  Goetz (2003) evaluated theory of mind development 
among English/Mandarin bilinguals versus English monolinguals and Mandarin 
Chinese monolinguals.  The children were given appearance-reality, level 2 
perspective-taking, and false belief tasks.  The bilinguals were tested in each of their 
languages.  Results showed that 4-year-old children outperformed 3-year-old children 
in each group.  Both of the monolingual groups performed similarly, and the bilinguals 
performed significantly better than monolinguals in both groups.   
 Farhadian et al. (2010) found similar results when assessing theory of mind 
development among Kurdish-Persian bilingual and Persian monolingual pre-schoolers.  
Children were given two unexpected transfer and one unexpected contents tasks; a 
larger proportion of bilingual children (45%) passed all theory of mind tasks than 
monolingual children (14%).  A hierarchical multiple regression revealed that 
bilingualism contributed significantly toward predicting preschoolers’ theory of mind 
development when age and verbal ability were controlled for.   
 Kovács (2009) sought to assess whether the advantage witnessed among 
bilingual children in terms of theory of mind development is due to advanced inhibitory 
control.  Kovács found that, despite having equal mean ages, both bilingual children 
outperformed the monolingual children on both a standard and a modified theory of 
mind task.  As the modified task was constructed to mimic a language-switch situation 
that bilingual children often encounter, and bilingual children performed similarly on 
the modified and standard tasks, the author concluded that the advantage witnessed 
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among bilingual children is likely not due to social experience, but rather due to 
heightened inhibitory control.  This provides evidence that maturing executive 
functions may contribute to solving standard ToM problems, as exposure from birth to 
two languages enhances development of EF (see Kovács & Mehler, 2009) and 
indirectly boosts ToM performance.   
 Rubio-Fernandez and Glucksberg (2012) were interested in the long-term 
effects of this bilingual advantage.  They used a traditional false belief task coupled 
with eye-tracking among bilingual and monolingual adults to see whether bilingual 
adults have an advantage over monolingual adults in false-belief reasoning, similarly to 
the difference found among children.  Findings indicated that adults in general have 
problems with interference from their own perspective when reasoning about others’ 
beliefs.  Bilinguals were found to be reliably less susceptible to this egocentric bias than 
were monolinguals.  Additionally, performance on the false belief task was significantly 
related to performance on an executive functioning task.  The authors argued that the 
advantage in terms of egocentrism for bilinguals is due to their early sociolinguistic 
sensitivity, and possibly enhanced executive control.   
 Bilingualism and executive functioning.  One of the primary researchers of 
executive functioning in bilinguals is Ellen Bialystok.  Bialystok and her colleagues 
have put forth many studies highlighting the fact that early bilingualism and continued 
use of multiple languages enhances certain cognitive processes among children (e.g., 
Bialystok, 1999; 2010; Bialystok, Craik, & Ryan, 2006; Bialystok & Viswanathan, 
2009).  In working with a group of Chinese-English bilingual children, Bialystok (1999) 
found that the bilingual children outperformed non-Chinese English monolingual 
children on the DCCS.  It was suggested that experience in switching between 
languages improves children’s cognitive control, which aids performance on this and 
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similar tasks.  More recently, Martin-Rhee and Bialystok (2008) assessed inhibitory 
control among bilingual and monolingual children.  Two tasks involving inhibition 
were administered – one involving inhibition of attention to a specific cue (e.g., Simon 
says game) and one requiring inhibition of a habitual response (e.g., day-night Stroop 
task).  Bilingual children outperformed monolinguals in terms of controlling their 
attention, but not regarding inhibition of prepotent responses.  This suggests that 
bilinguals may be particularly advanced on tasks requiring control over attention to 
competing cues, but not necessarily to tasks requiring control over competing 
responses.   
Additionally, Costa, Hernandez, and Sebastian-Galles (2008) found that 
bilingual children were not only faster in performing an attentional network task aimed 
at assessing orienting, alerting, and executive control, but they were also more efficient 
in these latter two networks.  The bilinguals were aided more by the presentation of an 
alerting cue and were better at resolving conflicting information.  Costa, Hernandez, 
Costa-Faidella, and Sebastian-Galles (2009) found evidence that bilinguals outperform 
monolinguals on tasks that require a great deal of monitoring resources.   
Kovács and Mehler (2009) assessed executive functioning among bilinguals and 
monolinguals in an attempt to determine whether early bilingual input leads to 
advantages in executive functioning prior to speech onset.  Seven-month-old bilingual 
infants were found to outperform monolinguals on executive functioning tasks.  During 
a cognitive control task, both bilingual and monolingual infants were taught to respond 
to a speech or visual cue to anticipate a reward on one side of a screen; however, only 
bilingual infants were able to successfully redirect their anticipatory looks when the cue 
began signalling the reward on the opposite side.  These results indicate that perceiving 
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and processing different languages was able to enhance executive functioning well 
before the onset of speech.   
In terms of bilingualism from birth versus later language learning, Carlson and 
Melzoff (2008) examined inhibitory control skills to determine the effects of early 
versus late bilingualism.  Carlson and Melzoff assessed multiple measures of executive 
functioning by administering a battery of tasks to three groups of kindergarteners.  The 
groups consisted of Spanish-English native bilinguals, English monolinguals, and 
English speakers who were enrolled in second-language immersion kindergarten.  The 
Spanish-English bilinguals did not differ on raw scores in comparison to the other two 
groups, despite having lower verbal scores and socioeconomic status as assessed by 
parent education and income levels.  After controlling for verbal scores, socioeconomic 
status, and age, they found that the native bilingual children outperformed both other 
groups on the battery.  Regarding specific tasks, the bilingual children showed a distinct 
advantage on tasks requiring management of conflicting attentional demands (conflict 
inhibition), but not on impulse-control tasks (delay inhibition).  Interestingly, Chastiotis 
et al. (2006) found that performance on conflict inhibition tasks was correlated with 
performance on false belief tasks, but delay inhibition was not correlated to false belief 
performance.  This suggests that, while researchers have proposed that advanced 
inhibitory control among bilingual children may explain their advantage on theory of 
mind related tasks, it appears that it may be more specifically related to the advanced 
ability to handle conflicting attentional demands.   
 Bilingualism and metalinguistic awareness.  Similarly as to with theory of 
mind development and executive functioning skills, bilinguals have been found to have 
enhanced metalinguistic awareness in comparison with their monolingual peers.  
Galambos and Hakuta (1988) examined the relationship between bilingualism and 
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metalinguistic awareness among a sample of Puerto Rican Spanish-English bilinguals.  
The children were enrolled in first through fifth grades in a transitional bilingual 
program in the U.S. A set of younger children were followed through two grades and 
assessed regarding their abilities to note and correct ungrammatical sentences in 
Spanish.  A set of older children were followed through two grades and were assessed 
regarding their abilities to detect ambiguity in sentences and to paraphrase the possible 
meanings of the sentence.  Results from both groups of students indicated that native 
language proficiency and degree of bilingualism both significantly predicted 
metalinguistic awareness.  That is, children with a higher degree of bilingualism, with 
the same level of Spanish proficiency, exhibited higher levels of metalinguistic 
awareness.   
 Cromdal (1999) also assessed metalinguistic awareness among bilinguals.  A 
sample of English-Swedish bilinguals was contrasted with a group of Swedish 
monolinguals on three tasks aimed at assessing metalinguistic awareness: symbol 
substitution, grammaticality judgment, and grammaticality correction.  The results of 
the study were consistent with past findings (e.g., Bialystok & Ryan, 1985; Galambos 
& Hakuta, 1988), that degree of bilingualism is related to degree of metalinguistic skill.  
More specifically, general bilingualism was found to have an effect on tasks requiring a 
high control of linguistic processing.   
Problem Statement 
Studies have been conducted assessing varying aspects of theory of mind among 
children from around the world, although the majority of these studies have been 
concentrated in Western societies, and more recently, East Asian societies.  While there 
have been a few cross-cultural studies conducted investigating mental state reasoning, 
these typically have included only a single non-Western culture, and varied task 
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methodology has made comparison of results difficult (Callaghan et al., 2005).  
Researchers have shown a relationship between the development of theory of mind and 
metalinguistic awareness among hearing children (e.g., Doherty, 2000; Doherty & 
Perner, 1998; Perner, Stummer et al., 2002).  Theory of mind development has also 
been shown to correlate with executive functioning development among hearing 
children (e.g., Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 2004; Carlson & Moses, 2001; Gordon & 
Olson, 1998, Kloo & Perner, 2003). Additionally, many studies have highlighted the 
fact that deaf children, particularly those born to hearing parents, tend to develop theory 
of mind skills at a delayed rate in comparison with hearing children (e.g., de Villiers & 
de Villiers, 2012; Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 1999; Schick, de Villiers, de Villiers, & 
Hoffmeister, 2007).   
Despite the extensive amount of research that has been conducted regarding the 
effect of language and cultural background on theory of mind, metalinguistic 
awareness, and executive functioning skills, there remain deficits of knowledge within 
the body of literature.  An in-depth assessment of how language background affects the 
development and intertwining of these skills is lacking, particularly in regards to the 
effects of deafness and bilingualism.  Furthermore, very little research regarding theory 
of mind development among African children has been conducted, despite the wealth of 
research involving children of other cultures worldwide.  While these gaps in the 
literature are of interest in and of themselves, a larger purpose can be served through 
investigations aimed at addressing these gaps; information gleaned can be used 
practically in identification of children at risk for delays and subsequent interventions 
and educational strategies aimed at countering delays.   
 
 
68 
 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this doctoral thesis was to examine the relationships between 
theory of mind, metalinguistic awareness, and executive functioning development.  
Effects of language and cultural background on development of these abilities were also 
of interest.  In order to assess the effect language experience has on developing these 
abilities, monolingual English-speaking, bilingual English and Spanish-speaking, deaf 
signing, and deaf oral children were included in in samples of Studies 1, 2, and 4.  To 
assess impact of cultural background on development, hearing and deaf children from 
the United Kingdom and Ghana were included in the samples of Studies 1, 2, and 3.  
Quantitative methods were used to assess the hypotheses developed that correspond 
with the study research questions, with some supporting qualitative analyses included in 
Study 3.  Data collection methods included a variety of tasks designed to assess theory 
of mind, metalinguistic awareness, and executive functioning skills.  Surveys were used 
to collect demographic data regarding the participants involved.  Full details of the 
methods and instruments used are described in regards to each study in Chapters 2 – 5.  
Research Questions 
 Six research questions were used to guide the study.  These research questions 
were: 
Research Question 1: Are there relationships among theory of mind, metalinguistic 
awareness, and executive functioning development?  If so, what is the nature of those 
relationships?  
Research Question 2: Does language background affect the development of theory of 
mind? 
Research Question 3: Does language background affect the development of 
metalinguistic awareness? 
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Research Question 4: How do performance rates on a variety of theory-of-mind-related 
tasks vary among deaf children? 
Research Question 5: Does cultural background affect the development of theory of 
mind? 
Research Question 6: Does cultural background affect the development of 
metalinguistic awareness? 
Definition of Terms 
Bilingual.  There are a variety of definitions of bilingualism used by 
researchers.  Given that young children (aged 7 years and younger) were included as the 
bilingual group in Study 4, it is likely that many of these children fit a stricter definition 
of bilingualism as posed by Bloomfield (1993, as cited in Butler & Hakuta, 2004): 
“native-like control of two languages” (p. 114).  However, to avoid being too 
prohibitive in using this definition, the present study employed the fairly broad 
definition proposed by Butler and Hakuta (2004), that bilinguals are “individuals or 
groups of people who obtain communicative skills, with various degrees of proficiency, 
in oral and/or written forms, in order to interact with speakers of one or more language 
in a given society” (p. 115).   
Deaf.  While the most basic definition of deafness is a partial or total inability to 
hear (Encyclopædia Britanica, 2013), the term ‘deaf’ takes on different meanings within 
deafness research dependent on situation.  Emmorey (2002) highlighted the differences 
in the terms deaf and Deaf as such:  
Lane et al. (1996) argue that the use of capitalized Deaf for children reflects that 
fact that if a child with little or no hearing is given the opportunity, he or she 
would naturally acquire a signed language and would be a member of Deaf 
culture.  Similarly, Navajo children or Black children are called Navajo or Black 
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as soon as they are born, even though they have not yet been exposed to Navajo 
or Black culture.  As with adults, I use deaf when deafness itself is the critical 
issue and Deaf to emphasize sign language acquisition or use. (p. 8) 
Executive functioning.  The term executive functioning refers to a set of mental 
processes that are related to self-control of thought, attention, or action (Doherty, 2009).  
This “set of higher-order cognitive processes” included “impulse control, set-shifting, 
… and working memory” (Bernier, Carlson, Deschenes, & Matte-Gagne, 2012, p. 12). 
False belief.  This term refers to the discrepancy between what one believes is 
the state of the world and what is the actual state of the world (Doherty, 2009).  A false 
belief may cause an individual to “behave in ways that cannot be predicted or explained 
by reference to the real situation” (Doherty, 2009, p. 8).  
False belief task.  According to Doherty (2009), the false belief task is 
“considered to be the diagnostic test of ‘theory of mind’” (p. 213).  He further stated 
that “’theory of mind’ is informally taken to require the ability to predict action on the 
basis of a character’s belief, rather than on the basis of the real state of affairs.  In order 
to distinguish between these two possibilities, the belief in question needs to be false” 
(p. 213).  The two commonly used forms of the false belief task are the unexpected 
transfer task and the unexpected contents task, as previously described.    
Metalinguistic awareness.  Metalinguistic awareness is defined as “an 
awareness of the underlying linguistic nature of language use” (Malakoff & Hakuta, 
1991, p. 147), that is, the understanding of the representational nature of language 
(Doherty, 2009).  Cazden (1974) defined metalinguistic awareness more formally as 
“the ability to make language forms opaque and attend to them in and for themselves” 
(p. 29).  Malakoff and Hakuta (1991) stated that “a metalinguistic task, in the most 
general sense, is one which requires the individual to think about the linguistic nature of 
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the message: to attend to and reflect on the structural features of language” (pp. 147-
148).  Doherty and Perner (1998) further argued that metalinguistic awareness has its 
roots in metarepresentation, with support from Kamawar and Olson (2009).  
Theory of mind.  Premack and Woodruff defined theory of mind quite simply 
as “the individual imputes mental states to himself and others” (1978, p. 515).  
However, since that definition the term has been used in a variety of ways and is now 
“best treated as an umbrella term for children’s understanding of mental states,” with 
particular attention paid to belief and desire (Doherty, 2009, p. 7).  
Significance  
 While there has been extensive research conducted over the past three decades 
on theory of mind and metalinguistic awareness, several key questions remain 
unanswered.  The goal of the research presented in this thesis was to address some of 
these key questions and help bridge the significant gaps in literature.  Study 1 was 
conducted to further establish whether theory of mind development and metalinguistic 
awareness are related, and whether this relationship is associated with, or even driven 
by, development of executive functioning skills.  Study 2 and Experiments 3A and 3B 
were conducted to probe deeper into the issue of theory of mind development and 
deafness.  Particular interest was placed on effects of task manipulation on 
performance, as well as whether theory of mind and metalinguistic awareness are 
related among deaf children.  Study 3 was conducted to evaluate cultural effects on 
theory of mind development, particularly by examining false-belief task performance 
among both hearing and deaf Ghanaian children.  Study 4 was conducted to evaluate 
the effects of language development, namely Spanish-English bilingualism, on 
development of theory of mind and metalinguistic awareness skills.  
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 The results of the research conducted for this thesis will have implications 
beyond contributing to the existing literature.  Gaining a greater understanding of the 
underlying mechanisms driving the development of theory of mind and metalinguistic 
awareness may aid in the creation of intervention strategies aimed at children at risk of 
experiencing developmental delays.  In order to plan effective interventions and 
determine best practices in working with young children to ensure proper development, 
it is vital to gain as complete a view of how development takes place and what 
differences may arise in developmental patterns due to environmental and atypical 
developmental factors.   
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Chapter Two 
 Study 1: Hearing Replication and Extension 
Introduction 
Between the ages of 3 and 5 years children typically develop the understanding 
that others may have different beliefs or desires to their own, and accordingly, 
recognise that others can indeed have false beliefs, or think something about a state of 
affairs that is untrue.  Children’s theory of mind is often measured using this key point, 
as it is critical to passing what is now a common theory of mind assessment, the false-
belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  It is around this same age when children are able 
to complete tasks which require the ability to understand that language is 
representational, that it carries meaning.  Several studies have demonstrated that this 
timing is not coincidental, but that false-belief understanding and metalinguistic 
awareness are related even beyond age and verbal ability (Doherty, 2000; Doherty & 
Perner, 1998).   
Metalinguistic awareness requires the ability to reflect on language as an object 
and the ability to control, monitor, and plan linguistic processing.  Doherty (2009) 
suggests this definition for metalinguistic awareness is then comparable to that for 
theory of mind; while theory of mind involves reflection on mental states, 
metalinguistic awareness involves reflection on language.   
Doherty and Perner (1998) showed empirically that the traditional false belief 
task correlated strongly with a synonym task, a measure of metalinguistic awareness.  
This relationship was maintained even after accounting for control tasks and verbal 
intelligence, supporting the idea that both tasks relate to a development of 
understanding representations.  Doherty and Perner concluded that the association 
between the metalinguistic tasks and the false belief task was due to the 
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metarepresentational nature of the tasks.  This hypothesis was further supported by 
Perner, Stummer et al. (2002) with the finding that the relationship extends to 
hierarchically related words, such as rabbit versus animal.  Perner, Stummer et al. 
(2002) found that a combined measure of this new categories task and the synonym task 
correlated with false belief when given as judgement-based tasks (r = .67, p < .001, 
partialling out age and verbal intelligence) or production-based tasks (r = .58, p < .005).   
Perner, Stummer et al. acknowledged that executive demands on children might 
explain why results on an alternative naming categories task resulted in findings similar 
to the synonyms task.  In an attempt to address this executive demand hypothesis, two 
additional tasks similar in format to the synonym and categories tasks were introduced 
in the 2002 study, the colour/colour (CC) task and the part/part (PP) task.  In the CC 
task a puppet names one of two colours present in a picture and the child must name the 
other colour present, with a similar design for the PP task.  According to Perner, 
Stummer et al., these tasks should present the same Stroop-like executive demands as 
the synonym and categories tasks, and therefore should be as difficult.  Yet, 
performance on these two tasks was near ceiling (87% correct on all CC items, 92% 
correct on all PP items) whereas performance on the synonym and categories tasks 
ranged from 21% to 42% correct on all items, providing evidence against the executive 
demand hypothesis.   
Farrar and Ashwell (2012) further tested this hypothesis using direct measures 
of executive demand and metalinguistic rhyming tasks designed to assess phonological 
awareness.  The semantic version of the task included a semantically-related distracter 
from the target rhyming word, not present in the non-semantic version.  Children also 
took part in measures of theory of mind as well as the measures of executive 
functioning.  Study 1 used a shortened version of the dimensional card sort task 
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(DCCS) (Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995) as a measure of inhibitory control and the 
Woodcock-Johnson Memory for Sentences (WRMT-R; Woodcock & Johnson, 1989, as 
cited in Farrar & Ashwell, 2012) as a measure of general verbal memory.  Study 2 
included a measure of semantic relatedness and the day-night task (Gerstadt, Hong, & 
Diamond, 1994) as a measure of inhibitory control typically used in theory of mind 
research.  Both studies showed a link between phonological awareness and theory of 
mind performance, although the non-semantic rhyming task relation was weaker, 
presumably because the metalinguistic demands are not as high due to semantic 
associations being low.  Measures of inhibitory control and memory for sentences were 
not related to the rhyming tasks after controlling for age in the individual studies, 
although they did correlate moderately with rhyme in the aggregate.  However, when 
controlling for memory for sentences and inhibitory control measures, the relationship 
between theory of mind and rhyming tasks remained significant.  In a hierarchical 
regression for predicting total rhyming, only verbal mental age (as assessed by the 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test – Third Edition; Dunn & Dunn, 1997) and theory of 
mind were significant predictors.  Farrar and Ashwell concluded that executive 
functioning, inhibitory control in particular, is an unlikely explanation of the 
relationship between metalinguistic awareness and theory of mind; they suggested the 
nature of the related emergence is due to children’s developing ability to shift between 
perspectives.   
 While Farrar and Ashwell (2012) found a relationship between metalinguistic 
awareness and theory of mind, success on the rhyming tasks relies on word sound rather 
than meaning, making perspective-taking less salient, particularly for the non-semantic 
task.  The present study aims to further examine the relationships between theory of 
mind, metalinguistic awareness and executive functioning using an alternative naming 
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task, for which perspective taking is key, similar to that used by Perner, Stummer et al. 
(2002).  While Perner, Stummer et al. report that Stummer found significant positive 
relationships between false belief and categories tasks when controlling for age and 
verbal intelligence (r = .42, p ≤ .05, 1997; r = .65, p ≤ .01, 2001, see Perner, Stummer et 
al., 2002, Table 2.1), data from Perner, Stummer et al.’s study show that this 
relationship was no longer significant when controlling for these factors (r = .25, p ≥ 
.05 for production task, r = .32, p ≥ .05 for judgement task).   
The research question that guided Study 1 was Research Question 1: Are there 
relationships among theory of mind, metalinguistic awareness, and executive 
functioning development?  Experiment 1A was designed to examine the relationship 
between theory of mind and metalinguistic awareness directly, in part to determine the 
replicability of Stummer’s findings, as well as to create a baseline of performance and 
investigate the types of errors common on the alternative naming task.  Additionally, 
while findings have shown the relations between the synonyms task, the alternative 
naming task, and the false belief task, these findings occasionally have not been robust, 
so additional attempts at replicability can only strengthen the base argument that 
metalinguistic awareness and theory of mind development are related.  Finally, the 
decision was made to use the alternative naming task versus the synonym or homonym 
tasks given that issues arose during the attempted creation of like tasks using sign 
language.  The alternative naming task lent itself well to be reworked using sign 
language, so for the purpose of comparability this task was chosen above the others for 
assessing metalinguistic awareness.   
Versions of the alternative naming task and colour/colour control task were 
developed to be administered along with a standard false-belief unexpected transfer task 
and a measure of verbal intelligence.  Experiment 1B built upon this by incorporating 
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an additional unexpected transfer task and two measures of executive functioning, the 
DCCS and Day/Night task, as there had been no direct examinations of the relations 
between alternative naming and false belief tasks with executive functions to date.   
Experiment 1A Method 
Participants.  Thirty-one children (15 boys, 16 girls) from one nursery school 
in Stirling, Scotland participated.  Ages ranged from 2;8 (2 years, 8 months) to 4;9 
(mean age 4;0, SD = 6.88 months).  
Design.  Each child was tested on four tasks in one session lasting roughly 10-
15 minutes.  The tasks were a false belief unexpected transfer task (FB), the alternative 
naming (AN) task, the colour/colour control (CC) task, and the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) short form (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Pintillie, 1982).  The 
presentation of the CC and AN tasks were counterbalanced, with the FB task given in 
between in order to break up the two similarly-designed tasks.  The BPVS was 
administered at the end of each session.   
Procedure.  Each child was tested individually in a corner of the nursery 
classrooms.   
Sally FB.  The Sally FB task was based on the false belief task used by Doherty 
(2000), and was very similar in structure to Peterson and Siegal’s adaptation of Baron-
Cohen et al.’s (1985) Sally-Ann test (Peterson & Siegal, 1995; 1999).  In this task, the 
child was shown a story acted out with two small dolls (1 male, 1 female), one small 
black jar, one small black box, and one marble.  Sally first put her marble in the box, 
then went out to play.  While she was gone, Tony moved the marble to the jar, and then 
also went out to play.  Sally returned and the child was asked three questions.   
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Belief question: Where will Sally first look for her marble? 
Reality question: Where is the marble really? 
Memory question: Where did Sally put the marble in the beginning?  
 The script for the Sally FB task was: 
In our next game we have a box, a jar, and two dolls.  This is a little girl, her 
name is Sally. What’s her name?  Right, Sally!  This is a little boy, his name is 
Tony.  What’s his name?  Right, Tony!   
 
Now, Sally has a marble.  Sally puts her marble into the box.  Now Sally goes 
out to play.  What does Tony do while she’s gone?   
 
He takes the marble out of the box and puts it in the jar, like this.  Now Tony 
goes out to play. 
 
Here comes Sally back in.   
 
Where will Sally first look for her marble? 
Where is the marble really? 
Where did Sally put the marble in the beginning? 
 
Great job!  Now Sally and Tony are going to go away and play together. 
 
AN task.  The AN task was based on the superordinate/basic categories task 
(NN-categories) used as a metalinguistic awareness measure by Perner, Stummer et al. 
(2002).  The decision was made to use the AN task rather than a synonym or homonym 
task as used by Doherty (e.g., Doherty, 2000) as the use of synonyms or homonyms in 
signing versions of the task with deaf children proved prohibitive.  As the NN-
categories task was easiest to adapt into sign language, it was chosen over the other 
forms of metalinguistic tasks considered.  
  The AN task comprised three phases: the vocabulary check, the training phase, 
and the test phase. For the vocabulary check, four cards (all A4 in size) were used with 
four pictures on each.  One or two of the pictures were critical items which were later 
used in either the training phase or the test phase (e.g., apple/fruit, milk/drink).  
Children were asked to point to, e.g., an “apple” on the first pass through the cards, and 
 
 
79 
 
then a “fruit” on the second pass through the cards.   In this manner it was established 
that the child could identify each of the critical items by both of the names that would 
be used later in the experiment. 
In the experimental portion of the task, the child was told that the experimenter 
had different pictures, and each picture had two different names.  First the experimenter 
would say one name, and then the child should say the other name.  There was one 
large picture centred on each of the six cards used in the rest of the task, with the first 
two cards serving as training cards.  If the child struggled to think of a different name 
during the training phase, the child could be encouraged and helped to come up with the 
second name. In the test phase, no such help was given.   
The four final cards made up the test phase, and each card was shown twice, in 
two full passes through all four cards.  Whether the experimenter said the basic or 
superordinate term first was counterbalanced among participants, and the two levels 
were alternated for each picture.  If the child was told the basic term, e.g., milk, on the 
first pass through the cards, then in the second pass he was told the superordinate term, 
i.e., drink, and vice versa.  If the child was able to give both the basic and superordinate 
terms for a picture, that picture was coded as a correct pair.  If the child was only able 
to give one or none of the terms for a picture, that picture was coded as an incorrect 
pair.  
The script for the AN task was: 
Ok now in this game we’re going to look at some pictures.  When I say a word, 
you show me which picture it is.  Ok let’s give it a try. 
 
(Order of lists counterbalanced) 
Point to the apple.    Point to the fruit. 
Point to the dog.  Point to the books. 
Point to the drink.  Point to the milk. 
Point to the rose.  Point to the flower. 
Point to the plane.  Point to the shoe. 
Point to the animal.  Point to the cat. 
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Point to the burger.   Point to the food. 
Point to the chair.   Point to the bear. 
Point to the bear.  Point to the sun. 
Point to the bird.  Point to the owl. 
Point to the ring.  Point to the house. 
Point to the carrot.   Point to the ring. 
 
Very good!  Now, I have some pictures.  Each picture has 2 names.  I’ll say the 
first name, then you say the other name.  Ok?  Let’s give it a try. 
 
(Practice phase items) 
This is a fruit.  What else is it?   This is a rose.  What else is it? 
 
(Items counterbalanced) 
This is a drink (/milk).  What else is it? This is milk.  What else is it? 
This is a cat (/an animal).  What else is it? This is an animal.  What else is it? 
This is food (/a burger).  What else is it? This is a burger.  What else is it? 
This is an owl (/a bird).  What else is it? This is a bird.  What else is it? 
 
 Great job!   
 
CC task.  The CC task was adapted from the CC-task used by Perner, Stummer 
et al. (2002).  However, rather than using a puppet that names the colours, the 
experimenter herself named the colours during the game.  Similarly to the AN task, the 
CC task was also comprised of three phases: the colour check, the training phase, and 
the experimental phase. In the colour check, the child was shown an A4 card with six 
circles, each one of the following colours: red, blue, green, yellow, orange, and brown.  
The child was asked to point to each colour individually to establish that the child could 
identify each of the different colours.   
In the experimental portion of the task, the child was told that the experimenter 
had different pictures, and each picture had two different colours.  First the 
experimenter would say one colour, and then the child should say the other colour.  
During the training phase, which consisted of the first two of six A4 cards, the child 
was allowed help and encouragement to name the second colour.  In the test phase, no 
such help was allowed, however the procedure remained the same.  Each child saw each 
of the four experimental cards one time, and each picture was marked as correct or 
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incorrect.  Which colour the experimenter named first for each card was 
counterbalanced between children.   
The script for the CC task was: 
Ok, the first game is about colours.  You know your colours?  Good! 
 
Show me, where is blue?  Where is brown?  Where is yellow?  Where is green?  
Where is red?  Where is orange? 
 
Very good!  Now, I have some pictures.  Each picture has 2 colours.  I’ll say the 
first colour, then you say the other colour.  Ok?  Let’s give it a try. 
 
(Colours counterbalanced) 
This picture is red (/yellow).  What other colour is it? 
This picture is brown (/blue).  What other colour is it? 
This ball is red (/blue).  What other colour is it? 
This turtle is brown (/green).  What other colour is it? 
This butterfly is blue (/yellow).  What other colour is it? 
This present is yellow (/red).  What other colour is it? 
 
 Good job! 
 
BPVS.  The BPVS short-form (Dunn et al., 1982) was used to assess verbal 
mental age.  Standard scores were calculated for each participant’s raw score based on 
chronological age.  Standard scores were included in the analyses where BPVS was 
specified. 
Experiment 1A Results 
Sally FB task.  Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) required correct responses to the test 
question and control questions, rather than just the test question, for a passing score on 
the false belief task.  Many researchers have also elected to use this more stringent 
requirement (e.g., Jackson, 2001; Peterson & Siegal, 1998), and as such this criterion 
was used for determining passing scores on this and all false belief tasks administered 
and reported throughout this thesis.  Approximately half (51.6%) of the children passed 
the test (see Table 2.1).  All of the children who answered the belief question correctly 
also answered both the reality and memory control questions correctly.  A total of 4 
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children (12.9%) failed a control question; one child failed the reality question, three 
children failed the memory question, and none failed both.  
AN task.  Of a maximum of four, the mean for correct pairs given was 1.68 (SD 
= 1.33).  The trials on which children had to provide the superordinate rather than the 
basic term (mean correct of four = 1.74) were significantly more difficult for the 
children than the subordinate to basic trials (mean correct of four = 3.23), t(30) = 8.03, 
p < .001.  The animal to cat item was particularly easy for children, with 100% correct 
responses.  The converse of this item, cat to animal, was the most difficult for children, 
with only 25.8% getting it correct.  In order to compare performance on the AN task to 
performance from the FB more directly, children who were able to provide at least three 
of four correct pairs were considered as passing the task, whereas those who were only 
able to provide two or fewer correct pairs were considered as failing the task.  The 
decision to use the criterion of three out of four pairs correct was made due to the low 
number of children achieving all four pairs (just 6.5%), while also maintaining a score 
of over 50% passing.  As such, when looked at in terms of passing or failing, 
performance on the AN task (35.5% correct) was weaker than for the FB task (see 
Table 2.1).   
CC task.  Again, if we look at the task in terms of passing (with at least three 
correct trials) or failing, children performed better on the CC task than on either the AN 
task or FB tasks (see Table 2.1).  Mean correct trials completed was 3.19 of four (SD = 
1.40).     
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Table 2.1 
Percentage of Children Passing Each Task in Experiment 1A 
Tasks % Passing (n = 31) 
FB 51.6 
AN 35.5 
CC 74.2 
 
Comparison of tasks.  Table 2.2 shows correlations between the two measures 
of age and performance on the FB, AN, and CC tasks.  Partial correlations controlling 
for both chronological age (in months) and standard score on the BPVS are represented 
in parentheses.  Although FB was correlated with both the AN and CC tasks, only the 
relationship between FB and AN remained significant when age and BPVS score were 
partialled out.  
Table 2.2  
Correlations between Age Measures and the Experimental Tasks of Experiment 1A 
(Partial correlations controlling for age and verbal mental age in parentheses)  
 
 
 FB AN CC BPVS 
Age .381* .393* .258 -.285 
FB - .800*** .417* .034 
AN (.758***) - .358* .109 
CC (.344) (.268) - .042 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
In order to compare all tasks, children were scored as passing the AN task if 
they correctly produced three out of four pairs and passing the CC task if they correctly 
answered three out of four trials.  The FB task was significantly more difficult than the 
CC task (McNemar, binomial, p = .039), as was the AN task (p = .002).  The FB and 
AN tasks did not differ significantly in difficulty (p = .125). 
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Experiment 1A Discussion 
The results from Experiment 1A are consistent with the findings from Stummer 
(1997; 2001, both as cited by Perner, Stummer et al., 2002).  However, while Stummer 
(1997; 2001) found robust relationships between the alternative naming task and false-
belief tasks when controlling for age and verbal intelligence, the significant correlations 
between these tasks were not maintained in the broader Perner, Stummer et al. (2002) 
study when controlling for these factors.  This led to some question as to the robustness 
of Stummer’s (1997; 2001) findings when taking age and mental ability into account.  
The results of the present study have provided further credence for Stummer’s findings, 
as the strong positive relationship between false belief and alternative naming was once 
again found and was maintained when accounting for age factors.   
What was consistent with Perner, Stummer et al.’s (2002) findings, however, was 
the fact that the alternative naming task was significantly more difficult for children 
than were the other “say-something-different” tasks implemented by Perner, Stummer 
et al. – the CC task and the PP task.  Perner, Stummer et al. argued that these tasks, 
which are similar in design and method, should elicit the same Stroop-like executive 
demands on children as the alternative naming task under the executive demand 
hypothesis, and therefore should result in similar performance on the three tasks.  
Similarly to as found by Perner, Stummer et al., children had significantly more 
difficulty with the AN task (35.5% passing) than they did with the similarly structured 
CC task (74.2% passing).  This supports Perner, Stummer et al.’s stance against the 
executive demand hypothesis.   
However, without more formally assessing the executive demands hypothesized 
to mediate the relationship between metalinguistic and false belief ability, as Farrar and 
Ashwell (2012) attempted, it is difficult to make concrete claims regarding the true 
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merit of the executive demand hypothesis.  As such, Experiment 1B was conducted 
with the aim of further investigating the role of executive functioning in the relationship 
between theory of mind and metalinguistic awareness.  
Experiment 1B Method 
Participants.  Participants were 50 children (28 boys, 22 girls) from one 
nursery school and one playgroup in Stirling, Scotland.  Their ages ranged from 2;10 (2 
years and 10 months) to 5;1 (mean age of 3;10, SD = 6.98 months). 
Design.  Each child was tested in two sessions lasting roughly 10-15 minutes 
about 2 weeks apart.  The first session consisted of one false belief task, the CC control 
task, and the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) task.  Session two consisted of a 
second false belief task, the AN task, and the Day/Night Stroop (DNS) task. In the first 
session, the false belief task was administered after the other two tasks, whilst in the 
second session the false belief task was administered prior to the other two tasks.  The 
BPVS short form was administered at the end of the second session.  Rather than 
standard BPVS scores, as used in the analyses for Experiment 1A, however, calculated 
verbal mental age in months was included for the present analyses.  
Procedure.  The Sally FB, AN, and CC tasks were administered using the same 
materials and procedures as in Experiment 1A.   
Puppet FB.  A secondary false belief task was implemented in addition to the 
Sally FB task in order to create a more robust false belief measure.  The task, while 
maintaining the basic structure of the original false belief task, included interaction with 
the child and the use of deception.  A meta-analysis by Wellman et al. (2001) indicated 
that the inclusion of a deceptive motive and participation in the task improved 
performance; thus, the inclusion of these factors in the Puppet task provided children 
with a strong opportunity to pass the task. 
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In this task, the child was introduced to Puppet and told the following story with 
a green frog puppet, a small covered box, and a small key.  Puppet had his house key, 
which is very important, so he needed to put it somewhere safe.  He decided to put in 
the box.  Then, because Puppet was very tired, he left to take a nap.  While Puppet was 
asleep, the experimenter told the child that they were going to play a trick on Puppet 
and move his key.  They moved the key to under a piece of paper.  Puppet woke up and 
came back, and the child was asked three questions. 
Belief question: Where will Puppet first look for his key? 
Reality question: Where is the key really? 
Memory question: Where did Puppet put his key in the beginning? 
 The script for the Puppet FB task was: 
Oh!  I hear something!  It’s Puppet!  What’s that you’ve got Puppet?  
 What does Puppet have? 
 Right, a key!  Is that your house key Puppet? [Puppet nods] 
 You don’t want to lose that, do you? [Puppet shakes head] 
 Where will you put it? [Puppet puts key in box] 
 Good idea. 
Are you tired Puppet?  Are you going for a nap? [Puppet nods, then goes “to 
sleep” in bag] 
 Night night Puppet! 
 
[Whispered] Let’s play a trick on Puppet.  I’m going to move his key from the 
box to… let’s see, where should we put it?  Under this paper?  Good – let’s hide 
it here.  
 I hear Puppet waking up! 
 
 Where will Puppet first look for his key? 
 Where is the key really? 
 Where did Puppet put his key in the beginning? 
 
 Oh here it is, Puppet!  See you later! 
 
DCCS.  The DCCS procedure was modelled after that used by Kloo and Perner 
(2003; 2005).  In the DCCS, the child was first introduced to the two black boxes (26cm 
× 7.5cm × 18cm), each with a laminated picture (9cm × 9cm) adhered to the front of the 
box, one with a blue apple and one with a red dog.  The colour and shape of the pictures 
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on each box was named.  Ten cards (9cm × 9cm) were used for sorting, five with red 
apples and five with blue dogs, with two additional cards used for demonstration or 
sorting.  The cards were designed to match one box on one sorting criterion (colour) 
and the other on the other sorting criterion (shape).  The child was also shown that there 
was a slit at the top of each box, where things could be put inside.   
The child was told that they would begin by playing the colour game.  In the 
colour game, the experimenter explained that all of the red cards go into the red box, 
and all of the blue cards go into the blue box, simultaneously demonstrating sorting one 
card of each colour.  Then the child was given five cards, one at a time, and asked to 
place them into the appropriate boxes.  As each card was handed to the child, the 
appropriate sorting criterion (in this case, colour) was stated, e.g., “Here is a red card”.  
During this phase of the experiment, the child was allowed help, correction, and 
feedback from the experimenter. 
Once the five cards had been sorted by colour, the experimenter then said that 
they were going to play a new game, the shape game.  In the shape game, all of the dog 
cards go into the dog box, and all of the apple cards go into the apple box.  The child 
was then given five cards, one at a time, which were labelled by the appropriate shape 
sorting criterion and asked to sort them into the two boxes.  The child was given no 
feedback or help during this test phase.  
The script for the DCCS was: 
Now, a new game.  In this game, we have 2 boxes.  This one has a blue apple.  
This one has a red dog.  See the holes on the top?  We can put things inside. 
 
First we’ll play the shape game.  In the shape game, all the dogs go in the dog 
box and all the apples go in the apple box.  I’ll try first.  Here is an apple.  It 
goes in the apple box.  Here is a dog.  It goes in the dog box.  Now you try. 
Here’s an apple.  Where does it go in the shape game? 
Here’s a dog.  Where does it go in the shape game? 
... 
 
 
88 
 
Ok now let’s play a new game.  It’s called the colour game.   All the red pictures 
go in the red box and all the blue pictures go in the blue box.  Understand?  Ok 
you try. 
Here’s a blue one.  Where does it go? 
Here’s a red one.  Where does it go? 
... 
Good job!   
 
DNS.  The DNS task procedure was very similar to the original used by 
Gerstadt et al. (1994), however only the experimental condition was presented.  The 
child was shown a laminated card (21cm × 14.85cm) with a white moon and stars on a 
black background and told, “When you see this card, I want you to say ‘day’.”  After 
confirming this response by having the child repeat the word ‘day’, the child was shown 
a card with a yellow sun on a blue background and told, “When you see this card, I 
want you to say ‘night’.”  Once again the response was confirmed with repetition.  
Examples of the two card designs are included in Appendix B. 
The child was then shown a black moon card with no instruction.  If the child 
did not respond, he or she was prompted with the question, “What do you say for this 
one?”  If the child responded correctly, praise was given and the experimenter moved 
on to the white sun card.  If the child responded correctly to the white sun card, these 
two cards were counted as trials 1 and 2 of testing and testing continued.  If the child 
responded incorrectly to either of the first two trials, they were counted as practice and 
the child was reminded of the rules of the game.  Once the child was able to correctly 
name each card for trials 1 and 2, testing continued. 
Eight ‘day’ cards and eight ‘night’ cards were presented in a pseudorandom 
order for a total of 16 trials.  If the child did not respond to a card, he or she was 
prompted with the question, “What do you say for this one?” or “What do you say to 
this picture?”  No feedback was given during the 16 test trials.   
 
 
 
89 
 
The DNS script was: 
 Now let’s have a look at our next game.   
Whenever you see this picture, I want you to say “Day”.  What do you say?   
Right! “Day”! 
 Whenever you see this picture, I want you to say “Night”.  What do you say?  
 Right! “Night”! 
Right, now let’s give it a try. 
 (If wrong in first 2, repeat and say - What do you say to this picture?) 
 Good job, you did very well! 
 
Experiment 1B Results 
False belief.  More children (94%) answered the reality question correctly on 
the Sally task than answered the memory question correctly (82%).  Of the 50 children, 
only 30 (60%) answered the belief question correctly on the Sally task.  A total of 28 
children passed both the belief question and the two control questions for a pass rate of 
56% on the Sally task.  Again, slightly more children passed the reality question (94%) 
on the Puppet task than passed the memory question (92%).  Thirty-two children (64%) 
passed the belief question, with 31 (62%) passing both the belief question and the two 
control questions.  Performance on the two tasks was significantly correlated (rφ = .385, 
p = .006) and a total of 22 children (44%) passed both versions of the false belief task.  
When considered in aggregate, the children gave near-perfect responses to the 
reality control question (Where is the object now?) in both tasks (90% correct in both 
tasks).  Although they were slightly less reliable in their answers to the memory control 
questions, most still responded correctly in both tasks (82% correct in both tasks).  In 
total, 40 of the 50 children (80%) answered both control questions in both stories 
correctly, yet only 25 of the 50 children (50%) answered both test questions correctly.   
AN task.  Children were near perfect in the vocabulary check, with 94% 
correctly identifying all critical items.  Children performed similarly to as in 
Experiment 1A, with a mean score of 1.44 correct pairs out of four (SD = 1.48).  Out of 
the 50 children, 23 (46%) were able to correctly produce both the basic and 
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superordinate terms to at least three of the four item pairs, which was considered 
‘passing’ the task.  It is clear that the difficulty arose for children when given the basic 
term and having to produce the superordinate term.  Forty-seven of the 50 children 
(94%) were able to produce the basic term for at least two items, but only 23 (46%) 
were able to produce the superordinate term for at least two items.  A paired-samples t-
test confirmed that the children’s scores on basic-to-superordinate items (M = 1.52) 
were significantly lower than their scores on superordinate-to-basic items (M = 3.46), 
t(49) = 9.86, p < .001.   
CC task.  Again, children were near perfect in the colour check (96% achieving 
a perfect score).  Performance was once again similar to performance in Experiment 
1A, with a mean score of 3.74 out of four (SD = .80).  Performance was very strong on 
the experimental portion of the task with 46 out of 50 children (92%) passing the task 
by correctly answering at least three out of four trials.   
DCCS.  Children performed well on the DCCS, with 34 of 50 (68%) correctly 
sorting all five cards in the post-switch phase.  Eight of the fifty children (16%) were 
unable to correctly sort any of the five cards in the post-switch phase, with another eight 
correctly sorting between one and four cards.  The mean number of correct trials was 
3.78 (SD = 1.99).  
DNS task.  Children also performed well on the DNS Task, with slightly over a 
quarter of the sample (n = 13, 26%) achieving a perfect score.  The mean score on the 
task was 12.08 (SD = 4.85).   
Task relatedness.  Table 2.3 shows correlations between all tasks administered 
and both measures of age.  Partial correlations controlling for effects of age are 
presented in parentheses.  Only two significant relationships remained when controlling 
for age.  A marginally non-significant correlation was found between false belief and 
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DCCS performance (r = .29, p = .052), suggesting a possible trend between the two 
tasks.  False belief performance also correlated moderately and significantly with 
performance on the AN task (r = .465, p = .001).  This relationship between false belief 
and AN task performance remained when accounting for both measures of age, both 
measures of executive functioning, and the CC task, r = .447, p = .002.    
Table 2.3 
Correlations between Age Measures and the Experimental Tasks of Experiment 1B 
(Partial correlations controlling for age and verbal mental age in parentheses)  
 
 
 FB AN CC DCCS DNS BPVS 
Age .301* .345* .170 .380** .412** .566*** 
FB - .588*** .154 .407** .289* .376** 
AN (.465**) - .322* .325* .238 .256 
CC (.032) (.207) - .219 .115 .363* 
DCCS (.288) (.116) (.136) - .101 .383** 
DNS (.207) (.08) (.031) (-.055) - .266 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Displayed in Figure 2.1 is the proportion of false belief scores according to the number 
of AN pairs correctly produced.   
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Figure 2.1. Number of children providing 0-4 alternative naming pairs and showing 
false belief understanding in Experiment 1B  
 
In order to compare all tasks, once again children were scored as passing the AN 
task if they correctly produced three out of four pairs and passing the CC task if they 
correctly answered three out of four trials.  A passing score on the DCCS was 
considered correctly sorting at least 4 out of 5 cards or correctly sorting the last three.  
This criterion was based on that used by Frye et al. (1995).   The DNS task was 
considered passed if the child correctly completed 14 of the 16 trials, similarly as to the 
criterion of 13 out of 15 trials as used by Tager-Flusberg, Sullivan, and Boschart (1997, 
as cited in Perner & Lang, 1998).  The two FB tasks were of equal difficulty 
(McNemar, binomial, p = .607), so the two FB tasks were combined for a total measure 
of FB.  For the purpose of task comparison, a child was considered passing the FB 
portion of the experiment only if he or she passed both FB tasks.  Percentages of 
children passing each task are shown in Table 2.4. 
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The CC task was significantly easier than each of the other tasks (McNemar, 
binomial, ps < .022).  The AN task was significantly more difficult than the DNS and 
DCCS tasks (ps < .015), but not the FB tasks (p = .180).  The FB portion was 
significantly more difficult than the DCCS (p = .003), but not the DNS.  The DNS and 
DCCS did not significantly differ in difficulty (p = .134).  
Table 2.4 
Pass Rates for Each Task in Experiment 1B 
FB AN CC DCCS DNS 
44% 32% 92% 74% 58% 
 
Regression.  A hierarchical regression was performed, with number of AN task 
pairs as the dependent variable, age and BPVS as control variables, followed by 
measures of executive functioning and the CC task in step 2, and finally FB in step 3.  
Evaluation of collinearity statistics indicated that the assumption of non-
multicollinearity was met (all VIF < 10, T > .10).  As seen in Table 2.5, only FB 
performance was significantly related to performance on the AN task.  False belief still 
contributed to the metalinguistic awareness measure even after all other variables were 
controlled for.  
  
 
 
94 
 
Table 2.5 
Hierarchical Regression for Experiment 1B Data Predicting Total AN Pairs Produced 
Variable B B(SE) Beta p 
Step 1a     
   Age .027 .037 .124 .480 
   BPVS .018 .019 .171 .333 
Step 2b     
   Age .016 .041 .077 .689 
   BPVS .007 .020 .065 .734 
   DCCS .077 .123 .100 .537 
   DNS .026 .048 .086 .594 
   CC .361 .285 .198 .213 
Step 3c, d     
   Age .025 .037 .115 .506 
   BPVS -.006 .019 -.059 .736 
   DCCS -.041 .116 -.054 .725 
   DNS -.009 .044 -.028 .849 
   CC .375 .256 .206 .151 
   FB .888 .268 .500 .002** 
aR² = .069, p = .202  
b∆R² = .122, p = .476 
c∆R² = .307, p = .001 
dModel 3 significant, F(6, 41) = 3.027, p = .015 
**p < .01 
 
Experiment 1B Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1B confirm those of Experiment 1A, that there is a 
strong relationship between false belief and alternative naming understanding.  
Performance on the AN task was not related to either measure of executive functioning, 
and the relationship between FB and AN performance remained even when accounting 
for age differences and executive functioning performance.  The AN task once again 
appears more difficult for the children, with a lower passing rate than FB tasks, 
extending the pattern from Experiment 1A.  Consistent with previous research, 
performance on the CC task was high, indicating that despite having similar inhibitory 
control demands as the AN task, it is inherently easier.  False belief, while intially 
positively related to both aspects of executive functioning, was only marginally related 
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to DCCS performance after accounting for measures of age.  This is somewhat 
inconsistent with previous research, and warrants further inspection.  
Study 1 General Conclusion 
 The results of Experiments 1A and 1B support the hypothesis that theory of 
mind and metalinguistic awareness development are related.  These results confirm the 
previous work of Doherty and Perner (1998), Doherty (2000), and Perner et al. (2002), 
as well as extending them through the included evaluation of executive functioning 
skills in the relationship.  Results also confirm Farrar and Ashwell’s (2012) findings 
that executive functioning was unlikely to explain the relationship between 
metalinguistic awareness and theory of mind.  The results therefore support the theory 
that the related emergence of these two skills is due to the development of improved 
perspective taking skills.  Given that Farrar and Ashwell’s study was reliant on sound 
rather than meaning, the use of the AN task provides stronger evidence for perspective 
taking ability as the underlying mechanism driving false belief and metalinguistic 
awareness skills.  Contrary to Farrar and Ashwell, the present results did not show a 
significant relationship between vocabulary and performance on the metalinguistic 
awareness task.  This may be an artefact of the nature of the metalinguistic tasks used.   
 Also contrary to Farrar and Ashwell’s (2012) findings, performance on the 
DCCS did not correlate with performance on the AN task, although it did correlate 
positively and highly significantly with false belief performance. While Farrar and 
Ashwell appear to support Kloo et al.’s (2010) suggestion that the DCCS task may tap 
into perspective taking given that it correlated with performance on their theory of mind 
and rhyming tasks, this conclusion is questionable as the correlation between DCCS 
and false belief performance did not remain once age and verbal mental age had been 
taken into account.  While it could be argued that perhaps the relationships Farrar and 
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Ashwell identified were spurious due to the fact that DCCS performance was no longer 
significantly related to rhyming task performance in their hierarchical regression model 
when age and verbal mental age were accounted for in step 1, it is just as likely that the 
relationship is not very specific or is not a strong relationship.  This latter point is 
highlighted by the fact that the false belief task has been found to both correlate (e.g., 
Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; Henning, Spinath, & Aschersleben, 2011; Perner, Lang, & 
Kloo, 2002) and to not correlate (e.g., Remmel, Bettger, Weinberg, Novotny, & 
Eberwein, 2000, as cited in Remmel, Bettger, & Weinberg, 2001) with DCCS 
performance, depending on study.  This issue can only be resolved with further 
investigation, and it is suggested that other tasks aimed at assessing set shifting be 
included rather than dependence on one test, the DCCS.     
 Despite these differences regarding the effects of vocabulary and relationships 
with the DCCS and its potential nature, the overarching result of the present finding and 
that of Farrar and Ashwell (2012) remains consistent: metalinguistic awareness and 
theory of mind abilities are related in typically developing children, even above and 
beyond chronological age, mental verbal age, and executive functions of inhibitory 
control and set-shifting ability.  This provides strong evidence for a common underlying 
developmental mechanism supporting development of these tasks.  It is proposed that 
this underlying mechanism includes an aspect of perspective taking ability.  
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Chapter Three 
Study 2: Deaf Extension 
Introduction 
Much theory of mind research has been conducted with the non-typical group of 
deaf children, with a large amount of evidence suggesting deaf children can be 
extremely delayed in theory of mind development (e.g., Courtin, 2000; Meristo et al, 
2007; Peterson & Siegal, 1995; Steeds et al., 1997).  A variety of tasks, many of them 
variations on the typical false-belief task, have been used with deaf children with the 
aim of evaluating theory of mind skills in deaf children.  Some researchers, however, 
argue that use of one primary form of evaluation is too prohibitive in making claims 
that young deaf children have not yet developed a theory of mind (Marschark, Green, 
Hindmarsh, & Walker, 2000).  Using a storytelling-based task, Marschark et al. (2000) 
claimed that despite being unable to pass the false belief task, deaf children still have 
theories of mind, and they are at least as well developed as those of their hearing peers.  
Although there is some controversy regarding task and interpretation of false belief task 
performance, the majority of deaf theory of mind research indicates that there is a delay 
in some form of development attached to the ability to pass the false belief task and 
related tasks.  
Not all deaf children have been found to exhibit such delays, however.  Native 
deaf children, that is, deaf children of deaf parents, have been found to develop the 
ability to pass the false belief task at ages comparable to typically developing hearing 
children (e.g., Courtin, 2000; Courtin & Melot, 2005; Peterson & Siegal, 1995).  
Peterson and Siegal (1995) were some of the first researchers to suggest that 
conversational access to references of other people’s mental states in early childhood 
might be vital to theory of mind development.  They suggested that late-signing 
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children may lack the crucial exposure to conversational input about other’s mental 
states during a critical period of brain development.  Autistic children, who also 
struggle with delays in the ability to pass the false belief task, likely also lack sufficient 
“access” to early mental state talk, albeit for different reasons than being unable to hear 
conversation.   
Moeller and Schick (2006) found results suggesting hearing mothers of deaf 
children produce significantly less mental state utterances in interactions with their 
children than do hearing mothers of hearing children, providing some support for 
Peterson and Siegal’s claim.  A more recent study of early theory of mind reasoning 
among 17- to 26-month-olds showed hearing infants of hearing parents outperformed 
deaf infants of hearing parents in an anticipatory task based on false belief (Meristo et 
al., 2012).  This study provided further, strong evidence that early access to language 
and conversational input contributes to theory of mind reasoning.  While the lack of 
early language access appears to be the most viable explanation as to why late-signing 
deaf children experience a delay in false belief understanding, it is unclear how exactly 
this lack of access is tied to the underlying development.  Additionally, the extent of the 
delay in terms of related skills has yet to be fully investigated. 
Use of alternative tasks.  Remarking upon the use of the false-belief task as the 
primary measurement of theory of mind ability, Gray and Hosie (1996) warned that 
researchers should be “reluctant to pin faith on a single measure as an indicator” (p. 
229).  Marschark et al. (2000) agreed with this view, particularly because they found it 
somewhat absurd that “theory of mind is an area in which chimpanzees have been 
credited with abilities that are denied to children who are deaf” (p. 1067).  Marschark et 
al. (2000) examined stories told by groups of deaf and hearing children in order to 
assess theory of mind through expressions of mental states and behaviours being 
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ascribed to themselves and others.  The claim of the study was that while deaf children 
may have been shown to fail the false belief task, they may still have theories of mind at 
least as well developed as their hearing peers, under the assumption that a full-fledged 
theory of mind encompasses many mental phenomena apart from just beliefs.   
 In Marschark et al.’s (2000) study, 15 deaf (9- to 15-years-old) and 15 hearing 
(10- to 15-years-old) adolescents took part.  Videotapes of the participants signing or 
speaking stories, respectively, were selected from a large pool of videotapes previously 
recorded for past studies.  Selection of participants’ videotapes was based on age 
matching among 9- to 15-year-old children in the pool.  According to school records, all 
deaf children had severe to profound hearing loss, had hearing parents, were enrolled in 
a school with a total communication philosophy, and used sign language as their 
primary means of communication at school.   
 Transcriptions of the hearing children’s stories were prepared directly from the 
videotapes.  Transcription of the deaf children’s stories was completed by a nationally 
certified (U.S.) sign language interpreter.  Three of the authors scored each transcript 
independently for both occurrences of mental state attributions to self or another and 
classification of the mental state attribution involving elements such as belief, doubt, 
desire, knowledge, or thinking.  After coding, retraining, and recoding, 78% of 
attributions were agreed upon by the three scorers.  Analyses were conducted using 
both attributions identified by all three scorers, and by those identified by at least two 
scorers.  
 Analysis using the more conservative three-scorer criterion resulted in marginal 
effects of hearing status, with children who are deaf producing more mental state 
attributions than children who are hearing.  When using the less conservative two-
scorer criterion, the main effect of hearing status was reliable.  Further analysis with the 
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younger children only, aged 9 to 13 years to somewhat match the age range used by 
Peterson and Siegal (1995), showed that younger deaf children produced significantly 
more mental state attributions than the younger hearing children.  An analysis of the 
types of beliefs (self versus other, and true, false, or indeterminate belief) mentioned 
showed no difference overall or in interactions between deaf and hearing groups.  There 
were reliably more true beliefs (M = 1.36) mentioned than false (0.42) or indeterminate 
(0.16) beliefs.  There were also significantly more true self-attributions of belief than 
any other alternative. 
 The authors argued that the disconnect in findings between their study and the 
studies of others involving the false-belief task is due to the fact that demonstrating a 
theory of mind requires children to understand their own and others’ mental states and 
to recognize that these states lead to behaviour, yet the false-belief task requires the 
additional step that children predict the behaviour of others based on inferred mental 
states (p. 1072).  It therefore appears that perhaps deaf children may indeed have some 
understanding of theory of mind, yet lack some critical skill that results in the 
application of understanding.  It may also be argued that the current study was testing 
theory of mind in an implicit way, rather than the more explicit measure of the false-
belief task. While Marschark et al. may have demonstrated that perhaps the delay or 
deficit experienced by deaf children is not as deep-seated or severe as previously 
thought, it remains that there is still something significantly different happening in 
development between not just deaf and hearing children, but also native and late signing 
deaf children.  It can surely be argued that application of understanding in real-life 
situations is an important part of development, and something that appears to be lacking 
in distinctive cases.   
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 This is just the stance that Edmondson (2006) took in response to the claim of 
Marschark et al. (2000) that deaf children understand mental states, but have trouble 
using this understanding to predict the behaviour of others based on inferred mental 
states.  Edmondson argued that, “a functional understanding of false belief and an 
ability to predict the behaviour of others is a key cognitive component of social 
development and an essential life skill” (p. 162).  Edmondson chose to use a ‘deceptive 
box’ task, a variation of the unexpected contents task, in addition to the traditional 
unexpected transfer task in order to recreate as accurately as possible a deceptive 
situation for the children to interpret.  Once again, this study confirmed the findings 
from other studies that deaf children of deaf parents fare better on false-belief tasks than 
deaf children with hearing parents.  Edmondson also interpreted one fail and one pass 
on the two tasks as a ‘partial’ understanding of false belief.  While he acknowledges 
that practice effects may have played a part in this, he also suggests that there may be a 
gradual and socially mediated process of development, rather than a relatively sudden 
cognitive shift.  
 Study 2 was guided by the research question: What are the relationships among 
theory of mind, metalinguistic awareness, and executive functioning development 
among school-aged deaf children?  The aim of Experiment 2A was to evaluate 
application of potential underlying theory of mind ability on two versions of the false 
belief task among deaf children, as well as to establish whether the deficit commonly 
found spans into other areas of cognition, namely metalinguistic awareness and 
executive functioning.  Given that explicit demonstration of theory of mind and the 
metalinguistic awareness necessary to be successful on an alternative naming task 
appear to be strongly related in hearing populations, examining whether a similar 
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relationship exists among deaf children may provide insight into the nature of the delay 
in theory of mind development.   
Experiment 2A Method 
Participants.  Eighteen deaf children (9 boys, 9 girls) took part in Experiment 
2A.  Eleven of these students were recruited from a school for the deaf in California, 
USA, and seven were recruited from a school in central Scotland.  The decision was 
made to initially conduct data collection in Southern California as the researcher was 
originally from the area and knew there to be a large deaf population present.  
Additionally, the experimenter was able to use pre-existing knowledge of American 
Sign Language (formally trained to ASL level 3) during this data collection process 
while working on improving her British Sign Language skills in order to conduct 
research within the U.K.  Due to restrictions imposed by the deaf school, data collection 
in California proved to be more difficult than had previously been planned, resulting in 
additional data collection within Scotland being necessary to increase the sample size.  
After completing the Level 1 certificate in BSL (later receiving Level 2 certification), 
the experimenter had gained sufficient vocabulary and skill to conduct additional data 
collection within the central belt of Scotland, providing the ability to increase the 
sample size obtained in California.   
Students aged in range from 5;7 to 15;9 (mean age 10;2, SD = 29.73 months). 
Twelve of the eighteen participants indicated they prefer signed communication, while 
six indicated no preference between signed and oral communication.  Only three 
participants had a cochlear implant, and eight participants had at least one deaf family 
member.  Eight participants indicated having at least one deaf parent, and seven 
indicated having at least one deaf sibling; each of these participants is therefore 
considered native signing as they have an immediate deaf family member.  
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Design.  Each student was tested in one session lasting between 10 and 20 
minutes.  The tasks used in Experiment 2A were the same tasks as administered in 
Experiment 1B, apart from the vocabulary test conducted.  The tasks were two FB tasks 
and the AN, CC, DNS, and DCCS tasks.  Rather than the BPVS (Dunn et al., 1982), the 
PPVT (Dunn & Dunn, 1997) was used.  While similar in form, the PPVT edition was 
newer than the BPVS edition and the PPVT had been normed to American children, 
who were estimated to make up the majority of experiment participants prior to data 
collection.  However, due to problems with using the PPVT with deaf children, the task 
was discontinued after the first 11 participants.  No measure of verbal mental age was 
therefore included in the analyses.  Tasks were administered in sign language, spoken 
language, or a mix based on participant preference.  
Materials and procedure.  All tasks for Experiment 2A used identical 
materials as for Experiment 1B, apart from the measure of verbal mental age.  For data 
collection in the U.S., a native Deaf signer attended all sessions and interpreted 
instructions into ASL for participants.  The interpreter was a native Deaf signer who 
had grown up in the region, attended the school for the deaf that participants were 
currently attending, and was undertaking an undergraduate degree at a local university.  
An interpreter was used during the U.S. sessions due to the primary researcher’s short 
amount of time in the country prior to testing, limiting preparation time to ensure tasks 
were signed in a manner the children would understand.  During the testing sessions 
with children in California, the researcher and the Deaf interpreter sat with each child.  
The researcher acted out and spoke the tasks in English, while the interpreter signed 
what was spoken.  For data collection with deaf children in the U.K., rather than using 
an interpreter, the primary researcher worked with a sign language teacher prior to data 
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collection in order to be trained on how to conduct the tasks in BSL correctly.  Each 
child was tested in a one-on-one session with the researcher.   
Experiment 2A Results 
False belief.  Nearly all of the eighteen children answered the reality and 
memory questions correctly on the Sally task (n = 17, 94.4% on both).  However, only 
six participants answered the belief question correctly, resulting in a passing rate of 
33.3%.   All children passed both control questions on the Puppet task.  The pattern for 
the Puppet task was much different from that of the Sally task; 15 of 18 participants got 
the belief question correct for a passing rate of 83.3%.  A correlation analysis indicated 
that performance on the two tasks was not significantly related, r = .316, p = .201.  
Therefore when considering the relationship between false belief results and other task 
results, the two tasks were considered separately.    
AN task.  All children correctly identified 100% of the items named in the 
vocabulary check phase.  Children performed well on the AN task, with a mean score of 
3.56 correct pairs out of four (SD = 0.78).  Out of the 18 children, 15 were able to 
correctly produce both the basic and superordinate terms to at least three of the four 
item pairs, resulting in a pass rate of 83.3%.  Contrasting with the finding from 
Experiment 1B, no significant difference was found between children’s scores on basic-
to-superordinate items (M = 3.61) and their scores on superordinate-to-basic items (M = 
3.89), t(17) = 1.57, p = .135.   
CC task.  Performance on the colour check phase was perfect, with all children 
correctly identifying all colours.  All children also answered all four test trials correctly, 
for a passing rate at ceiling (100%).     
DCCS.  Children performed well on the DCCS, with 16 of 18 (88.9%) correctly 
sorting all five cards in the post-switch phase.  The other two participants did not sort 
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any of the five cards correctly in the post-switch phase.  The mean number of correct 
trials was 4.44 (SD = 1.62).  
DNS task.  Performance was again strong on the DNS Task.  Sixteen of 
eighteen participants (88.9%) achieved a perfect score of 16.  An additional child 
scored a 15, bringing the passing rate to 94.4%.  The mean score on the task was 15.78 
(SD = 0.73).   
Task relatedness.  Table 3.1 shows correlations between all tasks administered 
along with chronological age in months.  Partial correlations controlling for effects of 
age are presented in parentheses.  No significant relationships were found between any 
tasks, both with and without controlling for age.   
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Table 3.1 
Correlations between Age Measures and the Experimental Tasks of Experiment 2A 
(Partial correlations controlling for age in parentheses)  
 
 
 Sally FB Puppet FB AN DCCS DNS 
Age .107 -.401† -.111 -.437† .106 
Sally - .316 .103 .250 .221 
Puppet (.394) - .130 .316 -.140 
AN (.116) (.095) - .258 .023 
DCCS (.332) (.171) (.234) - -.110 
DNS (.212) (-.107) (.035) (-.072) - 
†p < .10 
 
In order to compare all tasks, passing scores as determined based on the criteria 
outlined in Study 1 were compared.  Percentages of children passing each task are 
shown in Table 3.2.  The CC task was not included in these analyses as performance 
was at ceiling.  Performance on the Sally task was significantly lower than from each of 
the other tasks (ps ≤ .012), indicating it was the most difficult task.  No other tasks 
differed significantly.  
Table 3.2 
Pass Rates for Each Task in Experiment 2A 
Sally Puppet AN CC DCCS DNS 
33.3% 83.3% 83.3% 100% 88.9% 94.4% 
 
Regression.  A hierarchical regression was performed, with number of AN task 
pairs as the dependent variable, age as a control variable, followed by measures of 
executive functioning in step 2, and finally the two FB tasks in step 3.  All three models 
were nonsignificant (ps ≥ .662).  Additionally, as shown in Table 3.3, none of the tasks 
individually predicted AN task performance.   
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Table 3.3 
Hierarchical Regression for Experiment 2A Data Predicting Total AN Pairs Produced 
Variable B B(SE) Beta p 
Step 1a     
   Age -.003 .007 -.111 .662 
Step 2b     
   Age < .001 .008 -.001 .997 
   DCCS .128 .139 .263 .375 
   DNS .056 .278 .052 .845 
Step 3c, d     
   Age .000 .009 .018 .959 
   DCCS .121 .161 .250 .465 
   DNS .060 .317 .056 .852 
   Sally .009 .540 .006 .986 
   Puppet .132 .691 .065 .851 
aR² = .012, p = .662  
b∆R² = .069, p = .660 
c∆R² = .073, p = .977 
dModel 3 non-significant, F(5, 12) = 0.188, p = .961 
Experiment 2A Discussion 
 The results of Experiment 2A clearly illustrate a different pattern of 
development and association between abilities than was found among hearing children 
in Experiment 1B.  Whereas performance on the false belief tasks and alternative 
naming tasks were very strongly associated among hearing children in Study 1, even 
after controlling for age and verbal mental age, no such association was found among 
the deaf sample.  Importantly, the results for Experiment 2A show no association 
between performance on the false belief tasks and the alternative naming task regardless 
of whether age was controlled for or not.  Similarly, whereas false belief performance 
significantly predicted alternative naming performance beyond the effects of age, verbal 
mental age, executive functioning skills, and performance on the control task in 
Experiment 1B, this was not the case in Experiment 2A.   
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 The pass rates for children greatly differed dependent on whether they were 
hearing or deaf.  The hearing children in Study 1 had greater difficulty with the 
alternative naming task than the false belief tasks (Experiment 1A FB 51.6%, AN 
35.5%; Experiment 1B FB 44%, AN 32%).  This pattern was reversed among the deaf 
children, who experienced much greater difficulty on the Sally false belief task (FB 
Sally 33.3%, AN 83.3%).  Curiously, the deaf children appeared to have significant 
difficulty with the Sally task, but did not struggle as a whole with the Puppet task (Sally 
33.3%, Puppet 83.3%).  Among the deaf sample, performance on the two false belief 
tasks was not correlated, as was expected due to the similar nature of the task and the 
fact that performance was moderately correlated among the hearing sample (rφ = .385, p 
= .006).   
 The difference in performance on these two tasks witnessed among deaf 
children may be due in part to the deceptive nature of the Puppet task.  In the task, the 
experimenter states to the child that they are going to play a trick on Puppet and hide 
the key while he is sleeping.  Wellman et al. (2001) found that “a deceptive motive 
enhances children’s performance, and does so for children of all ages” (p. 666).  In the 
meta-analysis Wellman et al. stated that a task using deceptive motives can increase the 
odds of a child being correct by 1.90; that is, “if children are 50% correct at 44 months 
without deception, then they are 66% correct with deception” (p. 666).   
Additionally, in the Puppet task the researcher asks for the child’s help in hiding 
the key.  The children were told, “Now, we’re going to play a trick on Puppet and hide 
the key!  Where do you think would be a good hiding place?”  On most occasions the 
child indicated under the paper that had been placed directly in front of them, although 
occasionally they point to other nearby locations.  On those occasions the researcher hid 
the key where the child indicated.  When the child did not make any response to the 
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question, they were prompted, “How about under this paper?  This looks like a good 
place to hide it.”  Wellman et al. (2001) also found that “participation by the child in 
transforming the target object is also important” (p. 666).  They found that when the 
child helps in manipulating the task situation or story props positively influences 
children’s performance.  As the Puppet task incorporated both deception and child 
participation, this may explain why the children performed at a much higher rate on the 
Puppet task than on the Sally task.  The same tendency for better performance on the 
Puppet task was seen in Experiment 1B, although the difference was much less 
pronounced (Sally 56%, Puppet 62%).    
 Children in the deaf sample in Experiment 2A were also much better at the 
DCCS and DNS tasks than those in Experiment 1B.  The majority of children in 
Experiment 2A passed the DCCS (88.9%) and the DNS (94.5%), while only 75% of 
those in Experiment 1B passed the DCCS and 58% passed the DNS.  The obvious 
explanation for the differences in abilities on the executive function tasks is the 
difference in ages between the two groups.  The average age of the hearing children was 
3 years, 10 months, whereas the average age for Experiment 2A was 10 years, 2 
months.  Given the wealth of information showing executive functioning skills develop 
with age, the difference in performance is not very surprising.  It does, however, 
highlight that the delays witnessed on false belief understanding among deaf children 
do not appear to be related to deficits in executive functioning skills.  
 As Experiment 2A appears to establish that the delays in theory of mind 
development among deaf children is fairly limited to theory of mind, rather than linked 
with a general metacognitive deficit, Experiment 2B was designed to further investigate 
the delay.  Additional tasks were developed to be used in conjunction with the false 
belief task to assess aspects related to theory of mind, such as understanding that seeing 
 
 
110 
 
leads to knowing and what information can be gained from different senses.  
Additionally, a variation on the typical unexpected transfer task, in which the test 
question on belief is asked first, was used to determine if question order affects 
performance.   
Experiment 2B Method 
 Participants.  Eighteen deaf children (12 boys, 6 girls) took part in Experiment 
2B.  All 18 students were recruited from central Scotland.  Students ranged in age from 
5;0 to 15;7 (mean age 10;6, SD = 33.37 months).  Children were recruited through two 
schools for the deaf, one in Edinburgh and one in Falkirk, as well as one organisation, 
the West of Scotland Deaf Children’s Society.   
 Design.  Each child was tested in two sessions, with some children being tested 
on each session one day apart and some children being tested with a 15 minute interval 
between sessions.  This variation in testing design was due to convenience for the 
child’s caregiver at the time of testing.  Some children were tested at school and could 
only miss a short portion each day, and were thus tested in two sessions, whereas the 
other children were tested at home with their parents present and were thus tested with 
just a short break for the child.  The first session consisted of six tasks, which were fully 
counterbalanced: the Smarties task, the Tunnel task, the AN task, the CC task, the DNS 
task, and the DCCS.  The second session also included six counterbalanced tasks: the 
Draw a Man task, the Puppet FB task, the Mary FB task, the Sally FB task, the 
Backward Explanation task, and the Lift/See task.     
 The doctoral researcher conducted all data collection with children in this group.  
By this point in the data collection process the researcher had completed the Level 2 
Certificate in BSL.  Additionally, in order to ensure the tasks were conducted in a 
manner that would be understandable to participants, the researcher worked through all 
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of the tasks with her BSL Level 2 instructor, a native Deaf signer, who gave 
suggestions and advice on how best to conduct the tasks.  The training session with the 
Deaf instructor was videotaped so the researcher could review the tasks and advice to 
practice prior to beginning data collection.   
Materials and procedure.  The materials and procedures for the Puppet FB 
task, the AN task, the CC task, the DCCS, and the DNS were identical to those used in 
Experiment 2A.  The materials used for the Sally FB task were identical to those used 
in Experiment 2A.  The procedure for the Sally task was also identical to that 
previously conducted when in the standard version; however, a revised version was also 
implemented, in which students were asked the belief question last rather than first.   
Smarties task materials.  The Smarties unexpected contents task was chosen to 
assess recognition of false belief in the self and in others; this task could potentially 
provide insight into deaf children’s understanding or assessment of their own false 
beliefs, in addition to merely reflecting on the false beliefs of others.  The materials for 
the Smarties task included an empty Smarties tube, a candy common in the U.K., and a 
set of coloured pencils.  The tube was approximately 14 cm in length, with a diameter 
of approximately 2.5 cm.  The container was chosen both for its common use in 
previous studies (e.g., Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 1986; LaLonde & Chandler, 1995; 
Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987) and its familiarity to British children.   
Smarties task procedure.  The experimenter first showed the child the Smarties 
tube and asked “What do you think is inside here?”  After the child responded with 
“Smarties,” “sweets,” or something similar, the box was opened to show the child that 
instead of candies there were coloured pencils inside.  The child was then asked two test 
questions in the order shown below. 
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Other knowledge question: If your teacher walked in and looked at the tube, what 
would (s)he think is inside?  
Own knowledge question: Before I opened the tube and showed you what was 
inside, what did you think was inside? 
Tunnel task materials.  The Tunnel task was based on a similar experiment 
conducted by O’Neill, Astington, and Flavell (1992).  The Tunnel task was chosen for 
inclusion in the battery of tests in order to examine the children’s understanding that the 
“acquisition of certain types of knowledge depends on the modality of the sensory 
experience involves” (O’Neill et al., 1992, p. 474).  A “tunnel” was constructed from a 
cardboard box (30 cm × 20 cm × 12 cm) that was painted matt black.  The box was 
open at each end, and the bottom had a small (16 cm × 8 cm ) hole cut into it.  Each of 
the open ends had a black fabric ‘curtain’ glued to it, so that one could not see into the 
box, but both experimenter and testee were able to easily reach into the box to either 
place or feel an object inside.  The objects used in the training task were a red crayon 
and a green ball.  The ball was made of hard rubber and approximately six centimetres 
in diameter.  The experimental task used two socks (one grey, one white), two 
toothbrushes (one green, one yellow), two black bags (one filled with hard beans, one 
with soft cotton), and two juice cartons/boxes (one empty, one full).  The objects were 
kept covered by a black piece of cloth when being transferred to the tunnel.  
Photographs showing the materials used in the task are presented in Appendix C.  
Tunnel task procedure.  The training phase of the Tunnel task consisted of 
illustrating to the participant that one can either see what is inside the tunnel by lifting 
the box, or feel what is inside by reaching a hand inside one of the curtained sides.  A 
red crayon covered by a black cloth was transferred into the box by the experimenter.  
The experimenter then explained to the child that something was put in the box and she 
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wanted to know what the colour of the object was.  The child was instructed to lift the 
box in order to see the object and name the colour.  After doing so, the experimenter 
explained that the child can lift the box to see an object inside, and a picture of an eye 
was placed in front of the box to further draw the link between lifting the box and using 
one’s eyes to see what is inside.  After removing the crayon, the green, hard ball was 
transferred into the box.  This time the child was instructed to place his or her hand 
inside the box and to report whether the ball was hard or soft.  After confirming the ball 
was hard, the experimenter explained that the child can put his or her hand in the side in 
order to feel what is inside.  A picture of a hand was placed in front of the box, beside 
the picture of the eye, in order to illustrate the two choices the child would be given in 
the task. 
In the experimental phase, the child had to decide whether to look inside the box 
or feel inside the box in order to determine a particular characteristic of each of four 
objects.  For each of four trials, two objects were shown to the child, their similarities 
and differences demonstrated, and then one was transferred (covered) into the box.  
Two of the trials involved two objects that looked the same, but felt differently, and two 
of the trials involved two objects that felt the same, but were different colours (and 
therefore look differently).  For the two identical looking objects the child was told the 
experimenter wanted to know whether the one in the box was soft or hard.  The child 
was then asked to choose whether to lift the box to look inside or reach inside to feel the 
object.  For the two identical feeling objects the child was told the experimenter wanted 
to know the colour of the object in the box and again was asked to choose whether to 
lift or reach inside the box to find out.  The child received a total score out of four, 
signifying whether the correct choice was made in each trial.   
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Mary FB task materials.  The Mary FB task was structured very similarly to the 
Sally FB task and previous versions of the Sally-Ann test (e.g., Peterson & Siegal, 
1995).  The primary difference between the tasks and the choice to include this revised 
FB task in the battery of tests is in the order in which test questions are asked.  In the 
“standard” version of the FB unexpected transfer task, the belief question is asked last.  
However, in order to investigate whether question order makes a difference in 
performance, in the revised version of this and the Sally FB task the belief question was 
asked first.  The Mary task used two small dolls (a ‘mother’ doll and a ‘Mary’ doll), a 
toy refrigerator, a toy cupboard, and a small toffee candy.   
Mary FB task procedures.  The procedure for the Mary task was very similar to 
that for the Sally task.  The child was introduced to the two dolls, Mary and her mother, 
and shown a story.  Mary had a sweet that she wanted to keep for later, so she put it in 
the cupboard.  Mary then went out to play.  While she was outside, her mother moved 
the candy to the refrigerator and subsequently left to clean the house.  Mary returned 
from playing and wanted the candy.  The children were then asked three questions. 
Belief question:  Where will Mary first look for her candy?  
Reality question: Where is the candy really? 
Memory question:  Where did Mary put the candy before? 
The order of these questions was varied based on which version of the task was being 
administered.  The standard version had the belief question asked first, whereas the 
revised version had the belief question asked last.  The standard and revised versions 
were alternated between children and the opposite version from the Sally version was 
administered.  That is, half of the children received the standard Sally task and the 
revised Mary task, while the other half received the revised Sally task and the standard 
Mary task.  
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Backward Explanation task materials.  The Backward Explanation task was 
included in the battery of tasks as Robinson and Mitchell (1995) claimed this version of 
the task was easier for children than the standard FB task, although Perner, Lang, and 
Kloo (2002) found no support for this claim.  The materials and procedure for the 
Backward Explanation task were based on Robinson and Mitchell’s (1995) work.  The 
Backward Explanation task used nine bound laminated A4 cards shown to the children 
one at a time.  The pictures illustrated a story about twin brothers as it unfolded, as 
shown in Appendix C.   
Backward Explanation task procedure.  The students were shown the story one 
card at a time with accompanying signs telling the story.  In the story are two identical 
twins brothers, Paul and Mark.  The twin brothers each have a drawer, one red and one 
blue.  The brothers together put the ball away in the red drawer, then Paul leaves to go 
outside and Mark stays inside.  Mark decides to play with the ball again, so he takes it 
from the red drawer, plays, and then puts it in the blue drawer and leaves.  Both boys 
appear with their mother, who asks them where the ball is.  One twin says it is in the red 
drawer and the other says it is in the blue drawer.   
At this point the child was shown a recap of the story using cards 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 
and 9.  The child was then told the experimenter wanted to know which twin was the 
one that went to the wrong (red) drawer – Paul who went outside to play, or Mark who 
stayed inside to play?  When asking this question, the experimenter showed the child 
card 4, which shows one twin leaving and one saying.  The order of naming the twins 
was counterbalanced between children.   
Lift/See task materials.  The Lift/See task was adapted from a similar task 
created by Lind and Bowler (2010).  This task was included in the battery of tests in 
order to assess the children’s understanding the seeing-knowing relationship as a 
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precursor to false belief competence (i.e., understanding whether someone has 
knowledge or ignorance of a piece of information given the perceptual access the 
person has to that information).  The Lift/See task was divided into a control phase and 
an experimental phase.  The control phase made use of two sets of three bound 
laminated A4 cards.  One set depicted the action the girl took in a short-story described 
to the children, whilst the other set depicted the action the boy took in the story.  
Children circled their answers (boy or girl) on an A4 answer sheet.   
The experimental phase made use of one of two sets of ten laminated A4 cards.  
Each set showed five cards of the boy either opening and looking in or lifting each of 
five differently coloured boxes.  The other five cards in the set showed the girl doing 
the opposite action for the same five coloured boxes.  The actions depending on box 
colour were counterbalanced amongst the two sets of cards, and the two sets were 
counterbalanced among participant groups.  For example, in Set A, the boy looks in the 
orange box while the girl lifts the orange box.  In Set B, the boy lifts the orange box 
while the girl looks in the orange box.  A third set of bound cards (21cm × 14.85cm) 
showed each of the five coloured boxes on its own.  The children circled their answers 
(again, boy or girl) on the same A4 answer sheet as was used in the control portion of 
the task.   
Lift/See task procedure.  The control phase comprised three stories, each 
illustrated on a card.  The three stories were signed to the children as the corresponding 
image was shown:   
Story 1: Sarah and John go out to play in the park.  Sarah falls over and cuts her 
knees and John gets muddy knees.  Who gets sore knees? 
Story 2: John does some colouring while Sarah goes for a long run.  Who gets 
tired out? 
 
 
117 
 
Story 3: John and Sarah are very hungry.  Sarah has a small glass of water and 
John has a big dinner.  Who gets full up? 
In each case the child responded by signing either ‘boy’ or ‘girl.’ The researcher then 
recorded whether the response was correct.   
 The experimental phase consisted of showing the child, one at a time, pictures 
of five differently coloured boxes and being told there was something inside each box.  
For each box the child was then shown corresponding images of the boy and girl, one 
lifting the box and one opening up the box and looking inside.  The child was then 
asked, “Who knows what’s in the box?”  Responses were again recorded as to 
correctness.   
Draw a Man task materials.  The Draw a Man task was used as a measure of 
intellectual ability.  The task was based on that developed by Goodenough and Harris 
(Harris, 1963).  The decision to use the Draw a Man task was based on the fact that the 
task had previously been used as a “largely nonverbal measure of general intellectual 
ability” by Peterson and Siegal (1995), who argued that “in at least one study (Clarke 
School for the Deaf, 1953), it has proved better at predicting deaf children’s academic 
achievement than either the WISC or the Leiter measures” (p. 465).  Peterson and 
Siegal also used the task as a measure of nonverbal IQ score for testing deaf children in 
their 1999 follow up study, as did Russell et al. (1998).  The materials for the Draw a 
Man task were one piece of A4 white paper and one pencil with eraser.   
Draw a Man task procedure.  Each child was asked to draw a picture of a man, 
and to make sure to show the whole man, from his head to his feet.  The child was 
given up to 10 minutes to complete the drawing.  Raw scores were converted to 
standard scores using the Draw a Man Short Scoring Guide (Harris, 1963), which were 
used in the analyses.  
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Experiment 2B Results 
False belief unexpected transfer tasks.  Performance on the Puppet task and 
the Mary task was equal, with 77.8% of participants passing each.  For the Puppet task, 
one participant answered the memory question incorrectly, but all eighteen participants 
correctly answered the reality question.  Fifteen children correctly answered the belief 
question.  For the Mary task, all participants answered both the reality and memory 
questions correctly.  Fourteen of the participants also answered the belief question 
correctly.  While all participants answered the Sally reality question correctly, two 
missed the memory question.  Five students answered the belief question incorrectly, 
with one of those students having also answered the memory question incorrectly for a 
passing rate of 66.7%.   
Pass rates did not differ significantly between the three tasks (p = .304).  To 
examine the effect of question order on performance, two formats were given for the 
Sally task and the Mary task.   No significant difference in either task was found 
between children that had the standard order and those that had the revised order (Sally 
p = .755, Mary p = .814).  
The majority of participants passed all three false belief tasks (n = 11, 61.1%).  
Consistency of performance across the three tasks was assessed using phi statistics.  
Performance between all three tasks was positively, significantly correlated.  
Correlations between the three tasks are shown in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 
Correlations Among FB Tasks for Experiment 2B 
 
 Sally Mary 
Puppet .472* .679** 
Sally - .472* 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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AN task.  Two-thirds (66.7%) of the participants achieved a perfect score of 4 
on the AN task.  An additional 16.7% obtained a score of 3, resulting in a total passing 
rate of 88.2% for the task.  The mean number of correct pairs produced was 3.53, out of 
4.   
CC task.  Participants’ performance was perfect on the CC task.  All 
participants achieved a full score of 4 on the task, resulting in a passing rate of 100%.  
DCCS.  The majority of participants (83.3%) achieved a full score of 5 on the 
DCCS.  One participant scored a 4 on the task, and the remaining two participants 
scored a 3 on the task.  None of the participants scored less than 3 on the task.  The 
passing rate for the task was 88.9% and the mean score was 4.72 (SD = 0.67).  
DNS.  Performance on the DNS was also nearly perfect.  The criterion for 
determining whether a participant passed or failed the task was the same as was used 
for Experiments 1B and 2A.  Seventeen of the eighteen participants achieved a full 
score 16.  The one participant that did not pass the task with a score of 14 or higher had 
a score of 13.  The mean score was 15.83.   
Smarties task.  Fourteen of the eighteen children (77.8%) responded correctly 
to the other’s belief question, and nine (50.0%) responded correctly to the own belief 
question.  All nine of those who responded correctly to the own belief question also 
responded correctly to the other’s belief question, resulting in a total of nine children 
who correctly answered both task questions.   
Tunnel task.  Ten of the eighteen participants (55.6%) gave correct answers for 
all four test trials.  An additional four children (22.2%) responded correctly to three 
trials.  The mean score on the Tunnel task was 3.22 out of 4.  Children responded better 
to the ‘feel’ trials than the ‘see’ trials.  Sixteen children (88.9%) answered correctly for 
the bags trial, followed by 83.3% for the boxes, 77.8% for the socks, and 72.2% for the 
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toothbrushes.  A non-parametric Friedman test showed no significant difference in 
responses based on stimuli, χ²(3) = 2.308, p = .511.   
Backward Explanation task.  The majority of participants (n = 13, 72.2%) 
answered the Backward Explanation task correctly.   
 Lift/See task.  The maximum for the control portion of the task was 3, which all 
but two participants achieved (n = 16, 88.9%).  Those two participants that did not score 
100% on the control portion received a score of 2 out of 3.  The test portion of the task 
had a maximum score of 5.  Of the 18 participants, 14 (77.8%) received the maximum 
score, with an additional participant scoring a 4.  For consistency with the scoring 
system for the DCCS, which also had a maximum score of 5, a score of 4 or better was 
considered passing for this task.  The pass rate was 83.3%.  The mean score on the task 
was 4.39 (SD = 1.38).  
 Comparison of tasks.  Correlations and partial correlations between tasks after 
controlling for age and standard scores from the Draw a Man task are shown in Table 
3.5.  Potential scores ranged as follows: maximum of 2 for Smarties task, maximum of 
4 for Tunnel, AN, and CC tasks, maximum of 16 for DNS task, maximum of 5 for 
DCCS and Lift/See tasks, maximum of 3 for FB tasks, and maximum of 1 for 
Backward Explanation task.   
Age was significantly, positively related to performance on the Lift/See task and 
negatively related to standard Draw a Man scores. The Smarties task was strongly, 
significantly related to FB performance, even after controlling for age and Draw a Man 
scores. DNS scores were significantly related to performance on the tunnel performance; 
this relationship was marginally non-significant when controlling for age and Draw a 
Man scores.  Lift/See and AN scores were not initially correlated; when controlling for 
age and Draw a Man scores they were strongly, significantly, positively related.  
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Table 3.5 
Correlations between Age and Experimental Task Scores from Experiment 2B 
(Partial correlations controlling for age and Draw a Man standard score in parentheses)  
 
 
 Smarties Tunnel AN DNS DCCS FB 
Backward 
Explanation Lift/See 
Draw a 
Man 
Age -.217 -.254 -.350 -.303 .178 -.066 .354 .482* -.500* 
Smarties - .462 -.198 .386 .148 .823*** -.094 -.152 .577* 
Tunnel (.457) - .189 .523* -.157 .254 .134 -.304 .222 
AN (-.154) (.161) - -.139 .080 -.013 -.054 .318 -.112 
DNS (.368) (.481†) (-.228) - -.104 .274 -.150 -.111 .265 
DCCS (-.216) (-.223) (.291) (-.046) - .324 -.265 .124 .255 
FB (.767**) (.238) (.106) (.311) (-.053) - -.216 .209 .441 
BE (.022) (.254) (.104) (-.070) (-.366) (-.183) - .180 -.190 
LS (-.100) (-.218) (.628*) (.056) (-.022) (.290) (.028) - -.233 
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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 To compare performance on the tasks, scores for tasks were converted to 
pass/fail scores.  AN, CC, DNS, and DCCS scores were judged as passing based on 
criteria previously discussed.  Children were considered to have passed the Smarties 
task if they correctly answered both task questions.  For consistency with AN and CC 
scores, which are also based on a scale of 0 to 4, Tunnel scores were deemed as passing 
if they were 3 or above.  As there were three FB tasks in this experiment, a passing FB 
score was 2 out of 3 tasks correct.  For consistency with a passing score on the DCCS, 
the Lift/See task was considered as passed with at least 4 correct trials.  Pass rates were 
compared using McNemar’s test to determine which pass rates were significantly 
different from each other.  CC task was excluded from these analyses given that the 
pass rate was at ceiling.  Results from the McNemar’s analyses indicated that the 
Smarties task was significantly more difficult than the DCCS (p = .039) and the DNS (p 
= .008).  No other tasks differed in terms of difficulty. Pass rates for the nine tasks are 
presented in Table 3.6.  
Table 3.6 
Pass Rates for Each Task in Experiment 2B 
Task Pass Criterion Pass Rate 
Smarties 2 of 2 50% 
Tunnel 3 of 4 77.8% 
AN 3 of 4 83.3% 
CC 3 of 4 100.0% 
DNS 14 of 16 94.4% 
DCCS 4 of 5 88.9% 
FB 2 of 3 72.2% 
Backward 
Explanation 1 of 1 72.2% 
Lift/See 4 of 5 83.3% 
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Experiment 2B Discussion  
 One of the primary questions associated with conducting Experiment 2B was 
whether the order of the questions presented in the false belief unexpected transfer task 
had some influence on performance.  After working with the children in Experiment 2A 
and seeing them answering the first question asked during the task with the present 
location of the object, the question was raised as to whether children were 
misinterpreting the question being asked.  According to Adams (1997), hearing parents 
with children who have a lesser degree of hearing loss or use a hearing aid “may believe 
that their children can understand more of what is happening in their environment than 
they actually do” (p. 77).  The children often receive distorted information or may 
misinterpret information they receive.  Mbaluka, Kurebwa, and Wadesango (2013) 
stated that not only may parents misinterpret facts stated be their children, but children 
may also fail to comprehend what their parents say.  
 As a deaf child growing up with hearing parents and siblings, it stands to reason 
that there are countless instances of misunderstanding on the part of the deaf child.  
These children may therefore develop the tendency to try to further interpret what they 
are being told in an attempt to avoid misunderstandings, particularly in the case of 
dealing with a hearing conversational partner.  This was the reasoning behind 
implementing a variation on the unexpected transfer task; perhaps while children 
understood the belief question being asked of them, they did not understand the value of 
answering the question directly, but instead thought the asker was instead querying the 
location of the object.  This would explain the tendency for these children to offer the 
location at which the object was presently located in response to the first question being 
asked, rather than providing the correct answer.  
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 Based on the findings from Experiment 2B, however, this does not appear to be 
the case.  If this were indeed the case, it would be expected that deaf children perform 
much better on the revised version of the unexpected transfer task than on the standard 
version.  As witnessed, however, there was no significant difference on tasks based on 
whether the standard order or reversed order was used.  This suggests that there is 
something inherently difficult in the question itself for deaf children.   
 The vast difference in performance between the Puppet and Sally tasks that was 
witnessed in Experiment 2A was not replicated in Experiment 2B.  While there was still 
a difference in passing rate between the two tasks in favour of the Puppet task, it was 
approximately an 11% difference rather than a 50% difference.  Additionally, 
performance was equal on the Puppet and Mary FB tasks, despite the fact that the Mary 
task does not involve deception and is a passive task for the child.   
 The passing rate on the Sally task was improved in Experiment 2B over that in 
2A.  Additionally, whereas the Sally and Puppet task performances were not correlated 
in Experiment 2A, the two tasks were significantly, positively related among the sample 
from Experiment 2B.  The Puppet task and Mary task were also strongly correlated.  
This discrepancy between Experiments 2A and 2B may warrant further research to 
establish whether individual differences or the nature of the sample can explain the 
difference in performance on the Sally task between the two groups.  
 Performance on the other tasks in common between the two experiments was 
identical.  Both groups had 83.3% pass the AN task, 100% pass the CC task, 94.4% 
pass the DNS, and 88.9% pass the DCCS.  The results from Experiment 2B therefore 
provide further support that the delay is false-belief specific, rather than being related to 
metalinguistic awareness or executive functioning.   
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 Passing rates were identical for the FB tasks and the Backward Explanation 
task, suggesting equivalent difficulty of tasks.  This stands in contrast with Robinson 
and Mitchell’s (1995) claim that the task was easier than the typical false belief task, 
which they claimed masked children’s insight into the representational character of 
mind.  This result is consistent, rather, with that discussed by Perner, Lang, and Kloo 
(2002), who found little evidence that the explanation task works better than the typical 
prediction task.   
Passing rates on the Tunnel, Lift/See, and AN tasks were all fairly similar, 
indicating a similar level of difficulty for children.  The Tunnel task proved slightly 
more difficult for children, although over three-quarters of them were able to pass the 
task with three out of four correct trials.  Results regarding the errors made were similar 
to those described by O’Neill et al. (1992).  O’Neill and colleagues indicated that the 
dominant error was to respond with the same chosen action on all four trials, and this 
chosen action was the feel the object rather than look at it; similarly, the most errors 
were made on the two ‘see’ trials, indicating that children preferred the ‘feel’ choice, 
regardless of whether it would help them to identify the requisite characteristic.   
The Smarties task proved the most difficult for the children.  While the number 
of correct responses to the other belief question was fairly consistent with the passing 
rate for the unexpected transfer FB tasks, the own belief question proved quite difficult 
for the children.  Only half of the children were able to correctly state that prior to being 
shown the pencils, they thought Smarties were inside the tube.  While it may intuitively 
seem that children should be better at identifying their own false beliefs because of their 
personal experience of having that belief, this appears not to be the case.  This indicates 
that perhaps this group of children particularly struggles with self-assessment and 
introspection as to their own beliefs.  
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Study 2 General Conclusion 
 Study 2 was conducted to serve two primary purposes.  Firstly it was aimed at 
assessing whether the close relationship found between theory of mind and alternative 
naming development found among hearing children extends to the special population of 
deaf children.  This group of children was of particular interest given the literature that 
highlights their struggles with the ability to pass the typical false-belief test.  Secondly, 
given the delay found among deaf children, it was of interest to determine the extent of 
the delay or impairment and whether it extends beyond theory of mind to other areas of 
cognition.   
 Evidence from Experiments 2A and 2B suggest that the relationship witnessed 
in Study 1 does not extend to deaf children.  While there may be some underlying 
mechanism that promotes development of theory of mind and metalinguistic awareness 
in close conjunction among hearing children, it does not appear that a similar 
mechanism exists for deaf children.  Alternately, perhaps the mechanism is in place for 
all children, but due to lacking some specific form of input, deaf children are unable to 
develop theory of mind beyond a certain point to an explicit ability.   
 The positive outcome to this study is that deaf children do not appear to be 
particularly delayed, at least not to the extent as visible with false belief understanding, 
on a broader range of cognitive skills.  While manipulations of the false belief task 
perhaps enhance false belief ability to some extent, the passing rate was still well below 
what would be expected from groups of children with these ages.  Understanding what 
specific abilities are delayed, however, may help future researchers in working towards 
closing the gap between hearing and deaf children in regards to theory of mind through 
early intervention strategies.   
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Chapter Four  
Study 3: Ghanaian Theory of Mind 
Introduction 
 Information gleaned from the review of the literature on deafness and theory of 
mind teamed with the results of the previous study results indicate there is a persistent 
deficit in theory of mind, or perhaps more specifically, understanding and application of 
false belief in pertinent situations, amongst deaf children.  Based on the results of Study 
2, it appears theory of mind development is most retarded, with metalinguistic 
awareness and aspects of executive functioning less difficult for school aged deaf 
children.   
While historically deaf and hard of hearing students were primarily placed in 
schools exclusively for children with hearing difficulties, there has been a shift in 
placement over the past few decades, with 85% of deaf and hard of hearing children in 
the U.S. aged 6 through 21 years being either fully or partially mainstreamed (Schick et 
al., 2012).  Due to economic, social, and legal changes, mainstreaming into public 
schools is now the norm within the U.S. (Hall, 2005).  Similarly, the majority of deaf 
children in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland are educated in mainstream schools 
(Haynes, 2012).  Results from a survey conducted by the Consortium for Research into 
Deaf Education (CRIDE) indicated that 86% of school-aged deaf children in Scotland 
attend mainstream schools, of which 8% attend mainstream schools with resource 
provision (NDCS, 2013).  Additionally, only about 9% of deaf children in Scotland use 
sign language, either on its own (2%) or with English (7%; NDCS, 2013).  
In addition to there being fewer specialized schools for the deaf due to increases 
in inclusion within the U.S. and the U.K., children are also receiving cochlear implants 
at an increased rate.  According to a study by Bradham and Jones (2008) based on 2000 
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U.S. Census Data, approximately 55% of children with severe to profound hearing loss 
between the ages of 12 months and 6 years had received a cochlear implant.  Hyde and 
Power (2005) estimated the implantation rate in the U.K. to be approximately 73%, and 
approximately 80% in Australia and Sweden.  It is also noteworthy that these 
percentages refer only to children with cochlear implants, and do not indicate the 
number of children who have other forms of amplification and support, such as hearing 
aids.  
The challenges of obtaining sufficient numbers of deaf children to take part in 
research combined with the reduced number of children that do not have hearing 
modifications makes it difficult to obtain a sample that is useful for teasing apart the 
nature of the observed deficit.  While it may be easy to dismiss the need for such 
research by stating that with fewer numbers of deaf children that do not receive 
cochlear implants in early childhood the need for understanding the underlying 
mechanisms of the delay is reduced, there still remain a large portion of children who 
would still benefit from such knowledge.  As the estimates of percentage of young 
children with severe to profound deafness that receive a cochlear implant in developed 
countries can range from 55-80%, this means that up to half of these children will still 
experience severe limitations to language input.   
Additionally, in many non-Western countries cochlear implants and hearing aids 
are not available or are simply too expensive for practical implementation.  “At least 
one-third of the world’s population lives in poverty, and a disproportionate number of 
deaf individuals live in these environments;” therefore implants are only available to a 
fraction of children worldwide who would benefit from them (Saunders & Barrs, 2011, 
p. 74).  It is estimated that 278 million people in the world have debilitating hearing 
loss, with approximately 80% of these people living in poor, developing countries 
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(Saunders & Barrs, 2011).  While there are “no comprehensive population studies for 
Africa [regarding hearing loss]… the available studies suggest that the prevalence is 
high” (Saunders & Barrs, 2011, p. 74).  As such, the understanding of why there is a 
delay in false belief understanding among deaf children without early exposure to 
signed language remains important worldwide.   
As there were limitations with obtaining sufficient sample sizes in the U.S. and 
U.K., the decision was made to explore recruiting participants in other countries, 
particularly in one in which the prevalence of cochlear implantation is low.  Ultimately 
the decision was made to work with a large school for the deaf in central Ghana.  There 
are several schools for the deaf in Ghana, and the Cape Coast School for the Deaf, also 
known as Cape Deaf, is the only such school within the Central Region of Ghana.  The 
choice of Ghana as a site for data collection was made based on the researcher’s 
previous experience as a volunteer teacher in Ghana, an experience during which she 
became familiar with Cape Deaf and found she was able to communicate with deaf 
individuals there as the sign language was a variant of ASL.   
There have been relatively few studies examining differences in theory of mind 
development based on culture.  Wellman et al.’s (2001) meta-analysis suggested there 
may be slight differences in the age at which children typically pass a false-belief test 
based on country of origin: children in the U.S., U.K., and Korea perform similarly, 
with children in Australia and Canada performing slightly better and those in Austria 
and Japan performing slightly worse.  One of the few available studies of false-belief 
among African children indicated that the children were able to demonstrate false belief 
understanding at an age similar to Western children (Avis & Harris, 1991).   
Despite the lack of clarity regarding cultural differences in false-belief 
performance in the literature, the aim of the present study was to evaluate deaf 
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performance in relation to their hearing counterparts, rather than comparing deaf 
children from different countries.  A sample of young, hearing Ghanaian children was 
therefore also recruited to take part in this study.  This group of children was also drawn 
from the Central Region of Ghana.   
Experiment 3A was designed to evaluate theory of mind, metalinguistic 
awareness, and executive functioning skills among deaf Ghanaian children.  Experiment 
3B was qualitative in nature, and was designed to provide a perspective of teachers’ 
experience with and theories regarding Ghanaian student performance.  Experiment 3C 
was designed to specifically evaluate theory of mind skills among hearing Ghanaian 
children to serve as a cultural control against which theory of mind performance among 
the deaf children could be compared.   
Experiment 3A Method 
 Setting.  All participants were drawn from Cape Coast School for the Deaf, 
located in Cape Coast in the Central Region of Ghana.  Education of the deaf in Ghana 
was introduced by Rev. Dr. Andrew Jackson Forster in the late 1950s.  In 1957, Dr. 
Forster, an African-American Deaf Evangelist, opened a class of 13 deaf students at 
Christianborg Presby Middle School in Accra.  After further development on the part of 
Dr. Forster, the Ghanaian government recognized the need for deaf education and took 
over the administration of the school in 1962.  Training of teachers of the deaf began 
shortly thereafter based on the recommendation of the NUF Field Foundation and 
Commonwealth Relation Office.  There are now 13 basic schools for the deaf in Ghana, 
of which Cape Coast School for the Deaf is one (E. Abiew, personal communication, 
June 29, 2011).   
 The Cape Coast School for the Deaf was started in November of 1970.  The 
school was established with the aim to provide formal education to hearing impaired 
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school-aged children in Cape Coast and the surrounding region.  The school began with 
15 pupils, 10 of which were boys.  The school was initially run as a foster system 
whereby the pupils stayed with foster parents.  In 1994 the school was moved to its 
current premises and serves as a boarding school for many of its students.  As of late 
2010, 394 students attended the school.  The school offers 2 to 3 years of pre-school 
education, 6 years of primary education, 4 years of junior secondary education, and an 
optional 3 years of technical and vocational training.  Classes at the school follow the 
same curriculum as presented in hearing schools, with some adaptations.  At the end of 
the course students must take a final examination set by the West African exams 
Councils and National Vocational Training Institute for certification along with their 
hearing counterparts (E. Abiew, personal communication, June 29, 2011).  
Participants.  Seventy deaf students (34 male, 36 female) from the Cape Coast 
region in Ghana served as participants in the study.  Their ages ranged from 8;6 (8 years 
and 6 months) to 24;3 (mean age of 15;6, SD = 44.125 months).   
Design.  Each child was tested in two sessions.  The first session was conducted 
individually with the researcher and consisted of six tasks: a modified Smarties task, the 
Tunnel task, the AN task, the CC task, the DNS task, and the DCCS.  The order of these 
six tasks was fully counterbalanced among participants.  The second session was 
conducted in a small group setting, consisting of 4-8 students, the researcher, and a 
teacher from the school to aid in communication.  The second session also included six 
tasks, the order of which was counterbalanced: the Draw a Man task, the Puppet FB 
task, the Mary FB task, the Sally FB task, the Backward Explanation task, and the 
Lift/See task.   
Materials and procedure.  While some of the tasks were presented using the 
same materials as used in Experiment 2B, several tasks were modified to reflect objects 
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relevant to Ghanaian children.  All communication, including task instructions, was 
conducted in Ghanaian Sign Language, which is a variety of American Sign Language 
and is the primary form of communication at the school.  
Modified Smarties task materials.  As the Ghanaian children are unfamiliar 
with the candy Smarties, the task was modified to use a container that would be familiar 
to children.  For the task, a small yellow cardboard box that had previously had teabags 
in it was used.  The box had a picture of a cup of tea on it so the children would 
understand that it held teabags.  Inside the box were six small coloured pencils 
(Appendix C).   
Modified Smarties task procedure.  In the task, the experimenter showed the 
child the box of tea and asked “What do you think is inside the box?”  After the child 
responded with “tea”, the box was opened to show the child that instead of tea there 
were coloured pencils inside.  The child was then asked two test questions, as follows. 
Other knowledge question: If your teacher walked in and looked at the box, what 
would (s)he think is inside?  
Own knowledge question: Before I opened the box and showed you what was inside, 
what did you think was inside? 
FB task materials.  The materials for the three false belief tasks varied slightly 
from those used in Experiment 2B.  The materials for the Puppet task remained the 
same: one green frog puppet, a small box with a removable lid, a small key, and a piece 
of white paper.  Sally task made use of two small dolls (1 male, 1 female), one small 
black jar, one small black box with a hinged lid, and one marble.  The Mary task used 
two small dolls (a ‘mother’ doll and a ‘Mary’ doll), a toy refrigerator, a toy cupboard, 
and a small square candy called Chocomilo.  The primary difference in materials for the 
Sally and Mary tasks was the ethnicity of the dolls used (brown colouring versus light 
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colouring) and the culture-specific candy.  Additionally, as the false belief tasks were 
administered in a small group setting, each of the three tasks used one half A4 sheet of 
paper per participant on which the participants circled their answers.  The Puppet task 
showed a piece of paper and the box with removable lid as options for the three 
questions asked in the task; the Sally task showed the jar and the box as options for the 
three questions; and the Mary task showed the refrigerator and the cupboard as options 
for the three questions.  Photographs of the manipulative materials used for the Sally 
and Mary tasks are presented in Appendix C along with illustrations used on the 
response papers.  
FB task procedures.  While the materials varied slightly from Experiment 2B, 
the procedures remained largely the same.  The manipulation of materials was 
conducted in the same manner as previously explained, although when participants 
were asked the three questions for each task they were told to circle their answer on the 
response sheet in front of them.  Students were also reminded by the experimenter and 
the teacher present that they should keep their eyes on their own papers and not look to 
their neighbour’s paper for help.   
Backward Explanation and Lift/See tasks.  The Backward Explanation task 
and the Lift/See task were administered very similar as for Experiment 2B.  The 
materials differed, however, in that all pictures were of African children (brown 
skinned) rather than Caucasian children.  Additionally, as these tasks were administered 
in the group setting, each child was given a half sheet of paper for the Backward 
Explanation task and a whole sheet of paper for the Lift/See task to record their 
answers.  Examples of these response forms are provided in Appendix C. 
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Tunnel task.  The materials and procedure for the Tunnel task were identical as 
to what was described for Experiment 2b, apart from the use of a purple spoon in place 
of a red crayon in the instructional phase.  
AN, CC, DNS, DCCS, and Draw a Man tasks.  The materials and procedures 
for the AN task, CC task, DNS task, DCCS task, and Draw a Man task were identical to 
those as described for Studies 1 and 2.   
Experiment 3A Results 
False Belief Unexpected Transfer tasks.  Of the three False Belief Unexpected 
Transfer tasks, performance was best on the Puppet task (37.1% passing), slightly lower 
on the Sally task (32.9%), and lowest on the Mary task (24.3%).  Pass rates did not 
differ significantly based on task, however (p = .157).  A summary of the response rates 
for the questions associated with the three tasks is presented in Table 4.1.  As both the 
Sally task and Mary task were given in two formats, one with the standard order of 
questions and the other with a revised order of questions, these two tasks were 
examined further to determine if question order had an effect on performance.  In the 
Sally task, no significant difference was found between children that had the standard 
order and those that had the revised order (p = .274).  However, children that were 
administered the standard version of the Mary task performed better (35.3% passing) 
than those that received the revised version (13.9% passing), t(59.872) = 2.105, p = 
.039.   
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Table 4.1 
FB Task Pass Rates for Experiment 3A 
 
Task 
Question   
Passed Reality  Memory Belief 
Puppet 75.1% 51.4% 47.1% 37.1% 
Sally 74.3% 52.9% 44.3% 32.9% 
Mary 70.0% 48.6% 47.1% 24.3% 
 
Less than 10% of the sample passed all three false belief tasks (n = 5, 7.1%).  
The largest portion of participants did not pass any of the three false belief tasks (n = 
31, 44.3%).  Slightly over two-thirds of the group failed the false-belief portion of the 
experiment by passing fewer than two of the three tasks (n = 48, 68.6%).  To test for 
consistency in performance across the three measures, phi statistics were calculated.  
While performance on the Sally task was significantly, positively related to 
performance on both the Puppet task (rφ = .406, p < .001) and the Mary task (rφ = .242, 
p = .043), Puppet task performance and Mary task performance were not significantly 
correlated, rφ = .116, p = .338.   
AN task.  Slightly over half of the participants (55.7%) achieved a passing score 
of 3 or 4 on the AN task.  Twenty-four achieved a score of 3 and fifteen achieved a 
perfect score.  The mean score was 2.50 pairs produced.  If broken down from pairs into 
individual answers for a total score of 8, 77.2% achieved a score of 6 or better.   
CC task.  The participants performed overwhelmingly better on the similarly 
designed CC task than the AN task.  Of the 70 participants, 69 of them achieved perfect 
scores of 4, with the remaining participant achieving a score of 3.  The mean score was 
3.99.   
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DCCS.  The majority of participants (72.9%) achieved a full score of 5 on the 
DCCS.  However, there was a sizeable group that did not sort any of the cards correctly 
(17.1%), with only 10% of participants achieving a partial score.  The mean score was 
3.87 (SD = 1.98).  
DNS.  Performance on the DNS was also nearly perfect.  Sixty-six participants 
received a full score of 16, with only one participant achieving a score of less than 14.  
The mean score was 15.79, with a standard deviation of 1.34.  
Modified Smarties task.  On the other belief question, 18 (25.7%) of 
participants responded correctly, while the other 52 (74.3%) responded incorrectly.  On 
the own belief question, only 13 (18.6%) of participants responded correctly, with 57 
(81.4%) responding incorrectly.  When looking at the scores cumulatively, seven (10%) 
participants passed both questions, 17 (24.3%) passed one question, and 46 (65.7%) did 
not pass either question.   
Tunnel task.  Of the 70 children, 15 (21.4%) gave correct answers for all four 
test trials.  Twenty-two (31.4%) responded correctly to three trials, with the remaining 
47.1% responding correctly to two or fewer trials.  The mean score was 2.64 out of 4.  
Children responded better to the ‘feel’ trials than the ‘see’ trials; 80% correctly 
responded to the bags and 77% correctly responded to the juice boxes; 59% responded 
correctly to the socks and 49% responded correctly to the toothbrushes.  A Friedman 
test showed there was a significant difference between one or more stimuli pairs, χ²(3) = 
21.127, p < .001.  Post-hoc testing using a Bonferroni correction (α = .05/6 = .0083) 
showed that children performed significantly better on the juice box trial than on the 
toothbrush trial (p = .002) and significantly better on the bag trial than on either the 
toothbrush trial (p = .001) or the sock trial (p = .007).   
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Backward Explanation task.  The majority of participants (72.9%) answered 
the Backward Explanation task incorrectly.   
 Lift/See task.  The maximum for the control portion of the task was 3, which 
38.6% of participants achieved.  A further 38.6% received a score of 2, with 22.8% 
scoring 0 or 1.  The test portion of the task had a maximum score of 5.  Of the 70 
participants, 22 (31.4%) received the maximum score, with a further 6 (8.6%) scoring 4 
and 21 (30%) scoring 3.  The mean score was 3.29 (SD = 1.44).  
 Comparison of tasks.  Correlations and partial correlations between tasks after 
controlling for age and standard scores from the Draw a Man task are shown in Table 
4.2.  Age was significantly, positively related to performance on the FB tasks, 
Backwards Explanation task, and Lift/See task, and negatively related to standard Draw 
a Man scores.  DCCS scores significantly, positively correlated with performance on 
the majority of the other tasks: Tunnel, AN, CC, FB, Backwards Explanation, and 
Lift/See.  Once age and Draw a Man scores were partialled out, DCCS remained 
significantly, moderately correlated with Tunnel, AN, and FB scores.  While AN task 
scores were positively correlated with CC and FB scores, only the relationship between 
AN and CC remained significant after partialling out age and Draw a Man scores.   
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Table 4.2 
Correlations between Age and Experimental Task Scores from Experiment 3A 
(Partial correlations controlling for age and Draw a Man standard score in parentheses)  
 
 
 Smarties Tunnel AN CC DNS DCCS FB 
Backward 
Explanation Lift/See Draw a Man 
Age .000 .035 .164 .029 .097 .208 .369** .435** .324** -.267* 
Smarties - -.135 -.178 .080 .042 .043 -.005 .028 .032 -.019 
Tunnel (-.133) - .046 .082 -.084 .338** .101 .061 .150 .169 
AN (-.179) (.034) - .263* -.061 .398** .241* .183 .210 -.004 
CC (.081) (.076) (.261*) - -.019 .237* -.007 .073 .193 .028 
DNS (.014) (-.076) (-.076) (-.020) - -.093 .133 .026 -.073 -.093 
DCCS (.049) (.316**) (.376**) (.234) (-.105) - .314** .236* .243* .114 
FB (-.002) (.071) (.193) (-.024) (.116) (.242*) - .133 .144 .025 
BE (.039) (-.004) (.118) (.060) (.002) (.120) (-.077) - .216 .138 
LS (.036) (.131) (.165) (.192) (-.105) (.175) (.014) (.060) - .007 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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 To compare performance on the tasks, scores for tasks were converted to 
pass/fail scores according to the same requirements as indicated in Experiment 2B.  
Pass rates were then compared using McNemar’s test.  CC task was excluded from 
these analyses given that the pass rate was at ceiling.  Pass rates for the nine tasks are 
presented in Table 4.3.  
Table 4.3 
Pass Rates for Each Task in Experiment 3A 
Task Pass Criterion Pass Rate 
Smarties 2 of 2 10.0% 
Tunnel 3 of 4 52.9% 
AN 3 of 4 55.7% 
CC 3 of 4 100.0% 
DNS 14 of 16 98.6% 
DCCS 4 of 5 74.3% 
FB 2 of 3 31.4% 
Backward 
Explanation 1 of 1 27.1% 
Lift/See 4 of 5 40.0% 
 
 Results from the McNemar’s analyses were used to group tasks according to 
difficulty.  Table 4.4 indicates task grouping.  Those tasks that did not differ 
significantly appear in the same column. As indicated, the Smarties task was 
significantly more difficult than all other tasks administered, while the DNS was 
significantly easier than all other tasks, apart from the CC task.  
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Table 4.4 
Order of Task Difficulty for Experiment 3A 
Most Difficult    Least Difficult 
Smarties 
(10.0%) 
Backward Exp. 
(27.1%) Lift/See (40.0%) DCCS (74.3%) DNS (98.6%) 
 FB (31.4%) Tunnel (52.9%)   
 Lift/See (40.0%) AN (55.7%)   
 
Experiment 3A Discussion 
 The results of Experiment 3A indicate a similar pattern to that seen in 
Experiment 2B with deaf children from the U.K.  However, children in the present 
study generally performed worse on tasks than the children included in the sample of 
Experiment 2B.  Among the sample of 18 deaf children from the U.K. in Experiment 
2B, half passed the Smarties task, the lowest pass rate in that group.  The Smarties task 
was also the most difficult for the Ghanaian sample, but the pass rate was just 10%, far 
lower than that seen among the U.K. sample.  While performance on the DNS task was 
similar between the two groups, and in fact slightly higher among the Ghanaians (U.K. 
94.4%, Ghanaian 98.6%), the Ghanaian group demonstrated lower pass rates on all 
other tasks.  The lower success rates are likely due to the nature of deaf education and 
early childhood for deaf children in Ghana.  Many of the deaf children at the Cape 
Coast School for the Deaf do not begin attending school until they are 7, 8, 9, 10 years, 
or even older.  None of the children have hearing aids or cochlear implants, and the 
majority of their parents have no sign language knowledge.  As such, they have very 
little linguistic input until they begin attending school.  The extensive delays in access 
to language, which is much more pronounced than in the U.K. and other Western 
countries, likely leads to even greater delays in developing skills.   
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 Table 4.5 illustrates the comparison between the sample from the U.K. and the 
Ghanaian sample on the nine tasks administered, from lowest to highest pass rate.  As 
can be seen, the order of pass rates is very similar between the two groups, with only 
two discrepancies: the U.K. group had equivalent pass rates on the Backward 
Explanation task and the FB tasks, while the Ghanaian group performed slightly lower 
on the Backward Explanation task, and performance on the Tunnel and Lift/See tasks 
were reversed between the two groups.   
Table 4.5 
Comparison of UK and Ghanaian Pass Rates 
Task UK Pass Rate  Ghana Pass Rate Task 
Smarties 50% Most difficult 10.0% Smarties 
Backward 
Explanation 72.2% 
 27.1% Backward Explanation 
FB 72.2%  31.4% FB 
Tunnel 77.8%  40.0% Lift/See 
Lift/See 83.3%  52.9% Tunnel 
AN 83.3%  55.7% AN 
DCCS 88.9%  74.3% DCCS 
DNS 94.4%  98.6% DNS 
CC 100.0% Least difficult 100.0% CC 
 
 Despite the similarity in pattern of performance on the tasks between the group 
from the U.K. and the Ghanaian group, differences were witnessed in the correlations of 
task performances.  Among the Scottish group, age was positively correlated with 
performance on the Lift/See task and negatively related to Draw a Man standard scores.  
These two relationships remained among Ghanaian participants, with the addition of 
positive correlations between age and performance on the FB and Backward 
Explanation tasks.   
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 After age and Draw a Man scores were partialled out, only the FB and Smarties 
tasks and AN and Lift/See tasks remained correlated among the U.K. sample.  These 
relationships did not exist among the Ghanaian sample.  Rather, among the Ghanaians, 
after partialling out age and Draw a Man scores, the DCCS remained positively 
correlated with the Tunnel, AN, and FB tasks, and the AN and CC tasks were positively 
correlated.   
 The correlation between DCCS score and Tunnel, AN, and FB tasks suggests 
there are elements of set-shifting and inhibitory control in each of these tasks.  The 
correlation between DCCS scores and FB tasks supports previous research by Kloo and 
Perner (2003), in which training children in either executive skills or false belief 
understanding enhanced performance on the other skill.  Given the stark contrast in 
passing rates between the FB tasks and DCCS task, however, it is clear that while there 
may be elements of executive functioning that are necessary for passing the false belief 
task, this is not the defining element and there remains some other skill or 
understanding that has yet to be fully developed among this group of deaf children.   
The individuals that work most closely with these deaf children and witness 
their development over time is their teachers.  Therefore, for Experiment 3B, a focus 
group was held with a group of teacheres in order to get a feel for what deficits and 
delays the teachers witness in the classrooms and in their interactions with their 
students.    
Experiment 3B Method 
Participants.  Participants included five teachers from the Cape Coast School 
for the Deaf.  The subjects taught by the teachers were science, English, and 
kindergarten.  The teachers had been teaching at the school for between 6 weeks and 17 
years.     
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Design.  A focus group was conducted in which qualitative data were collected.  
The researcher met with the five participating teachers for one 20 minute session to 
discuss aspects related to working with deaf students.   The session was videotaped and 
later transcribed by the researcher.  Due to the setting in which the focus group was 
conducted, in a classroom during a break while students played nearby outside, some 
portions of the audio were unable to be transcribed due to heightened background noise.  
These appear in the transcript as [inaudible].  The transcript is included in Appendix D. 
Experiment 3B Results 
 Prior to beginning the interview portion involving discussing their experiences 
in working with the children, the participants were asked about the requisite training for 
becoming a teacher of the deaf and whether they had experience in teaching hearing 
children.  Responses indicated that they must attend university to study education, and 
they must focus on special education specifically in order to be a teacher of the deaf.  In 
addition to studying their discipline, such as mathematics, they also had to take 
specialised courses in educational behaviour, human behaviour, and mental issues.  All 
participants indicated they had previous experience in teaching hearing children, as this 
was part of the process of becoming a special education teacher.  
Participants indicated that they had different experiences that led to them 
becoming special education/deaf teachers.  One indicated that many go into special 
education because of a mentor they have.  This was the case for one participant, who 
stated this was her reason for coming to the school.  Another mentioned that her interest 
in special education was piqued after taking a course for her teaching program.  The 
two male teachers indicated it was their personal interaction with deaf people and deaf 
students that inspired them to pursue teaching deaf students.  One stated, “I personally 
met some deaf students who were signing.  They were signing and laughing, and you 
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know, attracted me, and I decided to go do the course.”  The other also mentioned that 
he needed an additional language for his schooling and decided to pursue sign language 
after meeting a deaf person.  The fifth participant mentioned a personal connection that 
inspired her to pursue teaching the deaf: “My father fell sick and couldn’t talk and he 
was writing, so my passion developed from that, personally.” 
 A thematic analysis of responses to interview questions was conducted to 
identify key themes and subthemes related to the general research question concerning 
their experiences in working with deaf children.  Key themes that emerged included: 
Differences from hearing students, barriers to learning, barriers to teaching, and 
differences due to language background.  Some utterances were unique to one theme, 
whereas others were applicable to more than one theme.   
 Barriers to teaching.  The primary theme extracted from the transcribed 
interview was regarding barriers to teaching that the teachers experience.  There were 
12 utterances that were associated with this theme.  Subthemes included conceptual 
learning, language skills, and quantity.  
 Conceptual learning.  Several of the teachers mentioned that the deaf children 
had a particularly difficult time grasping abstract concepts.  They stated that they very 
often had to have some concrete materials available to try to convey concepts, which 
was more difficult when the concept was something abstract.  Teacher E stated: “They 
find it difficult to understand abstracts and concepts, so always need to use a lot of 
materials.  So when they are not a good use of materials, it is very difficult.” Later in 
the interview he went on: “They need a lot of materials, those materials can be quite 
simple… [inaudible].  So you can teach a whole lesson with the wrong materials, so 
you are always nervous.”   
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The teachers also mentioned that teaching abstract concepts can be especially 
difficult due to the fact that “before you finish talking, they assume what you are going 
to say.  They go and then do different thing” (Teacher C).  This was highlighted in the 
video of the interview by Teacher A mimicking the students and repeatedly making the 
sign for KNOW to the laughter of the other teachers.  Teacher B agreed that this makes 
it hard to get concepts across to the students and stated that “sometimes they get one 
concept out of what you are telling them and it gets totally confused.”  
Language skills.  The language skills, or lack of skills, proved a great barrier to 
the teachers.  This was partly due to inherent differences in English and the signed 
language.  Teacher B illustrated this point when describing what makes teaching deaf 
children difficult: “Their language, what they write… grammar… grammar, we have 
past tense, we have present, we have past, but they don’t have past in deaf language.  So 
if it is yesterday that they do something, they still use the present tense.  There is no 
past tense in their language.”  
Teacher D stated that because they cannot communicate at home prior to 
coming to the deaf school, this places a huge barrier to teaching the children.  She said, 
“Very little language is applied at home.  When they come here, they come to learn the 
language.  So they have inadequate language and this is something we have to teach 
them.”  She went on: “At home, they don’t learn.  Most of them hardly anything at 
home.  But with hearing children, they learn at home.  Their parents teach them.  Deaf 
children, all of… vocabulary – barrier, language – barrier, communication – barrier.  
Nothing is done at home.”  The fact that learning does not take place at home also 
makes the children underprepared for learning in the classroom each day.  Regarding 
homework assignments, Teacher B stated: “They can’t learn when they are home. 
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…And they have prayer time.  They don’t really come prepared.  And you see them 
writing” during prayer time to prep at the last minute for class time.   
Additionally, due to their lack of adequate language skill, the children suffer in 
terms of reading comprehension.  Teacher B stated that they suffer “especially in 
English, the comprehension, the passage.”  She stated that in order to overcome this 
barrier, teachers will read passages “and then… give them the gists [sic]… in their 
language that they understand.”  
An additional barrier to teaching arose because some students came to the 
school at such a late age, it would not be worthwhile to try to educate them in 
traditional subjects because of their lack of language.  Teacher A stated that children of 
“different ages.  Some as old as 18 years” come to the school.  Of these students who 
come to school so late in their life, Teacher B stated: “They are not starting school.  So 
that person, you can’t send that person into the classroom.  What we normally do is if 
someone comes to school at 18… we send the person to the vocational side.”  In other 
words, those children who arrive at school so late that learning proper language and 
traditional subjects is not worthwhile tend to be taught vocational skills instead, to 
prepare them to be a contributing adult member of society despite their lack of 
education and language skills.   
Quantity.  Teachers reported that it is difficult to teach students due to 
limitations in terms of the quantity of material they can teach.  Teacher C stated that 
“teaching them, you have to talk moooore [teacher’s emphasis] before maybe one 
person will grab the concept.”  Teacher E stated that students “have a very short 
attention span.”  Teacher B expanded on this, saying that “you want to give them 
more… give them more at a time.  But we can’t, they get frustrated.  So, something 
small, little at a time.”  
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 Barriers to learning.  Many of the same issues that serve as barriers to teaching 
also serve as barriers for student learning.  The majority of the barriers to learning 
mentioned have to do with students’ poor language skills and lack of early language in 
the home.  Teacher D stated: “the deaf, before they come to school, they are not taught 
language at home.”  She went on to further illustrate:  
There is no language, very little language is applied at home.  When they come 
here,  come to learning the language.  So they have inadequate language and that 
is something we to teach them to [inaudible] to get their education.  ... So with 
the deaf child, nothing [inaudible] so frustrating, unless the deaf child is really 
good.  The deaf child, most of the time, depends on what the teacher teaches.  I 
mean, at home, they don’t learn.  Most of them hardly anything at home.  But 
with hearing children, they learn at home.  Their parents teach them.  Deaf 
children, all of… vocabulary – barrier, language – barrier, communication – 
barrier.  Nothing is done at home. 
Not having the opportunity to learn language early in life, as hearing children do, 
creates a huge barrier to learning for the children.  The children are unable to take part 
in incidental learning and come to school with the disadvantage of first having to learn 
language before being able to learn their core competencies.   
 Just as the age at which children come to the school is a barrier to teaching, it is 
also a barrier to learning.  The children who come to school too late in life to practically 
be taught language and core subjects are limited to vocational learning.  As Teacher B 
said, (when one comes to school at age 18) “what is he coming to do already?  So we 
send the person to the vocational side.”  These children will not learn to read or write or 
basic mathematics, which severely limits how they interact and contribute in society.   
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 Even among children who come to school at a young age, the lack of early 
language input is clear when it comes to their reading comprehension.  Teacher B stated 
that since their English skills and reading comprehension is so poor, teachers will read a 
passage themselves, and then give students the gist using language they can understand.  
This often results in them losing much detail, and simply being able to capture the big 
picture or portions of the concept.  
 Differences from hearing students.  The teachers involved in the focus group 
provided some great insight on how deaf students differ from hearing students.  As all 
of the teachers had experience in teaching hearing students, they were able to contrast 
key things that affected teaching and learning among deaf children.  Teacher C stated: 
There is a big difference teaching the hearing and the deaf.  The hearing, they 
can hear.  So, when we teach them, we can… materials… maybe we can adapt 
so that people can understand.  But the deaf is not like that.  Teaching them, you 
have to talk mooooore [teacher emphasis] before maybe one person will grab 
the concept. 
As previously discussed, Teacher B mentioned a key difference is seen in terms 
of grammar, likely due to inherent difference between spoken English and the sign 
language used at the school.  She indicated that “there is no past tense in their 
language,” which causes grammar to be much more difficult to teach to deaf children 
than hearing children.   
Teacher D made a very good point concerning the differences between deaf and 
hearing children.  She stated that deaf children: 
don’t have incidental learning, like the hearing children. They hear people 
talking, they are able to pick a few things.  They listen… listen to radio, listen 
to… I mean at the dining table, and things like that.  They learn, they keep 
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learning in their environment.  …The deaf child, most of the time, depends on 
what the teacher teaches.  I mean, at home, they don’t learn.  Most of them 
hardly anything at home.  But with hearing children, they learn at home.  Their 
parents teach them.  Deaf children, all of… vocabulary – barrier, language – 
barrier, communication – barrier.  Nothing is done at home. 
This lack of incidental learning taking place in early age among deaf children no doubt 
manifests in barriers to teaching and learning that the teachers discussed.   
 Related to this incidental learning is self-teaching.  Due to their poor language 
skills, the deaf children are very limited in their abilities to self-teach.  Teacher E 
mentioned that “hearing people, when they are reading the textbook, they are going to 
assimilate that… talk about what they are reading.”  Regarding the deaf children, he 
said this is difficult, as “they use one vocabulary for too many options… so they always 
need somebody to guide them.”  
 Differences due to language background.  The teachers did mention that there 
are some differences in ability due to the language background of the students.  For the 
majority of the students, prior to coming to school “they have their own language… 
home sign.  It is different from the standard language that we teach here.  Just like 
speaking Pidgin English.  The deaf community, they have their own language.”   
However, some of the children have one or both parents who are deaf, which 
affects their ability in school.  Teacher B said, “There’s a girl. …The one that is the 
mother of the father, one of them [is deaf].  …There’s a girl here.”  Teacher A 
volunteered: “Both parents are deaf.”  Of these children, Teacher D said, “They come 
with the sign language. …and they do better than the other children.”  Of the girl 
previously mentioned, Teacher A stated “that girl… she does very well.”  This does not 
appear to be the case for students with deaf siblings.  In regards to students who had 
 150 
 
 
siblings who were also deaf, Teacher D stated “they are about the same” as the majority 
of students with no deaf parents.   
Experiment 3B Discussion 
 The focus group with teachers from the school proved very insightful.  These 
individuals work closely with the deaf children and are tasked with teaching them not 
only their core subjects, but also sufficient language skills so that they are prepared to 
learn.  The teachers emphasised the difficulties they experienced in teaching the deaf 
children, and the barriers these children face in learning.  The lack of exposure to early 
language appears to be the most impactful on these difficulties.  The children do not 
experience incidental learning early in life, as hearing children do, and they are very 
limited in their abilities to self-teach due to their poor language skills.  They have short 
attention spans and have extreme difficulty in conceptual learning, particularly in 
regards to abstract concepts.  As sign language is a visual language, it lends itself well 
to concrete things.  The teachers mentioned that using concrete materials aids them in 
their teaching of the children; however, when these materials are not available or are 
not able to convey an abstract concept, teaching is hindered and learning is severely 
limited.   
 The teachers also gave anecdotal evidence of the advantage for deaf children 
born of deaf parents.  They stated that these children already know sign language when 
they come to school and are therefore better prepared to learn.  These children therefore 
excel in comparison with their peers who were born to hearing parents.  While it may 
be assumed that having a deaf sibling might provide a similar enhancement, this does 
not appear to be the case.  Teachers stated that those children with deaf siblings, but not 
deaf parents, performed similarly as to those children without deaf siblings or parents.  
The results of this qualitative analysis provide additional, practical evidence for the 
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benefit of early exposure to language for learning abstract concepts and performing well 
in school.   
Experiment 3C Method 
Setting.  All participants for Experiment 3C were drawn from a school located 
within a close distance from Cape Coast School for the Deaf, Ghana National Basic 
School.  The school is located in Cape Coast and serves children in grades KG 1 
through JSS 2.  The school also is involved with a program of inclusion in which blind 
pupils from the blind unit at the Cape Coast School for the Deaf walk up the hill to 
attend classes at Ghana National.  None of the students included in the sample for 
Experiment 3C were blind.  
Participants.  Forty students (25 male, 15 female) from three classes at Ghana 
National Basic School in the Cape Coast region in Ghana served as participants.  
Students were in grades KG1, KG2, and P1, the rough equivalents of pre-school, 
kindergarten, and first grade at schools in the U.S.  The teachers of the children 
informed the researcher that birthdates are not generally recorded or known to teachers, 
children, or even the children’s parents.  The teachers were able to give estimated ages 
in years for the majority of students, but specifics for establishing children’s ages in 
months were only available for a few students.  As such, ages included in the analyses 
are in years. Students for which age information was available ranged in age from 4 to 
12 years (M = 6.43, SD = 1.97).   
Design.  Each child was tested in one private session with one task administered 
to the entire group at once.  Three tasks were administered in the private testing session: 
the Puppet task, the Sally task, and the Mary task.  Similarly as to in Experiments 2B 
and 3A, Sally and Mary tasks alternated as to revised and standard versions.  The Draw 
a Man task was administered to the entire group of pupils within the classroom prior to 
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initiating private sessions.  Given the young age of the children and the limited amount 
of schooling they had had, the majority of students had limited understanding of 
English.  The majority of students spoke Fanti, the local language of Cape Coast, so one 
of the teachers sat with the researcher and each student to act as an interpreter.   
Materials and procedure.  The materials for the four tasks were identical as for 
Experiment 3A.  The procedures for the tasks were almost identical as for Experiment 
3A.  However, since the tasks were conducted with students individually, responses 
were recorded by the researcher rather than having the students circle their responses on 
a form.  
Experiment 3C Results 
 Of the 40 participants, 21 (52.5%) passed all three FB tasks.  Performance was 
best on the Puppet task, with 65% passing the task.  One student failed the reality 
question and two students missed the memory question.  Twenty-six children passed the 
belief question, each of whom also passed both control questions.  One child missed the 
reality question and six missed the memory question on the Sally task.  Fourteen 
children missed the belief question.  Of the 26 children who correctly answered the 
belief question, 24 also answered both control questions correctly for a pass rate of 
60%.  The pass rate for the Mary task was 55%.  Two children answered incorrectly on 
the reality question and four answered incorrectly on the memory question.  While 26 
children correctly answered the belief question, similarly as for the Sally task, four of 
those children missed one of the control questions.  A summary of the response rates for 
the questions associated with the three tasks is presented in Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6 
Pass Rates for Experiment 3C 
 
Task 
Question   
Passed Reality  Memory Belief 
Puppet 97.5% 95.0% 65.0% 65.0% 
Sally 97.5% 85.0% 65.0% 60.0% 
Mary 95.0% 90.0% 65.0% 55.0% 
 
 Half each of the Sally and Mary trials were conducted with the standard order, 
in which the Belief question is asked first, and the other half were conducted with the 
revised order, in which the Belief question is asked last.  Whether the standard or 
revised version was given made no significant effect for either the Sally (p = .520) or 
the Mary (p = .520) tasks.  
Performance on the three FB tasks was strongly, significantly correlated.  A 
reliability analysis revealed a Cronbach’s alpha of .834, indicating that a scale made up 
of performance on the three tasks is reliable.  Table 4.7 shows the correlation statistics 
between the three tasks.  
Table 4.7 
Correlations Among FB Tasks for Experiment 3C 
 
 Sally Mary 
Puppet .685*** .601*** 
Sally - .595*** 
***p < .001 
 Correlational analysis between the total number of FB tasks, age, and standard 
Draw a Man scores was conducted.  No significant relationships were found between 
FB performance and the two other tasks.  There was, however, a significant negative 
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correlation between age and Draw a Man scores. Correlation statistics are presented in 
Table 4.8.  
Table 4.8 
Correlations Among FB, Age, and Draw a Man Scores for Experiment 3C 
 
 Draw a Man Total FB 
Age -.333* -.028 
Draw a Man - .229 
*p < .05 
Experiment 3C Discussion 
 With a mean age of approximately 6 and a half years, between 55% and 65% of 
children were able to pass each of the FB tasks.  Slightly over half of the children were 
able to pass all three tasks.  In their meta-analysis, Wellman et al. (2001) found that at 
about 44 months of age (3 years, 8 months), children are about 50% correct on the task.  
With the effects size for age of 2.94, this means that the pass rate for children a year 
older (4 years, 8 months) is 74.6%.  Comparing the pass rates obtained in Experiment 
3C with those found in the meta-analysis by Wellman et al., it appears that false belief 
understanding develops at a slightly later age in Ghanaian children from this region.   
 This finding runs counter to the finding of Avis and Harris (1991), who 
suggested that Baka children from the rain forests in Southeast Cameroon demonstrate 
false belief understanding at an age similar to Western children.  This discrepancy may 
be due in part to the fact that Avis and Harris used a version of the task that included 
child participation and was acted out in person rather than by dolls or puppets.  The 
salience of the situation, the fact that trickery was involved, and that the children met 
with the person that ultimately had the false belief may have increased performance 
over the children in the present study.  This reasoning is consistent with the fact that 
similarly as to in Experiments 1B, 2A, and 3A, the Puppet task was the easiest task for 
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the children.  In the Sally and Mary tasks, the characters in the study did not 
intentionally trick another character.  Additionally, the participants were not included in 
the task, as was done in stating that the group was going to play a trick on the frog in 
the Puppet task.  As such, the advanced performance on the Puppet task in comparison 
with the other tasks seems likely due to child involvement and trickery being 
components of the task.  
 The apparent delay may also be due to the socioeconomic situation of the 
Ghanaian children.  Previous findings have illustrated that children of poorer 
backgrounds in the U.S. and the U.K. tend to fail the false belief task until 5 years of 
age, which is less markedly different from the present finding.  Doherty (2009) 
highlighted these differences by citing that “Holmes et al. [1996] found that 
disadvantaged children of mean age 4 years 3 months passed transfer and contents task 
between a quarter and half the time, and children of 5 years 3 months between 52% and 
84% of the time” (p. 169).   
 Despite the higher mean age among the deaf children from Experiment 3A (M = 
15;6 years) than those in Experiment 3C (M = 6;5 years), the younger children 
outperformed their older, deaf counterparts on all three tasks.  The highest passing rate 
among the deaf children, 37.1% for the Puppet task, was still almost 20% lower than the 
lowest passing rate among the hearing children (55.0% for Mary task).  Follow-up 
independent-samples t-tests confirmed that the sample of deaf children were 
significantly older than the hearing children, t(104.977) = 15.892, p < .001, yet the deaf 
children performed significantly poorer on the false belief tasks in aggregate, t(65.725) 
= -3.645, p = .001.  These results provide strong evidence for the theory of mind delay 
in deaf children, regardless of country, in comparison with hearing children.   
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Study 3 General Discussion 
 The results of Study 3 provide further support for the delay in false belief 
reasoning among deaf children.  Additionally, alternative naming and executive 
functioning skills were not delayed to the same extent, suggesting there is something 
specific about false belief understanding that proves particularly difficult for deaf 
children.  Performance on false belief performance among hearing Ghanaian children 
appears slightly delayed in respect to Western children, but was significantly stronger 
than the performance by deaf Ghanaian children.   
 Results from the focus group conducted with teachers of the deaf children 
suggest that the deaf children have particular difficulty with learning concepts and 
abstract reasoning.  It seems likely that this may be key to the difficulty on the false 
belief tasks, without a similarly impaired performance on the alternative naming task.  
The false belief tasks focus around an individual’s thoughts and beliefs, which cannot 
be physically seen.  The alternative naming task, however, focuses on concrete objects, 
like cat, milk, and flower.  These are objects that can be touched and seen, and therefore 
may be easier for the deaf children to grasp conceptually than “invisible” beliefs.  This 
would also explain why the deaf children struggle with the false belief tasks than did 
the hearing children.   
  
 157 
 
 
Chapter Five  
Study 4: Bilingual Theory of Mind 
Introduction 
 Most deaf people live within a larger society that is dominated by hearing 
people, with many deaf children having to learn to read and write the spoken language 
in school (Ann, 2001).  Using Grosjean’s (1982) definition of bilingualism, “the regular 
use of two or more languages” (p. 1), Ann thus argued that “most deaf people are 
bilingual to some extent in a spoken language in some form” (p. 41).  While deaf 
children who use both a signed language and a spoken language may generally be 
considered bilingual, they represent a specific type of bilingual – bimodal bilingualism.  
Deaf people as a group tend to have their own (signed) language and culture, but live 
within a larger hearing culture with at least one dominant spoken language.   
 ‘Bimodal’ refers to the fact that one language is spoken and the other is signed, 
two modes of language – one that is perceived auditorily and one that is perceived 
visually (Emmorey, Borinstein, Thompson, & Gollan, 2008). In addition, bimodal 
bilinguals have the unique opportunity to produce and perceive their two languages at 
the same time, whereas unimodal bilinguals cannot simultaneously produce two spoken 
words or phrases because they are limited to a single output channel, the vocal tract 
(Emmorey et al., 2008).  Additionally, although deaf signers are generally bilingual in a 
sign language and a spoken language, many deaf people prefer not to speak the spoken 
language (Emmorey et al., 2008).  Comprehension of spoken language via lip reading is 
also quite difficult for deaf individuals (Emmorey et al., 2008).  Given the unique set of 
circumstances for deaf bimodal bilinguals, it is reasonable that patterns of development 
of theory of mind and metalinguistic awareness among deaf bilinguals would not 
necessarily reflect the patterns of development among unimodal bilinguals.  
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 Given that past researchers (e.g., Shatz, Martinez, Diesendruck, & Akar, 1995; 
deVilliers & Pyers, 1996) focused on the role of language in theory of mind acquisition, 
it is not surprising that there are multiple studies contrasting false-belief understanding 
between (unimodal) bilingual children and monolingual children.  Goetz (2003), 
Kovács (2009), and Farhadian et al. (2010) all found evidence of superior performance 
by bilingual children on theory of mind related tasks than amongst their monolingual 
counterparts of similar age.   
 Goetz (2003) compared performance on appearance-reality, level 2 perspective-
taking, and false-belief tasks between English monolinguals, Mandarin Chinese 
monolinguals, and Mandarin-English bilinguals.  Thirty-two children comprised each 
monolingual group, with the bilingual group consisting of 40 children.  Half of the 
children in each language group were 4-years-old and half were 3-years-old, which 
allowed Goetz to evaluate the effect of age as well as language group.  Children were 
tested twice, one week apart; monolingual children were tested twice in their language, 
while bilinguals were tested once in each language with the order of languages 
counterbalanced.   
In comparing the two monolingual groups Goetz (2003) found that 4-year-old 
children significantly outperformed 3-year old children and that children performed 
significantly better during the second testing session than in the first.  No significant 
effect of language (English versus Mandarin) was found for any of the tasks.  When 
including the bilingual children in the analysis, once again 4-year-olds performed 
significantly better than 3-year-olds and children performed significantly better at the 
second time-point than the first.  Additionally, a main effect of language background 
(monolingual versus bilingual) was found, with bilinguals performing significantly 
better than monolinguals.  When adjusting for language ability, as measured using 
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PPVT standard scores, bilinguals performed significantly better than monolinguals at 
time 1, but the effect was reduced to marginal non-significance at time 2.  The 
examination of performance change from time 1 to time 2 showed that monolingual 
children improved significantly from the first to second testing time, whereas the 
bilingual children scored similarly at the two time points.   
 Goetz (2003) suggested three possible explanations for her evidence of a 
bilingual advantage on theory of mind task: a metalinguistic advantage, greater 
inhibitory control, and greater sociolinguistic awareness regarding conversational 
partners’ linguistic knowledge.  The first explanation is supported by research by 
Galambos and Goldin-Meadow (1990), which indicated that learning two languages 
increases the speed of development of certain metalinguistic skills in young children.  
Goetz (2003) reasoned than an increased metalinguistic awareness among bilingual 
children may lead to increased metarepresentation, as increased awareness of the 
representational nature of language may lead to increased understanding that objects 
(and in turn, situations) can be represented in different manners by different individuals.   
 Goetz’s (2003) second explanation for her findings ties together research by 
Carlson and Moses (2001) that shows a relationship between inhibitory control and 
performance on false-belief tasks and by Bialystok’s (1988, 1992, 1999) suggestion that 
bilinguals have greater control over their selective attention as necessary for resolving 
situations of ambiguity.  This possibility is strengthened by the fact that Goetz found 
the bilingual advantage decreased on a version of the false-belief task that did not 
require a verbal response.  Elicitation of verbal responses may have, as Goetz argued, 
increased their attention toward controlling their responses by making their language 
choice particularly salient.   
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 Finally, Goetz (2003) suggested that perhaps performance was improved due to 
bilingual children’s development of: a) awareness of the need to match their language 
with their partners, b) understanding their partner’s knowledge of a language can differ 
from their own, and c) recognition that this difference in knowledge must be taken into 
account during communication.  This explanation focuses on the impact of social 
experience on development, similar to past findings that highlight the impact of having 
an older sibling on theory of mind (e.g., Ruffman, Perner, Naito, Parkin, & Clements, 
1998).  That is, as bilingual children have increased exposure to and experience with 
people who differ from them in their linguistic knowledge, this increases the salience of 
others’ knowledge, and ultimately, mental states.   
Kovács (2009) similarly assessed theory of mind understanding among 
bilinguals, albeit among Romanian-Hungarian bilinguals versus Romanian 
monolinguals.  Thirty-two bilinguals and thirty-two monolinguals were assessed on 
three tasks: the standard task created by Wimmer and Perner (1983), presented as 
coloured illustrations; a modified theory of mind task involving two dolls and illustrated 
cards; and a control task, the gizmo task, developed by Zaitchik (1990, as cited by 
Kovács, 2009).  The modified task involved a language switch, in that one doll was 
bilingual and the other monolingual and they were told pertinent information in the 
language only the bilingual doll knew.  The children had to therefore infer a false belief 
due to the monolingual not understanding the pertinent information and make a 
judgement on that doll’s actions.   
Despite being of similar ages (both groups mean age = 3.3, age range 2.10 – 
3.6), the bilingual children in Kovács’s (2009) study outperformed the monolingual 
children on both the standard and modified theory of mind tasks.  The two groups 
performed similarly on the control task, which had significantly stronger performance 
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than the theory of mind tasks.  Approximately twice as many bilingual children passed 
each theory of mind task, a result that was statistically significant for both tasks (ps ≤ 
.03).  Neither group performed significantly differently on the standard versus the 
modified task.  
 Kovács’s (2009) results, similarly to Goetz’s (2003), suggest bilingual children 
have an advantage over their monolingual peers in terms of false-belief task 
performance.  Kovács also reasoned that this advantage may arise due to enhanced 
inhibitory control abilities in bilingual children, as Bialystok (1999) found.  Kovács 
argued that her findings did not support Goetz’s theory that social experience in terms 
of language-switch situations enhances or encourages earlier theory of mind 
development, as bilinguals did not exhibit better performance on the task modified to 
mimic a language-switch situation than on the standard task.  Kovács cited Bialystok’s 
research as making it likely that the advantage is due to the ability to suppress a 
prepotent response regarding object location.  However, Kovács did also suggest that 
what may be driving this performance difference is the enhanced ability to label a 
concept with two verbal labels, which may help in maintaining alternative mental 
representations.  This reasoning is consistent with the theory regarding development of 
metarepresentational ability as key to or underpinning theory of mind development.   
Further evidence for the bilingual advantage comes from Farhadian et al. 
(2010).  Farhadian et al. gave three false belief tasks to a group of 65 Persian 
monolingual and 98 Kurdish-Persian bilingual preschool children in order to determine 
to what extent bilingualism contributes to theory of mind development over and above 
age and verbal ability.  Two unexpected transfer and one unexpected contents tasks 
were administered; children were awarded one point for a correct false belief response, 
and one point for correct memory check response for a total range of 0 to 6 on the three 
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tasks.  The McCarthy Scales of Children’s Ability (McCarthy, 1972, as cited in 
Farhadian et al., 2010), a measure of verbal ability, was also administered.   
A larger proportion of bilingual children (45%) passed all theory of mind tasks 
than did monolingual children (14%), with bilingual children also obtaining a 
significantly higher mean score on the tasks (MBilingual = 4.76, MMonolingual = 3.53).  A 
hierarchical regression analysis showed both age and verbal ability significantly 
predicted performance on the theory of mind tasks in step one; language status 
significantly predicted performance beyond age and  verbal ability in step two.  This 
indicates that language status significantly predicted theory of mind performance above 
and beyond the effects of age and verbal ability, consistent with findings from Goetz 
(2003) and Kovács (2009).  Farhadian et al. (2010) also provided similar reasoning for 
this advantage: better metalinguistic abilities or advanced inhibitory control.   
While these studies have shown better performance on theory of mind tasks and 
provided consistent explanations for this difference, they have not included measures of 
metalinguistic ability or executive functioning in an attempt to tease apart the nature of 
the relationship between bilingualism and theory of mind development.  In order to 
address this deficit, tasks assessing theory of mind, metalinguistic awareness, and 
aspects of executive functioning were administered to Spanish-English bilingual and 
English monolingual preschool children.   
Experiment 4 Method 
 Participants.  Sixty-eight children (33 male, 35 female) in total took part in the 
experiment.  Of these, 40 were monolingual English speakers and 28 were bilingual in 
English and Spanish.  All participants were drawn from the Inland Empire in Southern 
California, U.S.  The Inland Empire, consisting of San Bernardino and Riverside 
counties, is a metropolitan area within Southern California that is located directly east 
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of the Los Angeles metropolitan area.  The Inland Empire has a large Hispanic 
population, with Hispanics making up 49% of San Bernardino County and 46% of 
Riverside County according to the 2010 census (Inland Empire Center, 2014).  The 
mean age of participants was 3 years, 10 months (SD = 9 months) and the mean verbal 
age, as assessed with the PPVT (Dunn & Dunn, 1997), was 3 years, 2 months (SD = 10 
months).   
 Of the monolinguals, 20 were male and 20 were female.  The mean age was 3 
year, 10 months (SD = 11 months) and the mean verbal age was 3 years, 4 months (SD 
= 10.5 months).  Of the bilingual participants, 13 were male (46.4%) and 15 were 
female (53.6%).  The mean age of bilinguals was 3 years, 10 months (SD = 5 months) 
and the mean verbal age was 2 years, 10 months (SD = 8 months).  Monolingual 
participants tested significantly higher for verbal mental age, t(66) = 3.028, p = .004, 
although chronological age did not differ significantly between the two groups (p = 
.775).   
Table 5.1 
 
Age Characteristics of Children Participating in Experiment 4  
Age group N Mean (y;m) SD (months) Range (y;m) 
Monolinguals 40 3;10 (3;4)* 11 (10) 2;8 – 4;1 
Bilinguals 28 3;10 (2;10) 5 (8) 3;2-4;5 (2;1-4;1) 
*verbal mental age, assessed with the PPVT, in parentheses 
 
 Design.  Each child was tested individually by the primary researcher in two 
sessions that lasted approximately 10-15 minutes each.  The two sessions took place 
one week apart and were conducted either in the child’s home with a parent nearby, or 
in the corner of a preschool room in which the child attended preschool.  Three or four 
tasks were administered in the first session, depending on language background.  For all 
children, one false belief task, the CC task, and the DCCS were administered in this 
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first session.  For bilinguals, an additional task, the Bilingual task, was also 
administered.  In session two, the second false belief task, the AN task, the DNS, and 
the PPVT were administered.   
 Materials and procedure.  The materials and procedures for the FB, AN, CC, 
DCCS, and DNS tasks used in Experiment 4 were identical to those used in Experiment 
1B.   
 Language switch task.  This task was administered to children who were 
identified as both English and Spanish speaking by their preschool teacher.  The 
preschool class is taught primarily in English, although teachers use some Spanish, 
particularly with those who they recognize as using Spanish in the home.  The language 
switch task was structured similarly to the AN task and also comprised three phases: 
vocabulary check, practice, and test.  The materials for the task were four A4 sized 
cards, each with four pictures on it for a total of 16 images.  These images were of 
everyday items that preschool aged children were very likely to be familiar with, such 
as clothing, animals, and body parts.  All images were named during the vocabulary 
check phase, two images were used during the practice phase, and the test phase 
consisted of four images. The images used for the practice phase and test phase were 
counterbalanced among participants.  
The vocabulary check, similar to the AN, consisted of two passes: in the first 
pass items were named in either English or Spanish, and items were named in the other 
language during the second pass.  The order of which language was presented first was 
counterbalanced.  Trials were phrased as “Where is the [image name]?” in English, and 
“¿Dónde está el/la [image name]?” in Spanish.  
Two images were used for practice and to familiarise the children with what was 
expected of them.  During this phase the children were provided feedback and coached 
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in order to produce the correct answer if necessary.  The two practice trials were 
worded as follows.   
Spanish to English:  
Esta es una mano.  ¿Cómo se dice en inglés?  
Esta es una casa.  ¿Cómo se dice en inglés?  
English to Spanish: 
 This is a hand.  How do you say it in Spanish? 
 This is a house.  How do you say it in Spanish?  
Trials were administered in both Spanish to English and English to Spanish.  The order 
in which the two items (hand and house) were presented was counterbalanced, as was 
the order of first language presented.  The test phase consisted of similarly structured 
scripting for four items.  Each trial once again was conducted in both Spanish to 
English and English to Spanish, with order counterbalanced.  Children received a total 
score out of eight: four English to Spanish and four Spanish to English; children were 
also scored in terms of number of items for which they successfully passed both 
language switches.   
Experiment 4 Results 
 False belief tasks.  A slightly higher percentage of bilingual children (32.1%, 
versus 25.0%) passed the Sally FB task, although this difference was not significant, p 
= .588, Fisher’s exact test.  However, monolinguals performed marginally significantly 
better than bilinguals on the Puppet FB task (Table 5.2), p = .045 by Fisher’s exact test.  
As can be seen in Table 5.2, children appear to have had difficulty in correctly 
answering the memory question for each task.  When aggregated, there was no 
significant difference in the number of children who passed both versus failed both 
tasks based on language status, p = .748, Fisher’s exact test.  When performance was 
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split into three groups (failed both, passed one, passed both), again there was no 
significant difference between language groups, χ²(2) = 1.084, p = .582.   
Table 5.2 
Number and Percentage of Children Passing False Belief Tasks 
  All 
Participants Monolinguals Bilinguals 
Sally FB Belief Question 23 (33.8%) 12 (30%) 11 (39.3%) 
 Reality Question 62 (91.2%) 36 (90%) 26 (92.9%) 
 Memory Question 51 (75%) 31 (77.5%) 20 (71.4%) 
 Passed all three 19 (27.9%) 10 (25.0%) 9 (32.1%) 
     
Puppet 
FB Belief Question 17 (25%) 13 (32.5%) 4 (14.3%) 
 Reality Question 63 (92.6%) 37 (92.5%) 26 (92.9%) 
 Memory Question 46 (67.6%) 27 (67.5%) 19 (67.9%) 
 Passed all three 16 (23.5%) 13 (32.5%) 3 (10.7%) 
 
 When assessing all children, the false belief tasks correlated positively with each 
other to a moderately-large degree (rφ = .504, p < .001).  Performance on the false belief 
tasks was significantly correlated with both chronological age and verbal mental age 
(Table 5.3).  However, when disaggregated by language status it was revealed that the 
correlations with age were driven by the monolingual children; among bilingual 
children there was no correlation between false belief task performance and measures of 
age.   
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Table 5.3 
Age and False Belief Correlations 
 VM Age  FB Total  Sally FB  Puppet FB  
Age (all) .793** .488**  .390** .458** 
     Monolinguals .853** .654** .634** .535** 
     Bilinguals .857** -.068 -.201 .153 
VM Age (all)  .381** .181 .487** 
     Monolinguals  .628** .463** .648** 
     Bilinguals  -.195 -.185 -.174 
FB Total Passed 
(all) 
  .875** .859** 
     Monolinguals   .881** .899** 
     Bilinguals   .919** .803** 
Sally FB Passed 
(all) 
   .504** 
     Monolinguals    .586** 
     Bilinguals    .503** 
Ages in months, *p < .05, **p ≤ .001 
AN task.  Children were near perfect in the vocabulary check, with 91.2% of 
total participants, 92.5% of monolinguals, and 89.3% of bilinguals missing no critical 
word checks.  For monolinguals, this number seems consistent with the percent passing 
from Study 2 (50 typically-developing nursery children).  Of the 40 monolinguals, 13 
(32.5%) were able to produce at least three of the four item pairs.  While all children 
had more difficulty when given the basic term and having to produce the superordinate 
term, bilingual children showed particularly poor performance on this aspect of the task 
(Table 5.4).  As none of the bilingual children were able to produce at least three 
superordinate terms during these trials, this limited their overall performance, resulting 
in no passing scores among bilinguals.  The monolinguals (M = 1.83) significantly 
outperformed the bilinguals (M = 0.71), t(56.293) = 4.436, p < .001.  A paired-samples 
t-test confirms that the children’s scores on basic-to-superordinate items (M = 1.49) 
were significantly lower than their scores on superordinate-to-basic items (M = 3.28), 
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t(67) = -14.782, p < .001.  This remains true for both monolinguals (t(39) = -9.837, p < 
.001) and bilinguals (t(27) = -12.042, p < .001).   
Table 5.4 
Summary of Performance on AN Task  
 All Participants Monolinguals Bilinguals 
2+ pairs 24 (35.3%) 22 (55%) 2 (7.1%) 
3+ pairs 13 (19.1%) 13 (32.5%) 0 (0%) 
3+ Super – Basic 56 (82.4%) 37 (92.5%) 19 (67.8%) 
3+ Basic – Super  13 (19.1%) 13 (32.5%) 0 (0%) 
 
Chronological age was moderately and significantly correlated with passing the 
AN task with three or more pairs (r = .477, p = .002) among monolinguals.  Verbal 
mental age also correlated moderately with AN task performance among monolinguals 
(r = .401, p = .01).   As none of the bilingual children passed the AN task with three or 
more pairs correct, correlations were conducted between total pairs correct and each 
measure of age for this group.  Chronological age correlated with the number of pairs 
correct for bilinguals (r = .461, p = .014), as did verbal mental age (r = .527, p = .004). 
CC task.  Children performed perfectly on the colour check (100%).  
Performance was also very strong on the experimental portion of the task with all 68 
children (100%) passing the task by correctly answering at least three out of four trials.  
Only 4 (5.9%) of children did not achieve a perfect score on the test portion, and all 
four of these children were bilinguals.   
DCCS.  Children performed well on the DCCS, with 58 of 68 (85.3%) correctly 
sorting all five cards in the post-switch phase.  Only one of the sixty-eight children 
(1.5%) was unable to correctly sort any of the five cards in the post-switch phase, and 
only five children (7.4%) sorted less than three cards correctly.  Of monolinguals, 90% 
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correctly sorted all five cards.  Of bilinguals, 78.6% correctly sorted all five cards, with 
a collective of 98.3% correctly sorting at least four cards.   
Scores on the DCCS did not correlate significantly with either chronological age 
(r = .082, p = .507) or verbal mental age (r = -.168, p = .171).  When split by language 
background, each group individually produced similarly non-significant correlations 
among these measures.   
DNS task.  Overall, children performed well on the DNS task, with 58.8% 
passing the task with at least 75% accuracy (12 of 16 trials).  Nineteen of the children 
(27.9%) achieved a score of 8 or less.  Monolinguals performed somewhat better than 
the bilingual children on this task; monolinguals had a passing rate of 70%, while 
42.9% of bilinguals attained the same standard.  An independent-samples t-test revealed 
that monolinguals (M = 12.75) significantly outperformed bilinguals (M = 10.5) on this 
task, t(66) = 2.257, p = .027.   
DNS score correlated moderately with chronological age (r = .329, p = .006) 
and strongly with verbal mental age (r = .614, p < .001).  Among bilinguals, DNS score 
correlated strongly with both chronological age (r = .719, p < .001) and verbal mental 
age (r = .626, p < .001); however, among monolinguals only verbal mental age 
correlated significantly with DNS score (r = .559, p < .001; chronological age – r = 
.239, p = .137).   
Language Switch task.  The Language Switch task proved to be difficult for 
the bilingual children.  Only two (7.1%) children passed the task with three out of a 
possible four pairs correctly given.  A total of nine children (32.1%) correctly answered 
two pairs out of four.  Of the children, 14 (50%) were unable to correctly translate even 
one full pair from English to Spanish and Spanish to English.  Translating from Spanish 
to English was slightly easier for the children: 39.3% of children correctly translated at 
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least three of the four English words to Spanish; only 14.3% correctly translated at least 
three of the four Spanish words to English.  Over one-third (35.7%) of children were 
unable to translate any of the words in either order.   
 
Figure 5.1.  Performance by bilinguals on Language Switch task 
 
Task relatedness.  Chronological and verbal mental ages were partialled out to 
see if any relationships remained among tasks apart from those influenced by age.   
All participants.  A marginally non-significant correlation was found between 
passing scores on the AN task and DCCS performance (r = .241, p = .051).  
Performance on the DCCS also correlated moderately negatively with performance on 
the Puppet FB task (r = -.372, p = .002), but not with the Sally FB task (p = .666) or 
combined false belief performance (p = .164). 
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All three measures of false belief performance (Sally task, Puppet task, and 
aggregated) correlated moderately and significantly with performance on the AN task (r 
= .292, p = .017; r = .386, p = .001; r = .392, p = .001).  These relationships remain 
when accounting for both measures of age and both measures of executive functioning 
(r = .288, p = .021; r = .540, p < .001; r = .458, p < .001).  
Monolinguals only.  There was a negative trend found between performance on 
the DCCS and aggregate false belief performance (r = -.301, p = .066), which is likely 
driven by the significant negative relationship between DCCS and performance on the 
Puppet Task (r = -.552, p < .001).  Passing performance on the AN task was moderately 
and significantly related to the three measures of false belief performance (Sally task, r 
= .422, p = .008; Puppet task, r = .439, p = .006; aggregate, r = .494, p = .002).  When 
additionally controlling for performance on both executive functions, these 
relationships were strengthened (r = .461, p = .005; r = .693, p < .001; r = .627, p < 
.001).   
Bilinguals only.  Among the bilingual children, score on the DCCS correlated 
moderately with score on the DNS task (r = .425, p = .03).  DNS score also correlated 
moderately with each of the other tasks, as shown in the Table 5.5.   
Table 5.5 
Correlation Between DNS and Other Tasks for Bilingual Children 
 FB 
Aggregate 
Sally Task Puppet Task AN Task 
Pairs 
Language 
Switch Pairs 
DNS 
Score 
r 
p 
.471 
.015 
.477 
.014 
.348 
.082 
.472 
.015 
.655 
.000 
 
As no bilingual children passed the AN task with three or more pairs, the 
number of pairs correctly answered was used as the measure for the task.  This measure 
correlated again with the Sally task, the Puppet task, and the aggregate (r = .676, p < 
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.001; r = .612, p = .001; r = .715, p < .001).  Performance on the AN task also 
correlated moderately with the number of pairs produced in the Language Switch task.  
No measures of the Language Switch task correlated with any of the measures of false 
belief.   
When controlling for executive functioning measures, Language Switch task 
performance no longer correlated with AN task performance.  However, it then 
negatively correlated with performance on the Puppet task (pairs produced, r = -.449, p 
= .028).  Performance on the AN task remained strongly correlated with false belief task 
performance after controlling for performance on the DCCS and DNS (Sally, r = 589, p 
= .002; Puppet, r = .542, p = .006; aggregate, r = .637, p = .001).   
False Belief and AN task.  A two-way between participants ANOVA conducted 
on performance on the AN task (as measured in pairs correct out of four) revealed a 
significant interaction between language background and total number of false belief 
tasks passed, F(2, 62) = 3.756, p = .029, η² = .108.  The interaction was examined by 
simple effects and multiple comparison analyses.  Among monolinguals, those that 
passed both false belief tasks scored significantly higher on the AN task than those that 
passed only one or neither false belief task (p ≤ .001).  Among bilinguals, those that 
passed both false belief tasks performed significantly better on the AN task than those 
that passed neither false belief task (p = .025).   
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Figure 5.2.  Interaction effect of language status and FB task performance on AN task 
performance 
 
There was also a significant main effect of language background F(2, 62) = 
24.536, p < .001, η² = .284.  Simple effect analysis revealed that monolinguals 
outperformed bilinguals on the AN task at all levels of false belief performance.   
 
p ≤ .001 
p = .025 
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Figure 5.3.  Main effect of language on AN task performance 
 
Regression analyses.  Three hierarchical regressions were conducted to assess 
whether performance on the FB tasks could be significantly predicted based on age 
factors and performance on the other tasks, both for monolinguals and bilinguals 
separately, and together.  As the goal in this case was to identify predictors of false 
belief performance, FB tasks correct was the outcome variable.  Chronological and 
verbal mental age were entered in step 1, along with CC task performance; these served 
as control variables.  Both measures of executive functioning and number of AN pairs 
produced were included in step 2; evaluating the contributions of DNS, DCCS, and AN 
task performances on FB performance allowed for a direct comparison of impact on FB 
reasoning.  In all three cases, evaluation of collinearity statistics indicated that the 
assumption of non-multicollinearity was met (all VIF < 10, T > .10). 
All participants.  A hierarchical multiple regression with number of FB tasks 
passed as the outcome variable showed that age, verbal mental age, and CC 
p = .041 
 
p = .026 
p ≤ .001 
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performance accounted for approximately 25.6% (unadjusted R²) of the variability in 
FB tasks passed (p  < .001).  The addition of the two executive functioning tasks 
(DCCS and DNS) and AN pairs produced in step 2 significantly improved the model (p 
< .001).  When evaluating the predictor variables independently, chronological age and 
AN pairs produced both made unique, significant contributions to the model (Table 
5.6).     
Table 5.6 
Hierarchical Regression for Experiment 4 Data Predicting Total FB Score – All 
Children 
 
Variable B B(SE) Beta p 
Step 1a     
   Age .046 .015 .548 .004 
   PPVT -.007 .014 -.094 .618 
   CC .461 .369 .143 .217 
Step 2b     
   Age .049 .015 .572 .002* 
   PPVT -.031 .016 -.406 .055 
   CC .262 .324 .082 .421 
   DCCS -.138 .073 -.189 .064 
   DNS -.013 .024 -.069 .599 
   AN .342 .071 .569 .000** 
aR² = .256, p < .001  
b∆R² = .229, p < .001 
cModel 2 significant, F(6, 61) = 9.562, p < .001 
*p < .01; **p < .001 
 
Monolinguals.  Among monolinguals, neither chronological age nor verbal 
mental age made significant, unique contributions in step 1, although model 1 was 
significant as a whole (p < .001).  The addition of the two executive functioning tasks 
(DCCS and DNS) and AN pairs produced in step 2 significantly improved the model (p 
< .001).  When evaluating the predictor variables independently, verbal mental age 
showed a marginally significant effect, whereas performance on the DNS and AN tasks 
were strong, unique predictors of FB task performance (Table 5.7).  The final model 
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accounted for 73.7% (unadjusted R²) of the variability in FB scores.  The regression is 
highly significant, F(5, 34) = 19.081, p < .001. 
Table 5.7 
Hierarchical Regression for Experiment 4 Data Predicting Total FB Score – 
Monolinguals 
 
Variable B B(SE) Beta p 
Step 1a     
   Age .032 .017 .434 .072 
   PPVT .020 .018 .258 .279 
Step 2b     
   Age -.002 .018 -.026 .919 
   PPVT .045 .021 .581 .038* 
   DCCS -.126 .068 -.191 .073 
   DNS -.100 .029 -.491 .002* 
   AN .366 .067 .635 .000** 
aR² = .446, p < .001  
b∆R² = .291, p < .001 
cModel 2 significant, F(5, 34) = 19.081, p < .001 
*p < .05; **p < .001 
 
Bilinguals.  Among monolinguals, again neither chronological age nor verbal 
mental age made significant, unique contributions in step 1; model 1 containing these 
measures of age and CC performance did not significantly predict FB task performance 
(p = .119).  Model 2 was significant (p = .003), and the addition of the two executive 
functioning tasks and AN pairs produced in step 2 significantly improved the model (p 
= .004).  When evaluating the predictor variables independently, only verbal mental age 
and AN performance were significant, unique predictors of FB task performance (Table 
5.8).  The final model accounted for 58.1% (unadjusted R²) of the variability in FB 
scores.  The regression is highly significant, F(5, 34) = 19.081, p < .001. 
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Table 5.8 
Hierarchical Regression for Experiment 4 Data Predicting Total FB Score – Bilinguals 
Variable B B(SE) Beta p 
Step 1a     
   Age .061 .049 .439 .225 
   PPVT -.061 .037 -.715 .062 
   CC .774 .378 .400 .051 
Step 2b     
   Age .023 .047 .0163 .636 
   PPVT -.079 .025 -.923 .005* 
   CC .081 .364 .042 .826 
   DCCS -.102 .165 -.107 .545 
   DNS .048 .047 .284 .321 
   AN .811 .223 .705 .002* 
aR² = .213, p = .119  
b∆R² = .369, p < .004 
cModel 2 significant, F(6, 21) = 4.861, p = .003 
*p < .01 
 
Study 4 Discussion 
 The results of Experiment 4 in terms of false belief performance differences 
between bilingual and monolingual children did not reflect the findings from past 
research.  While previous studies (e.g., Farhadian et al., 2010; Goetz, 2003; Kovacs, 
2009) clearly showed better performance by bilingual children on false belief tasks, this 
was not the case for the present study.  It is difficult to make any conclusions based on 
the non-difference found in the current study, however, due to the lower sample size 
and significantly lower verbal mental age among the bilingual children.  It is therefore 
strongly recommended that further research be conducted with a larger bilingual sample 
and potentially matched subjects between groups based on age and verbal mental age.   
Additionally, the inclusion of slightly older children in the sample may help to 
increase the low passing rates found among the present sample.  As highlighted in 
Table 5.2, children in both groups struggled with the memory question, particularly on 
the Puppet FB task.  Overall FB passing rates ranged from only 10.7% to 32.5%, much 
lower than what was witnessed in Studies 1 and 2.  Ideally these passing scores would 
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be around 50% in order to better differentiate children in terms of performance.  Future 
researchers may consider tracking pass rates in order to aim for approximately half of a 
sample passing critical tasks for this reason.    
 Despite the fact that the general result regarding theory of mind performance 
and bilingualism is not consistent with past research, there is still information that helps 
to delve into the underlying influence of theory of mind development.  Once again, 
performance on the FB and AN tasks were related, regardless of language status.  As 
evidenced by the results of the multiple regressions, the number of pairs produced 
during the AN task was strongly related to performance on the FB tasks, even above 
and beyond effects of age and executive functioning.  Inhibition does appear to play 
some part in the ability to pass the false belief tasks, as performance on the DNS was 
related to performance on the Language Switch task and FB tasks among bilinguals.  
Performance on the DNS was significantly, negatively related to FB task performance 
among monolinguals when controlling for all other variables.  This runs counter to 
previous research and warrants further investigation to determine whether this is a 
reliable finding.   
Regardless, it is clear from the results of the regression analyses that AN and FB 
task performances are strongly related, even when accounting for age, verbal mental 
age, and measures of executive functioning.  This lends support for the claim for a 
general metarepresentational development as an explanation for stronger theory of mind 
performance among bilinguals that has been witnessed in past research, rather than 
simply being due to increased inhibition abilities.   
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Chapter Six 
Summary, Implications, and Future Research 
 The field of theory of mind research has quickly grown since 1978, when 
Premack and Woodruff inquired into the chimpanzee’s ability to understand human 
goals.  While this seminal paper that sparked great interest in the “ability to impute 
mental states to oneself and to others” and “to make inferences about what other people 
believe to be the case in a given situation” (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985, p. 39) in order to 
predict that behaviour began focused on chimpanzees and grounded in animal 
psychology, it quickly became of interest within developmental psychology.  By 1981, 
Bretherton, McNew, and Beeghly-Smith were asking a question that would lead to a 
field of study in developmental psychology that continues to be explored in great depth 
over 30 years later: When do infants acquire a “theory of mind”? 
Through decades of research and debate, the present general consensus is that explicit 
false-belief reasoning is generally developed by around the preschool years, or 4 years 
of age, among typically developing children (Wellman & Peterson, 2013).   
 There are specific groups that show developmental delays in theory of mind 
reasoning, namely children on the autistic spectrum and deaf children of hearing parents 
who do not have early access to sign language.  While the underlying mechanisms for 
children with ASD may differ somewhat, evidence suggests that access to language 
(spoken for hearing children, signed for deaf children) early in life plays a vital role in 
theory of mind development (Meristo et al., 2012; Moeller & Schick, 2006; Ruffman, 
Slade, & Crowe, 2002).   
 There are several other skills that have been found to develop around the same 
time as theory of mind; however, while many have theorised as to the role these skills 
play in theory of mind development, much remains somewhat unclear.  These skills 
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include metalinguistic awareness (e.g., Doherty, 2000; Doherty & Perner, 1998; Farrar 
& Ashwell, 2012; Perner et al., 2002) and aspects of executive functioning (e.g., 
Carlson & Moses, 2001).   
 Additionally, language background, including deafness and bilingualism, has 
been shown to affect the ages at which children develop these skills.  While deaf 
children have been shown to experience delays in theory of mind development, 
bilingualism has been shown to be advantageous for this development (e.g., Goetz, 
2003; Fahradian et al., 2010; Kovács, 2009; Rubio-Fernandez & Glucksberg, 2012).  
Bilingual children have also exhibited higher executive functioning skills than their 
monolingual peers, particularly in processes involving inhibition and set shifting (e.g., 
Bialystok, 1999; Carlson & Melzoff, 2008; Costa et al., 2008; Kovács & Mehler, 2009; 
Martin-Rhee & Bialystok, 2008).  Degree of bilingualism has also been found to be 
related to degree of metalinguistic skill (e.g., Bialystok & Ryan, 1985; Cromdal, 1999; 
Galambos & Hakuta, 1988).   
 While executive functioning, metalinguistic awareness, and false belief 
understanding have been examined among typical hearing, deaf, and bilingual children 
in the past, there are a lack of studies that do so comprehensively.  The links between 
these three areas of development among these groups of children has also yet to be 
investigated in depth, as are the causes for possible relationships among them.  This 
study sought to undertaking an in-depth assessment of how language, including lack of 
early language input due to deafness and early input of multiple languages, affects the 
development of these skills to provide greater insight on the socio-cognitive 
developmental process.  Additionally, the inclusion of a sample from the yet unstudied 
group of deaf and hearing children in Ghana adds to the body of knowledge regarding 
theory of mind development in different cultures around the world.   
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 The purpose of this thesis was to investigate the development of theory of mind, 
metalinguistic awareness, and executive functioning, how these skills overlap in terms 
of development, and to examine the role of language in developing these skills.  More 
specifically, these skills were assessed in several groups of children in order to tease 
apart the nature of the relationships between these areas of development.  Typically 
developing, hearing, monolingual children served as somewhat of a baseline for the 
thesis by examining relationships between theory of mind, metalinguistic awareness, 
and executive functioning in Study 1.  Study 2 sought to expand this line of 
investigation by examining performance among deaf children in the U.S. and the U.K.  
Given that many young deaf children in these developed countries use hearing aids or 
cochlear implants of some sort, it is difficult to isolate effects of delayed language 
exposure.  As such, Study 3 was carried out in Ghana, where these technologies are not 
readily available to deaf children.  A group of hearing Ghanaian children were 
evaluated to determine trends in the region regarding theory of mind development in 
order to provide a comparison group for the sample of deaf Ghanaian children.  Finally, 
Study 4 expanded upon existing research into the role of bilingualism on theory of mind 
development, seeking to tease apart the reason for more advanced performance among 
bilinguals over monolinguals.   
The aim of the thesis was to provide information for answering the following six 
research questions:  
Research Question 1: Are there relationships among theory of mind, metalinguistic 
awareness, and executive functioning development?  If so, what is the nature of those 
relationships?  
Research Question 2: Does language background affect the development of theory of 
mind? 
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Research Question 3: Does language background affect the development of 
metalinguistic awareness? 
Research Question 4: How do performance rates on a variety of theory-of-mind related 
tasks vary among deaf children? 
Research Question 5: Does cultural background affect the development of theory of 
mind? 
Research Question 6: Does cultural background affect the development of 
metalinguistic awareness? 
 The present chapter condenses and further evaluates the evidence from the four 
empirical chapters.  Major findings from the four studies are discussed in terms of the 
thesis as a whole, as well as in the context of the existing literature in the field.  
Practical implications of the research are examined, and suggestions for expanding 
upon the information synthesised within this thesis are made.  
Summary and Evaluation of Findings 
The primary findings from each of the four empirical studies are compared and 
contrasted within this section.  A table summarising details and main findings of the 
four studies is presented in Table 6.2.  How the findings fit together to more fully tell 
the story of how language background plays a role in theory of mind and metalinguistic 
awareness development is discussed in terms of research questions.   
Study 1.  Study 1 consisted of two experiments, each with hearing children 
from Central Scotland between the ages of 2 and 5 years as participants.  Experiment 
1A involved assessing false belief understanding, metalinguistic awareness, and verbal 
mental age among a group of 31 nursery students.  Performances on the false belief task 
and the metalinguistic task were significantly, positively related, even after partialling 
out age and verbal mental age at the time of testing, r = .758, p < .001.   
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These results were consistent with results obtained by Stummer (1997; 2001, 
both as cited by Perner, Stummer et al., 2002), showing a robust relationship between 
performance on an alternative naming metalinguistic awareness task and a false belief 
task, even when accounting for participants’ ages and verbal mental ability.  While 
Perner, Stummer et al. (2002) found that the relationship between these tasks did not 
remain when accounting for these additional factors, the present study supports 
Stummer’s results, as do further findings from experiments conducted throughout this 
doctoral thesis.  The fact that the difficulty experienced by the children on the 
metalinguistic task did not translate over to the similarly structured CC task support’s 
Perner, Stummer et al.’s stance against the executive demand hypothesis.  Additional 
support against executive functioning as mediating the relationship between 
metalinguistic awareness and false belief understanding was obtained in Experiment 
1B.   
Experiment 1B included the same false belief, metalinguistic awareness, and 
verbal mental age tasks, but also included a secondary false belief task and two 
measures of executive functioning.  The purpose of Experiment 1B was to build upon 
the results of Experiment 1A and to assess whether executive functioning skills explain 
the relationship between metalinguistic awareness and false belief understanding.  
Performance on the false belief tasks, metalinguistic awareness task, and executive 
functioning tasks all correlated with age.  After controlling for age and verbal mental 
age, performance on the false belief and metalinguistic awareness tasks remained 
positively correlated, r = .465, p < .001.  A hierarchical regression showed that 
performance on the false belief tasks significantly predicted performance on the 
metalinguistic awareness task even after controlling for age, verbal mental age, and 
performance on the two executive functioning tasks (β = .500, p = .002).   
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The findings from both experiments in Study 1 support the notion that theory of 
mind understanding and metalinguistic awareness development are related, supporting 
previous work on the subject (e.g., Doherty, 2000; Doherty & Perner, 1998; Farrar & 
Ashwell, 2012; Perner, Stummer et al., 2002).  The results argue against the executive 
demands hypothesis, as the relationships between metalinguistic awareness and false 
belief reasoning remained when accounting for not only age and verbal mental ability, 
but also performance on tasks explicitly designed to assess executive functioning skills 
believed to underpin performance on the standard false belief tasks.  Rather, results 
from Study 1 support the theory that the two abilities may share a common core in 
understanding of representations, as proposed by Kloo et al. (2010).  Given the findings 
of this study, the development of understanding of metarepresentation remains a strong 
hypothesis regarding why these skills develop somewhat concurrently.   
Study 2.  Study 2 similarly consisted of two experiments, both of which focused 
on performance among samples of deaf children and adolescents.  The children in both 
experiments ranged in age from 5 to 15 years.   The 18 children included in the sample 
for Experiment 2A were drawn from deaf populations in Southern California, U.S., and 
Central Scotland, U.K., whereas all 18 of the children in Experiment 2B lived in Central 
Scotland.   Experiment 2A was very similar to Experiment 1B, using many of the same 
tasks, although they were modified for use with deaf children.  The mean age of the 
children in Experiment 2A was 10 years, 2 months.  No significant correlations were 
found among task performances after controlling for age.  Performance on the two false 
belief tasks varied greatly, as 33.3% passed the traditional “Sally” unexpected transfer 
task, but 83.3% passed the “Puppet” task, which involved explicit trickery.  Children 
performed well on all other tasks: alternative naming mean 3.56 out of 4, DCCS mean 
4.44 out of 5, and DNS mean 15.8 out of 16.   
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Experiment 2A illustrated a very different pattern of development than was 
found among the hearing children included in Experiment 1B.  While a clear 
relationship was found between performance on the metalinguistic awareness measure 
and measures of false belief among the hearing children in Study 1, no such relationship 
was found among participants in Experiment 2A.  Results of Experiment 2A point 
toward a more specific delay in false belief development, without similar delays in 
metalinguistic awareness or executive functioning.  These results support the vast 
amount of research that has suggested significant delays in theory of mind development 
among deaf children (Courtin, 2000; Moeller & Schick, 2006; Peterson & Siegal, 1995; 
Peterson & Siegal, 1999; Russell et al., 1998).  Given that only standard forms of the 
false belief task were included in Experiment 2A, however, it begged the question as to 
whether alternative forms of false belief tasks or tasks that require precursory 
knowledge would prove more effective in use with deaf children.     
As such, Experiment 2B involved a battery of tasks found to relate to theory of 
mind development, as well as the metalinguistic awareness task and two executive 
functioning tasks.  The mean age of the children was 10 years, 6 months.  The standard 
false belief unexpected contents task was also presented in two ways: one with the 
critical belief question asked first, and the other with it asked last.  This was done in an 
attempt to determine if children were making assumptions about what the experimenter 
was asking prior to being asked the control questions.  This alteration in the wording 
did not result in a significant difference in performance.  Approximately two-thirds to 
three-quarters of children passed the false belief unexpected transfer tasks.  
Performance on the three tasks ranged from 66.7% to 77.8%, with 61.1% passing all 
three versions.  The unexpected contents task appeared more difficult: 77.8% correctly 
answered the other’s belief question, but only 50% correctly answered the own belief 
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question.  Performance on the other theory-of-mind related tasks was fairly consistent: 
77.8% scored at least 3 out of 4 on the Tunnel task, 83.3% scored at least 4 out of 5 on 
the Lift/See task, and 72.2% correctly answered the Backward Explanation task.  
Performance remained high on the alternative naming task (mean 3.53 of 4), DCCS 
(mean 4.72 of 5), and DNS (mean 15.8 of 16).   
Similarly as to the findings from Experiment 2A, results from Experiment 2B 
suggest that the delay witnessed among deaf children regarding false belief 
understanding does not directly translate over to delays in other areas of cognition.  As 
such, it appears that deaf children may not experience a more widespread 
metarepresetation developmental delay, but that there is something specific to theory of 
mind understanding that is impacted by their deafness.  The use of an alternative order 
of questions in the unexpected transfer tasks was designed to test the hypothesis that 
deaf children, who often receive distorted information or misinterpret information they 
receive (Mbaluka et al., 2013), may in essence be guessing at what information the 
experimenter is really after rather than simply answering the question presented in a 
straightforward manner.  The fact that the alternate wording did not improve 
performance suggests that this is not the underlying reason for poor performance on 
false belief tasks by deaf children.   
Regarding the other tests in the battery, results concerning performance on the 
Backward Explanation task are consistent with Perner, Lang, and Kloo’s (2002) finding 
that an explanation task is not inherently easier or more useful than the typical 
unexpected transfer task.  Errors made on the Tunnel task were consistent with those 
described by O’Neill et al. (1992); deaf children were more prone to feel an object than 
to look at it, despite the fact that feeling would provide no useful information in 
differentiating objects.   
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Study 3.  Study three consisted of three separate portions.  Experiment 3A 
involved assessing theory of mind, metalinguistic awareness, and executive functioning 
among 70 deaf students at a school for the deaf in Cape Coast, Ghana.  Experiment 3B 
was a focus group involving five teachers of the deaf from the school.  Experiment 3C 
involved assessing theory of mind abilities of 40 hearing children in Cape Coast, 
Ghana.   
Experiment 3A was very similar to Experiment 2B.  The 70 deaf children that 
were tested ranged in age from 8 years, 6 months to 24 years, 3 months, with a mean 
age of 15 years, 6 months.  Performance on the majority of the tasks was somewhat 
lower than found among the deaf children in Experiment 2B.  Performance on the 
unexpected transfer tasks ranged from 24.3% to 37.1%, with just 7.1% passing all three.  
Only 25.7% passed the other’s belief on the unexpected contents task, and 18.6% 
passed the own belief question.  Performance on the other theory of mind tasks were: 
52.8% scored at least 3 out of 4 on the Tunnel task, 40.0% scored at least 4 out of 5 on 
the Lift/See task, and 27.1% correctly answered the Backward Explanation task.  
Children performed well on the measures of executive functioning: mean of 3.87 of 5 
on the DCCS, and mean of 15.79 of 16 on DNS.  Performance was lower than among 
the sample from Experiment 2B on the alternative naming task (mean 2.50 out of 4), 
although in terms of percent achieving a passing score of three out of four pairs 
(55.7%), the children performed better on this task than on the false belief tasks.    
Once again, these findings are consistent with past research establishing delays 
in theory of mind development among deaf children (e.g., Peterson & Siegal, 1995; 
Peterson & Siegal, 1999; Russell et al., 1998).  This group of children additionally did 
not have confounding effects of hearing aids and cochlear implants, perhaps providing a 
more “pure” sample of deaf children among which to assess theory of mind 
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development.  Performance on the more direct measures of false belief understanding 
(Smarties, Backward Explanation, and FB tasks) were the most difficult for individuals 
in this sample, as they were for the British sample in Experiment 2B.  Contrastingly, 
measures of executive functioning skills (DNS, DCCS) were the easiest for the 
children, consistent with past research indicating that poor performance on false belief 
tasks by deaf children are not due to general problems with representation or executive 
functioning (Remine et al., 2008; Woolfe et al., 2002) 
Experiment 3B involved a video-taped focus group with five of the teachers of 
the deaf.  The teachers were queried regarding their experiences in working with the 
deaf children.  Primary themes that arose from a qualitative analysis of the transcribed 
focus group were barriers to teaching, barriers to learning, differences from hearing 
students, and differences due to language background.  Subthemes for barriers to 
teaching included conceptual learning, language skills, and quantity.  Teachers 
expressed the great difficulties they had in teaching the children due to their poor 
language skills and struggle with abstract concepts.   
The participants in Experiment 3C were 40 hearing children between the 
approximate ages of 4 and 12 years (mean age 6 years, 5 months).  Children were tested 
on the three unexpected transfer false belief tasks that were also administered to the 
deaf children in Experiment 3A.  Between 55.0% and 65.0% of children passed each of 
the tasks.  Children were also tested using the alternative question order as described for 
Experiment 2B; this question order did not produce any significant differences in 
performance.  Performance on the three tasks were highly related (rs ≥ .595, ps < .001).   
Findings from Experiment 3C suggest that the hearing children sampled in 
Ghana develop false belief understanding slightly later than among children included in 
Wellman et al. (2001)’s meta-analysis.  Whereas Wellman et al. found that about 50% 
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of children at approximately 44 months of age (3 years, 8 months) are able to pass the 
false belief task, the children in the Ghanaian sample (mean age 6 years, 5 months) 
were only passing at slightly higher rates than this (55 – 65%).  A major limitation to 
this conclusion, however, is the fact that the ages were approximate for children in the 
Ghanaian sample and the age range was quite large (8 years) compared to most studies 
of typically developing children; the higher ages of some Ghanaian children may have 
skewed the sample, making any potential delay seem more extreme than it truly is.  
This finding runs contrary to Avis and Harris’s finding in their 1991 study of Baka 
children from Southeast Cameroon.  However, given the low socioeconomic status of 
children in this area of Ghana in comparison to many Western studies of theory of 
mind, a finding of 55 – 65% passing rate is not entirely inconsistent with past research 
with children of poorer backgrounds in Western countries (Doherty, 2009).   
Study 4.  Study 4 consisted of a single experiment aimed at assessing 
differences in performance on theory of mind, metalinguistic awareness, and executive 
functioning among monolingual and bilingual children.  Forty English-monolingual and 
twenty-eight English-Spanish bilingual preschoolers from Southern California were 
included in this experiment.  The mean age of both groups was 3 years 10 months, 
although the group of monolinguals had a significantly higher mean verbal mental age 
than the bilinguals.  The tasks used in the experiment were identical to those used in 
Experiments 1B and 2A, with the addition of a language-switching task for the bilingual 
children.  Results were fairly consistent between monolingual and bilingual children.  
There was no significant difference in aggregate false-belief task performance or DCCS 
performance among the two groups.  However, monolingual children did outperform 
their bilingual peers on the alternative naming task and the day/night Stroop task.  
Performance on measures of false belief, metalinguistic awareness, and executive 
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functioning all correlated with age.  False belief and metalinguistic task performances 
were significantly related for both groups, even after controlling for age and verbal 
mental age.  Additionally, performance on the metalinguistic awareness task remained a 
significant predictor of false belief performance, even after accounting for the effects of 
age, verbal mental age, and executive functioning.   
 Findings from Study 4 do not support findings from past research regarding 
false belief performance among bilingual children.  While Farhadian et al. (2010), 
Goetz (2003); and Kovacs (2009) all found clearly advanced performance among 
bilingual children in comparison with their monolingual peers, the present findings 
showed no significant difference between monolingual and bilingual children in terms 
of false belief performance.  However, as was previously acknowledged, there were 
some large limitations to this study, given that the two groups were not matched well on 
mental verbal age and unequal sample sizes, making it difficult to make claims from 
this study.   
The evaluation of findings in regards to theoretical implications of the research 
conducted for this thesis will be considered relevant to the six research questions that 
guided the thesis.   
Research Question 1.  Research Question 1 concerned the relationships among 
theory of mind, metalinguistic awareness, and executive functioning development.  
Information relevant to answering this research question comes from all four studies.  
The general finding is that theory of mind and metalinguistic awareness appear to be 
strongly related among typically developing children, but not among deaf children.  
Executive functioning does not explain that relationship, although components of 
executive functioning were found to relate to theory of mind in some cases.  As the 
findings between executive functioning and theory of mind were less robust, it appears 
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that the link between theory of mind and metalinguistic awareness is stronger among 
hearing children than is the link between theory of mind and executive functioning.   
Evidence from studies 1 and 4 show these relationships among hearing children 
most clearly.  In Study 1, performance on the false belief tasks and metalinguistic 
awareness task were positively correlated, even after controlling for age and verbal 
mental age (rs ≥ .465).  This was also the case in Study 4, both among monolingual and 
bilingual hearing children (rs ≥ .494).  This indicates that there is a strong, positive 
relationship between theory of mind development and metalinguistic awareness 
development among hearing children.  It is apparent from the fact that performance on 
the false belief and metalinguistic awareness tasks remained significantly, positively 
related even after accounting for scores on executive functioning tasks, as evidenced in 
the regression analyses conducted in studies 1 and 4, that this relationship cannot be 
explained merely by executive functioning skills.  This lends strong support for the 
claim that there is an underlying developmental process driving the development of 
theory of mind and metalinguistic awareness.   
There was not a similar, robust relationship found either between false belief 
performance and executive functioning or between metalinguistic awareness 
performance and executive functioning.  There were some correlations found between 
individual measures of executive functioning and other task performances; however, 
these tended to become non-significant after controlling for age and verbal mental age, 
or they were not consistent between experiments, providing doubt as to the general 
strength of the relationships.   
The relationships among the development of theory of mind, metalinguistic 
awareness, and executive functioning are not consistent between deaf and hearing 
children.  The robust relationship found between theory of mind and metalinguistic 
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awareness among hearing children was not witnessed at all with the deaf children in 
studies 2 or 3.  Performance on the measures of theory of mind and metalinguistic 
awareness did not correlate at all, and performance was at least slightly higher on the 
metalinguistic task than on the false belief tasks.  Rather, there is more evidence among 
the deaf children that executive functioning is playing a role in metalinguistic 
awareness and theory of mind development.  Moderate correlations between the DCCS 
and the alternative naming, tunnel, and false belief tasks were witnessed among the deaf 
Ghanaian sample.  This suggests that among deaf children who are severely limited in 
early language output due to the lack of hearing technology, set shifting ability supports 
metalinguistic and theory of mind development.   
Research Question 2.  Research Question 2 concerned whether language 
background affects the development of theory of mind.  Information relevant to 
answering this research question again comes from all four studies.  The general finding 
is that yes, language background, specifically the lack of early language input, affects 
the development of theory of mind.  This can particularly be seen when contrasting the 
performance on false belief tasks between the hearing children in studies 1 and 4 with 
the deaf children in studies 2 and 3.   
It appears that lack of early language input delays theory of mind development.  
Although the deaf children in the studies generally performed better than the hearing 
children in terms of percent passing tasks, it is important to keep in mind the age 
differences between the deaf and hearing groups.  The deaf groups were all quite a bit 
older than the hearing groups, yet they still struggled to pass the false belief unexpected 
transfer tasks at a rate of more than 80%.  In most cases, over 25% of the deaf children 
were failing the false belief task, despite none of the children being younger than 5 
years of age.   
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Figure 6.1 shows the breakdown of percent of children passing each false belief 
unexpected transfer task in each of the experiments, as well as the hearing status and 
mean age of the group being tested.  Figure 6.2 shows the average percent of children 
passing across the false belief tasks.  Although the lowest performing group was a 
hearing group and the highest performing group was a deaf group, there is a difference 
of almost 7 years in terms of mean age of the groups.  In directly comparing the hearing 
Ghanaian sample (3C) with the deaf Ghanaian sample (3A), it is clear that the hearing 
sample outperformed their deaf counterparts, despite the significantly lower mean age 
of the sample.  These two groups may show the most pure comparison regarding early 
language input, as none of the deaf Ghanaian children had hearing aids or cochlear 
implants, and the two groups were growing up in the same region under similar 
conditions, apart from hearing status.   
 
Figure 6.1.  Percentage of children passing false belief tasks by experiment and task 
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Figure 6.2.  Percentage of children passing false belief tasks by experiment, averaged 
across tasks 
 
 In terms of the effect of early input of multiple languages, the bilingual children 
in Study 4 did not outperform their hearing counterparts, contrary to past findings.  
Despite the fairly consistent finding that bilingual children outperform their 
monolingual peers (e.g., Goetz, 2003; Kovács, 2009;  Farhadian et al., 2010), no 
significant difference was found in aggregate false belief performance between the two 
language groups in Study 4.  One possible explanation for this anomaly, as well as for 
the fact that the bilinguals did not outperform their peers on measures of executive 
functioning, is that the bilingual sample in Study 4 had a significantly lower verbal 
mental age than the monolinguals, despite the same mean chronological age.  It may 
have been the case that the bilingual children were not as advanced in their English 
skills, as shown by PPVT scores, as the PPVT was administered in English.  If the 
bilingual children had lower English vocabularies than their monolingual peers, this 
may have hindered their performance on all tasks, limiting the potential to see a 
bilingual advantage on these skills.   
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Exp 1A
Mean age
4;0
Exp 1B
Mean age
3;10
Exp 3C
Mean age
6;5
Exp 4
Mean age
3;10
Exp 2A
Mean age
10;2
Exp 2B
Mean age
10;6
Exp 3A
Mean age
15;6
Hearing Deaf
%
 o
f C
hi
ld
re
n 
Pa
ss
in
g 
Average of FB tasks
 195 
 
 
Research Question 3.  Research Question 3 concerned whether language 
background affects the development of metalinguistic awareness.  The answer to this 
question is less clear than those previously discussed.  It may be that deafness increases 
metalinguistic awareness, or the fact that the deaf children outperformed the hearing 
children on the metalinguistic task may be an artefact of age.  Bilingualism did not 
appear to provide any advantage on the metalinguistic task, as the bilingual children in 
Study 4 actually performed significantly lower than their monolingual peers.  Figure 6.3 
shows the mean score for each experimental group on the alternative naming task.  
  
 
Figure 6.3.  Performance on alternative naming task, by experimental group  
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However, there is something unique about theory of mind that stops developing in deaf 
children while metalinguistic awareness continues to develop.  This could potentially 
also explain why hearing children tended to perform better on measures of false belief 
than metalinguistic awareness, but deaf children tended to perform better on the 
measure of metalinguistic awareness than on measures of false belief understanding.   
After considering the findings of the present thesis in light of past literature, it is 
proposed that false belief understanding and metalinguistic awareness develop in 
tandem due to an underlying mechanism that is grounded in perspective shifting ability.  
It appears that metalinguistic awareness develops slightly later than theory of mind, as 
hearing children tend to have more difficulty with metalinguistic awareness than 
explicit displays of false belief understanding, potentially due to lack of exposure to 
written language.   
However, among deaf children, they are able to continue development of 
metalinguistic awareness as it grows with age, but get “stuck” on theory of mind due to 
the abstract nature of the concepts of belief.  As was illustrated by the teachers of the 
deaf who took part in the focus group in Experiment 3B, deaf children appear to 
struggle greatly with abstract concepts.  The teachers stated that they needed concrete 
materials to illustrate concepts to the children and to aid in their learning of those 
concepts.  It is difficult to convey thoughts or beliefs visually, which may be where the 
difficulty with theory of mind arises for deaf children.  This would not be the case with 
metalinguistic awareness.  Deaf children learn language in regards to concrete items, 
whether they be signs, words, or the objects and things they represent.  This provides 
them with the visual material for associating language with things, and potentially 
different words or signs for the same thing, developing their metalinguistic abilities.  
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However, they do not have anything concrete to attach to what an individual is thinking 
or believes – this remains an abstract concept that they struggle with.   
Research Question 4.  Research Question 4 concerned how performance rates 
on a variety of theory-of-mind related tasks vary among deaf children.  In order to 
answer this question, a battery of theory-of-mind related tasks were administered to 
deaf children in Central Scotland (Experiment 2B) and in Cape Coast, Ghana 
(Experiment 3A).  This battery of tasks was used to scale performance by deaf children 
in order to provide some background for further investigation into scaling of 
developments.   
Table 4.5, reprinted below, illustrates the performance of the deaf children in 
Experiments 2B and 3A.  Below it has been condensed only to show performance on 
theory-of-mind related tasks.   
Table 6.1 
Comparison of UK and Ghanaian Pass Rates 
Task UK Pass Rate  Ghana Pass Rate Task 
Smarties 50% Most difficult 10.0% Smarties 
Backward 
Explanation 72.2% 
 27.1% Backward Explanation 
FB 72.2%  31.4% FB 
Tunnel 77.8%  40.0% Lift/See 
Lift/See 83.3% Least difficult 52.9% Tunnel 
 
 As illustrated in the table, the Ghanaian sample performed lower on all tasks 
than did the Scottish sample, presumably due to longer amount of time without 
language input prior to joining school, no availability of cochlear implants and hearing 
aids, and less technology available for aiding in development both prior-to and after 
joining school.  However, despite the differences in pass rates between the two groups, 
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their performance follows similar patterns.  The deaf children performed poorest on 
tasks that involved prediction or explanation based on another’s thoughts or beliefs.  
Alternatively, they performed better on the two tasks related to understanding the 
seeing leads to knowing or understanding which senses can reliably be used for 
understanding characteristics of an object.  The order of the Tunnel task and the 
Lift/See task were opposite between the two groups, but they still were the two most-
passed tasks.   
This again seems to relate to the comments made by the deaf teachers in 
Experiment 3B that deaf children have trouble with abstract concepts.  While the 
Lift/See task and the Tunnel task are somewhat related to theory of mind and 
understanding of how people know things, they are more concrete than the other three 
tasks.  The children appear better able to understand the concepts of seeing and feeling 
objects, and how that leads to knowing something about that object, better than they 
understand how seeing (or not seeing) something can change what another person 
believes.  It is therefore proposed that as scenarios and concepts become more abstract, 
the more difficult they become for deaf children.  The more salient the concept, 
including concepts regarding mind, the more easily they will understand.  While this 
does not get to the reason that undergirds this abstract difficulty, it is information that 
can be valuable in practical terms, such as in deaf education.   
Research Question 5.  Research Question 5 concerned whether cultural 
background affects the development of theory of mind.  Evidence for answering this 
research question is drawn from studies 1 and 3.  While there appears to be some 
potential effect of culture on theory of mind development, it is slight.  False belief task 
passing rates for the Scottish children in Experiments 1A and 1B ranged from 51.6% to 
62.0%; the false belief task passing rates for Ghanaian children in Experiment 3C 
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ranged from 55.0% to 65.0%.  The Ghanaian children were notably older than their 
Scottish counterparts (M = 6;5 versus M = 4;0 and 3;10); however, the passing rates for 
the Ghanaian sample are slightly higher than those for the Scottish sample.  In 
comparison to past findings by Wellman et al. (2001), who found that at about 44 
months of age (3 years, 8 months), children are about 50% correct on the task, the 
Ghanaian sample appears slightly delayed.  However, this could also be due to 
socioeconomic, rather than purely cultural, factors, as researchers (e.g., Holmes, Black, 
& Miller, 1996; Hughes et al., 2005) suggest that children from lower socioeconomic 
backgrounds tend to develop theory of mind at a slightly later age.   
Research Question 6.  Research Question 6 concerned whether cultural 
background affects the development of metalinguistic awareness.  This question has the 
least amount of evidence available from the studies conducted for this thesis.  Due to 
time and practicality constraints including translating the task into Fanti, the alternative 
naming task was not administered to the group of hearing Ghanaian children.  
Therefore, the only comparison of metalinguistic ability due to culture than can be done 
is between the deaf Scottish children in Experiments 2A and 2B and the deaf Ghanaian 
children from Experiment 3A.   
However, this comparison is very limited as well, as there are significant 
differences in the early lives of the two groups apart from merely cultural differences.  
The children in the sample from the U.K. were likely identified as deaf fairly early on in 
childhood, at least by the age of 5 when they entered school, if not much earlier.  In 
contrast, the children in the Ghanaian sample may or may not be identified as deaf until 
later in childhood, and even then, resources are very limited for parents of deaf 
children.  These children do not necessarily begin school at the age of 5, and as the 
teachers in the focus group stated, sometimes they do not join school until as late as 17 
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or 18 years of age (Appendix C).  Due to the limited resources available to them, 
children tend to have no language skills, apart from some home signs used with family, 
when they begin school.  This is not likely the case with deaf children in the U.K., as 
there are organizations and support for parents so they can begin exposing their children 
to sign language or potentially using hearing aids or cochlear implants prior to 
enrollment in school.   
 Having said that, the performance on the alternative naming task among the deaf 
children in Ghana was noticeably lower than among the Scottish children (see Figure 
6.3).  The samples from Experiments 2A and 2B performed almost identically on the 
task, despite the group in Experiment 2A including children from both America and the 
United Kingdom.  However, as both the U.S. and the U.K. are developed, English-
speaking, Western countries, cultural differences would be slight, and unlikely to 
provide a good contrast for evaluating effects of culture.  The fact that the Ghanaian 
children performed to a lower degree on the task than did the Western children may 
point to an effect of culture on metalinguistic ability; however, without additional 
investigation it is impossible to determine whether the difference is due to cultural 
differences or to more extreme language deficiencies among the Ghanaian sample.   
Practical Implications of the Research 
The most profound practical implication arising from this thesis is likely that 
which comes from the suggestion that deaf children struggle with abstract reasoning.  It 
is argued that this problem with abstract concepts is what undergirds the struggle deaf 
children have with theory of mind tasks, which was particularly highlighted among the 
sample of deaf Ghanaian children.  The scaling of performance on theory-of-mind 
related tasks among the groups from Experiments 2B and 3A appears to highlight the 
impact of having something tangible to see or feel in regards to gaining a theory of 
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mind.  Children struggled the most with tasks that were reliant on purely abstract 
concepts of others’ beliefs, as it is difficult to make these ideas salient without concrete 
materials.   
As the teachers pointed out, the deaf children’s struggle with abstract thinking 
affects their ability to learn in class, particularly without visual or tactile materials.  This 
highlights the need for creation of materials and availability of materials that can 
ground abstract concepts in concrete items.  This is something that potentially can be 
undertaken by researchers specialising in deaf education.   
This outcome of this thesis may also serve to motivate further research into 
designing and testing interventions for deaf children aimed at increasing theory of mind 
understanding.  Wellman and Peterson (2013) recently conducted such an intervention 
with deaf children in Australia.  The study made use of concrete materials, including 
cutout dolls, thought bubbles, and containers and rooms with opening paper flaps, to 
conduct an intervention program aimed at increasing false-belief understanding and 
progress on a broader theory-of-mind scale, an intervention that was found to be 
effective.  Information gained from this new study teamed with information from this 
thesis may serve as a solid framework for developing interventions for use with deaf 
children.   
Suggestions for Future Research 
This thesis was aimed at addressing gaps in the existing literature on the 
interplay between theory of mind, language, and metalinguistic awareness, whilst also 
evaluating claims and theories presented by previous research through additional 
empirical testing.  While some questions have been answered in this regard, the field 
can only be further strengthened by additional research.  This is particularly true given 
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some of the limitations that were encountered during the process of completing this 
thesis, particularly with access to participants.     
As with any special population, gaining access to deaf children to take part in 
this research proved difficult.  The existing knowledge can only be strengthened by 
replicating the studies presented in this thesis with larger sample sizes, particularly in 
regards to the deaf children.   
Bilingual participants also proved difficult to obtain, and as a result the analysis 
presented in Study 4 is not as strong as it could have been.  The bilingual children who 
did take part had notably lower verbal mental skills than their monolingual peers, which 
may have impacted results.  It is therefore recommended that future researchers seek to 
match bilingual and monolingual children not only on chronological age, but on verbal 
mental age as well, to ensure a fair comparison between groups.  
The evidence regarding Research Questions 5 and 6, those having to do with 
effects of culture on theory of mind and metalinguistic awareness development, was 
somewhat weak in the present thesis.  It is recommended that future researchers seek to 
expand upon this and existing research on theory of mind and culture in order to give a 
more complete view of how these skills develop in cultures around the world.  This 
should definitely entail more research being conducted in Africa, as there is a severe 
lack of studies investigating sociocognitive development of children in African 
countries.   
As previously mentioned, the opportunity for interventions for deaf children 
aimed at increasing theory of mind abilities should be considered.  In line with this, 
further investigation should be conducted into the theory that deaf children experience 
trouble with theory of mind due to the extreme abstractness of the concept of other 
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people’s beliefs.  Future research should be aimed at testing this hypothesis by 
including measures of abstract reasoning alongside measures of theory of mind.   
Conclusions 
The aim of this doctoral thesis was to conduct research into the effects of 
language and culture on the development of theory of mind, metalinguistic awareness, 
and executive functioning.  While relevant evidence regarding the effects of language 
was somewhat lacking, some important findings have nonetheless been noted.  Results 
show that there is a strong relationship among hearing children between theory of mind 
and metalinguistic awareness, which is likely due to the underlying ability to confront 
and shift between multiple representations or perspectives.  This relationship is not due 
to issues of executive functioning.  However, this relationship does not exist among 
deaf children.  It is proposed that while these skills may begin developing at the same 
rate in all children, deaf children are halted in their theory of mind development by the 
inability to understand abstract concepts, such as thoughts and beliefs.  It was 
recommended that future researchers aim to test this hypothesis by further evaluating 
abstract reasoning among deaf children and determining whether there is a correlation 
with theory of mind understanding.  
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Table 6.2  
Summary of Four Studies 
 Study 1 Study 2 
 Experiment 1A Experiment 1B Experiment 2A Experiment 2B 
Location Central Scotland Central Scotland Southern California & Central Scotland Central Scotland 
Participants 31 hearing children 50 hearing children 18 deaf children 18 deaf children 
Ages 2;8 – 4;9 (M = 4;0) 2;10 – 5;1 (M = 3;10) 5;7 – 15;9 (M = 10;2) 5;0 – 15;7 (M = 10;6) 
Tasks FB, AN, CC, BPVS 2 FB, AN, CC, BPVS, DCCS, DNS 2 FB, AN, CC, DCCS, DNS 
3 FB, AN, CC, DCCS, DNS 
Smarties, Tunnel, Backward 
Explanation, Lift/See, Draw a Man 
     
Main 
Findings 
51.6% pass FB 56% pass Sally FB 
62% pass Puppet FB 
 
33.3% pass Sally FB 
83.3% pass Puppet FB 
 
FB pass rates 66.7% - 77.8% 
66.7% pass all three FB  
AN M pairs correct (of 4) = 1.68  AN M pairs correct (of 4) = 1.44  AN M pairs correct (of 4) = 3.56  
 
AN M pairs correct (of 4) = 3.53  
CC mean correct 3.19 (of 4) CC mean correct 3.74 (of 4) CC mean correct 4.0 (of 4) CC mean correct 4.0 (of 4) 
 DCCS mean correct 3.78 (of 5) DCCS mean correct 4.44 (of 5) DCCS mean correct 4.72 (of 5) 
 DNS mean correct 12.08 (of 16) DNS mean correct 15.8 (of 16) DNS mean correct 15.8 (of 16) 
FB and AN significantly related to age 
 
FB, AN, DCCS, DNS all related to 
age 
No sig. correlations after controlling 
for age  
Smarties: 77.8% other belief 
                50.0% own belief 
FB and AN after controlling for age 
and VMA  
(r = .758, p < .001) 
FB and AN after controlling for age 
and VMA  
(r = .465, p < .001) 
 Tunnel mean 3.22 (of 4) 
 Backwards Explanation 72.2% correct 
 
FB significantly predicted number of 
AN pairs produced after controlling 
for age, VMA, DCCS, and DNS (β = 
.500, p = .002) 
 Lift/See mean correct 4.39 (of 5)  
 AN & Lift/See after controlling for 
age & Draw a Man  
(r = .628, p < .05) 
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 Study 3 Study 4 
 Experiment 3A Experiment 3C Monolinguals Bilinguals 
Location Cape Coast, Ghana Cape Coast, Ghana Southern California Southern California 
Participants 70 deaf children 40 hearing children 40 monolingual English 28 bilingual English-Spanish 
Ages 8;6 – 24;3 (M = 15;6) 4;0 – 12;0 (M = 6;5) 2;8 – 4;1 (M = 3;10) 3;2 – 4;5 (M = 3;10) 
Tasks 
3 FB, AN, CC, DCCS, DNS 
Smarties, Tunnel, Backward 
Explanation, Lift/See, Draw a Man 
3 FB, Draw a Man 2 FB, AN, CC, PPVT, DCCS, DNS 2 FB, AN, CC, PPVT, DCCS, DNS, Language Switch 
     
Main 
Findings 
FB pass rates 24.3% - 37.1% 
7.1% pass all three FB  
 
65% pass Puppet FB 
60% pass Sally FB 
55% pass Mary FB 
 
FB tasks highly related (rs ≥ .595, ps 
< .001) 
25.0% pass Sally FB 
32.5% pass Puppet FB 
 
32.1% pass Sally FB 
10.7% pass Puppet FB 
 
AN M pairs correct (of 4) = 2.50 AN M pairs correct (of 4) = 1.83  AN M pairs correct (of 4) = 0.71  
CC mean correct 3.99 (of 4) CC mean correct 4.00 (of 4) CC mean correct 3.86 (of 4) 
DCCS mean correct 3.87 (of 5) DCCS mean correct 4.60 (of 5) DCCS mean correct 4.68 (of 5) 
DNS mean correct 15.8 (of 16) DNS mean correct 12.75 (of 16) DNS mean correct 10.50  (of 16) 
Smarties: 25.7% other belief 
                18.6% own belief 
FB, AN, DCCS, DNS all related to 
age 
FB, AN, DCCS, DNS all related to 
age 
Tunnel mean 2.64 (of 4) FB and AN after controlling for age 
and VMA  
(r = .494, p = .002) 
FB and AN after controlling for age 
and VMA  
(r = .715, p < .001) Backwards Explanation 27.1% correct 
 
Lift/See mean correct 3.29 (of 5)  AN significantly predicted FB score 
after controlling for age, VMA, 
DCCS, and DNS (β = .635, p < .001) 
 
DNS negatively predicted FB score (β 
= -.491, p = .002) 
AN significantly predicted FB score 
after controlling for age, VMA, 
DCCS, and DNS (β = .705, p = .002) DCCS and… 
    Tunnel (r = .316, p < .01) 
    AN (r = .376, p < .01) 
    FB (r = .242, p < .05) 
AN and CC (r = .261, p < .05) 
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Appendix A 
Task Scripts 
*Note: references to signing were replaced with references to saying when working 
with hearing children 
 
Introduction 
Hi, my name is Danielle.  What’s your name? 
Hi ______.  Today I have a few games I want to play.  Will you play them with 
me? 
 
Colour/Colour Game 
Ok, the first game is about colours.  You know your colours?  Good! 
Show me, where is blue?  Where is brown?  Where is yellow?  Where is green?  
Where is red?  Where is orange? 
Very good!  Now, I have some pictures.  Each picture has 2 colours.  I’ll sign 
the first colour, then you sign the other colour.  Ok?  Let’s give it a try. 
This picture is red (/yellow).  What other colour is it? 
This picture is brown (/blue).  What other colour is it? 
This ball is red (/blue).  What other colour is it? 
This turtle is brown (/green).  What other colour is it? 
This butterfly is blue (/yellow).  What other colour is it? 
This present is yellow (/red).  What other colour is it? 
 Good job! 
 
DCCS 
Now, a new game.  In this game, we have 2 boxes.  This one has a blue apple.  
This one has a red dog.  See the holes on the top?  We can put things inside. 
First we’ll play the shape game.  In the shape game, all the dogs go in the dog 
box and all the apples go in the apple box.  I’ll try first.  Here is an apple.  It 
goes in the apple box.  Here is a dog.  It goes in the dog box.  Now you try. 
Here’s an apple.  Where does it go in the shape game? 
Here’s a dog.  Where does it go in the shape game? 
... 
Ok now let’s play a new game.  It’s called the colour game.   All the red pictures 
go in the red box and all the blue pictures go in the blue box.  Understand?  Ok 
you try. 
Here’s a blue one.  Where does it go? 
Here’s a red one.  Where does it go? 
... 
Good job!   
 
False Belief Sally Task 
In our next game we have a box, a jar, and two dolls.  This is a little girl, her 
name is Sally. What’s her name?  Right, Sally!  This is a little boy, his name is 
Tony.  What’s his name?  Right, Tony!   
Now, Sally has a marble.  Sally puts her marble into the box.  Now Sally goes 
out to play.  What does Tony do while she’s gone?   
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He takes the marble out of the box and puts it in the jar, like this.  Now Tony 
goes out to play. 
Here comes Sally back in.   
Where will Sally first look for her marble? 
Where is the marble really? 
Where did Sally put the marble in the beginning? 
Great job!  Now Sally and Tony are going to go away and play together. 
 
AN Task 
Ok now in this game we’re going to look at some pictures.  When I sign a word, 
you show me which picture it is.  Ok let’s give it a try. 
Point to the apple.    Point to the fruit. 
Point to the dog.  Point to the books. 
Point to the drink.  Point to the milk. 
Point to the rose.  Point to the flower. 
Point to the plane.  Point to the shoe. 
Point to the animal.  Point to the cat. 
Point to the burger.   Point to the food. 
Point to the chair.   Point to the bear. 
Point to the bear.  Point to the sun. 
Point to the bird.  Point to the owl. 
Point to the ring.  Point to the house. 
Point to the carrot.   Point to the ring. 
Very good!  Now, I have some pictures.  Each picture has 2 names.  I’ll sign the 
first name, then you sign the other name.  Ok?  Let’s give it a try. 
This is a fruit.  What else is it?   This is a rose.  What else is it? 
This is a drink (/milk).  What else is it? This is milk.  What else is it? 
This is a cat (/an animal).  What else is it? This is an animal.  What else is it? 
This is food (/a burger).  What else is it? This is a burger.  What else is it? 
This is an owl (/a bird).  What else is it? This is a bird.  What else is it? 
 Great job!   
 
Day Night Game 
 Now let’s have a look at our next game.   
 Whenever you see this picture, I want you to sign “Day”.  What do you sign? 
 Whenever you see this picture, I want you to sign “Night”.  What do you sign? 
 Right, now let’s give it a try. 
 (If wrong in first 2, repeat and say - What do you sign to this picture?) 
 Good job, you did very well! 
 
False Belief Puppet 
 Oh!  I hear something!  It’s Puppet!  What’s that you’ve got Puppet?  
 What does Puppet have? 
 Right, a key!  Is that your house key Puppet? 
 You don’t want to lose that, do you? 
 Where will you put it? 
 Good idea. 
 Are you tired Puppet?  Are you going for a nap? 
 Night night Puppet! 
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Let’s play a trick on Puppet.  I’m going to move his key from the box to…let’s 
see, where should we put it?  Under this paper?  Good – let’s hide it here.  
 I hear Puppet waking up! 
 Where will Puppet first look for his key? 
 Where is the key really? 
 Where did Puppet put his key in the beginning? 
 Oh here it is, Puppet!  See you later! 
 
 
 
BPVS 
Okay we have 1 more game today.  I’m going to sign a word and you point to 
the right picture.  Ok?  Let’s give it a try. 
--- 
That’s us all finished!  Thank you so much for helping me today, I had fun.  Do 
you have any questions?  Thank you! 
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Appendix B 
General Study Physical Materials 
Alternative Naming Task Materials 
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Colour/Colour Task Materials 
 
 
Day/Night Stroop Task Materials 
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Dimensional Change Card Sort Task Materials 
 
Language-Switch Task Materials 
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Appendix C 
Study 3 Physical Materials 
 
Figure C.1. Modified Smarties task used in Experiment 3A 
 
Figure C.2. Modified Smarties task used in Experiment 3A 
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Figure C.3. Tunnel task practice items used in Experiment 3A 
 
Figure C.4. Tunnel task see items used in Experiment 3A 
 
Figure C.4. Tunnel task feel items used in Experiment 3A 
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Figure C.5. Mary False Belief task items used in Study 3 
 
Figure C.6. Sally False Belief task items used in Study 3 
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Figure C.7. Puppet False Belief task items used in Study 3 (also used in all other studies 
with Puppet task) 
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Study 3 Backward Explanation Task 
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Study 3 Lift/See Task 
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Appendix D 
Study 3B Transcript 
Focus Group Transcript 
Participants, from left to right as video opens: 
Danielle: Blue Dress 
A: Gent, Blue Hawaii-style shirt 
B: Lady, pale yellow top 
C: Lady, Blue Vest 
D: Lady, Dark Striped top 
E: Gent, white polo shirt   
0:00 
Danielle:  I’d like to ask some questions about what working at the deaf school 
is like.  So how about we start, if everyone says their name, and how long 
you’ve been here 
E: My name is [name].  I’ve been...I’m teaching the science and geo [inaudible].  
I’ve been teaching for five years now.  
D: I’m [name] and I teach kindergarten.  I have been teaching here for seven 
weeks.  
Danielle: Seven weeks? 
D: Yes.   
C: My name is [name].  I have been here for six weeks. 
Danielle: What do you teach?   
C: I teach English language.  
B: [Name] 
Danielle: Sorry? 
B: [Name].  I’ve been teaching for seven years.  [inaudible]. English.  
A: I’m [name].  I teach English language to the kids.  I’ve been here for 17 
years. 
Danielle: Wow.  So you’ve been here for a long time.  
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1:26 
Danielle: So what kind of training do you normally do in order to teach at the 
deaf school?  Is there additional training besides regular teacher training? 
1:40  
E: Yes.  As I said before, when I teach [inaudible] you have to go to university 
for education, and you have to focus on special education…as a focus.  And 
study mathematics, or …when I was there you had to… disci- discipline.  
Educational behaviour, human behaviour, mental, … eh… [D says something 
inaudible, others chime in – inaudible] … so these three things.  You study them 
[inaudible].  You study them in specialised courses.   
2:24  
Danielle: So everybody does? [agreement from participants]  So why do you 
choose to go into special education?  Do you get to choose whether you work 
with deaf or blind or…?  
D: [inaudible].  Em, some of us had mentors. [inaudible] …the residents, the 
discipline [inaudible]; I personally had a mentor. Yes.  [inaudible]  So this was 
good, and I came to this school. 
3:06  
B: It was [inaudible] when I was in training, so I had a class [inaudible] so that's 
why I came into special education.   
A: Well I personally met some deaf students... who were signing.  They were 
signing and laughing, and you know, attracted me, and I decided to go do the 
course. 
3:45  
C: [inaudible]  …my father.  My father fell sick and he couldn't talk and he was 
writing, so my passion developed from that, personally. 
3:56  
E: For me, I once met a deaf person who [inaudible].  And besides that, I needed 
an additional language so when I saw him, I decided to [inaudible] and I went 
on a course for that.  And I knew that was what I want to teach.  
4:28  
Danielle: So have you all always taught deaf children or at deaf schools, or have 
you also taught hearing children?  [asked to repeat] Have you also taught 
hearing children, or only deaf children?  
 A: I taught hearing children for the teaching course, yet.  
 Danielle: Anybody else? 
 [All gesture to say they have taught hearing children] 
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 Danielle: You all taught hearing children before? [show agreement] 
 E: Before we went from [inaudible] we were teaching in a regular school 
Danielle: So you have experience of both here and elsewhere? [agreement] 
5:06  
Danielle: Are there any big differences that, you know, what are the traditional 
difficulties of teaching the deaf children versus the hearing children?  Or are 
they about the same? 
 D: Yeah... 
C: There is a big difference teaching the hearing and the deaf. The hearing, they 
can hear. So, when we teach them, we can...materials…maybe we can adapt so 
that people can understand. But the deaf is not like that.  Teaching them, you 
have to talk moooore before maybe one person will grab the concept.  
 Danielle: So it's slower? 
 All: Yes 
E: In addition to that, they find it difficult to understand abstracts and concepts, 
so always need to use a lot of materials.  So when they are not a good use of 
materials, it is very difficult [inaudible].  And then, we also write their sentences 
[inaudible]. 
6:28  
B: Their language, what they write...grammar...grammar, we have past tense, we 
have present, we have past, but they don’t  have past in deaf language. So if it is 
yesterday that they do something, they still use the present tense. There is no 
past tense in their language. 
Danielle: So it makes it harder to teach? [B agrees] 
7:03  
D: In addition to that, the deaf, before they come to school, they are not taught 
language at home. 
 Danielle: So how do they communicate? 
D: There is no language, very little language is applied at home.  When they 
come here, they come to learn the language. So they have inadequate language 
and that is something we to teach them to [inaudible] to get their education. And 
they don't have incidental learning, like the hearing children, they hear people 
talking, they are able to pick a few things.  They listen...listen to radio...listen 
to...I mean at the dining table, and things like that. They learn, they keep 
learning in their environment.  So with the deaf child, nothing [inaudible] so 
frustrating, unless the deaf child is really good. The deaf child, most of the time, 
depends on what the teacher teaches. I mean, at home, they don't learn. Most of 
the them hardly anything at home. But with hearing children, they learn at 
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home. Their parents teach them. Deaf children, all of...vocabulary – barrier, 
language -  barrier, communication - barrier. Nothing is done at home. 
8:46  
Danielle: About how old are the children when they first come, most of them? 
Are they all different ages? 
 A: Different ages.  Some as old as 18 years.   
B:  They are not starting school.  So that person, you can't send that person into 
the classroom. What we normally do is if someone comes to school at 18 
[inaudible] what is he coming to do already?  So we send the person to the 
vocational side. 
9:20  
E: Just last week, I went to P2.  P2.  And there is a boy of nineteen years in P2. 
 D: There's a boy in my class of 17. 
 E: KG? 
 D: KG1.  Kindergarten.   
 E: Kindergarten.  17.   
Danielle: So are their language skills, are they – are they very poor still, even 
though they’re older, when they come? [no response] 
Danielle: The one who is 17 in your class, is he able to communicate much, or is 
he at the same level as the very little ones? 
D: He didn’t have the normal functioning as the younger kids.  His functioning 
level is very poor. 
10:04 
Danielle: Do you think that’s something that ... you think that he was born or 
because he hasn’t had the language? 
D: Um, I think he has the brain... 
E: [asks something of D, inaudible]  
D:  That is why he isn’t able to function very well. [Danielle: lower?]  Yes, his 
functioning level is lower than even the children in the class. 
E: he is multiple handicapped 
10:37   
Danielle: So before they come, how do they communicate at home? They 
gesture, or...? 
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E: They have their own language...home sign. It is different from the standard 
language that we teach here. Just like speaking Pidgin English.  The deaf 
community, they have their own language. [inaudible].  
11:10  
Danielle: I remember before you were saying something about with the children, 
that they guess what you are trying to say before you finish saying it?  So they 
assume… assume before you finish talking? 
C: Yes.  
[Inaudible] 
11:28  
C: Before you finish talking, they assume what you are going to say.  They go 
and then do different thing. 
 Danielle: So they don't wait for you to... 
[all smile – “yes”.  A makes “know” gesture several times (mimicking students) 
and all laugh and agree] 
11:42  
B: Sometimes they get one concept out of what you are telling them, and it gets 
totally confused. 
 Danielle: I guess it's difficult to teach the full... 
A: And I remember, because I teach English [inaudible] I want to go to Accra, 
or I’m going to Accra [makes NAME sign] 
12:11  
Danielle: Is there anything else that you notice that is particular to the deaf 
children? That makes things complicated? 
[B asks C something] C: She is asking if there is anything particular to deaf 
children [inaudible] 
 E: [to Danielle] Go on. 
Danielle: That's mainly what I was most interested in, was… was how you feel 
about [inaudible] how you teach them, how are they learning, what is different 
between them and hearing children, [inaudible] any other points? 
13:00  
E:  So for them, I like...they need a lot of materials, those materials can be quite 
simple [inaudible].  So you can teach a whole lesson with the wrong materials, 
so you are always nervous. 
Danielle: And as far as their attention, is it similar to hearing children...is it 
harder to keep their attention than hearing children? Or…? 
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 [all agree yes] 
 E: They have a very short attention span.   
B: You want to give them more...give them more at a time... but we can’t, they 
get frustrated... So, something small, little at a time. 
E: And also the hearing people, when they are reading the textbook, they are 
going to assimilate that [inaudible] talk about what they are reading. [inaudible] 
they use one vocabulary for too many options [inaudible] so they always need 
somebody to guide them. 
14:27  
Danielle: So they can't really learn on their own like the hearing children who 
could read and learn on their own... they need the extra help? 
B: Especially in English, the comprehension, the passage...They read...we 
understand what's there...[inaudible] and then we give them the gists... in their 
language that they understand. 
E: For example, if say something is lying here, or something is white elephant, 
white elephant and they won't understand because I am not [others contribute: 
inaudible] …white.  Just it’s white. [inaudible] 
15:13  
Danielle: So maybe the details, they lose...they just remember the big 
E: Yes.  
C: You were asking whether they can learn when they are home.  They can’t 
learn when they are home.  Unless [inaudible] … And they have prayer time.  
They don’t really come prepared.  And you see them writing about [inaudible].  
If the teacher is not in the class that is [inaudible] 
 A: Confidence [inaudible] 
 C: And their comprehension is more good.  
16:05  
Danielle: So you do get some who understand…  
All: Yes [inaudible conversation] 
Danielle: Do any of the children come, do they have deaf parents?  Do they 
generally have deaf parents? 
 A: Deaf parents, oh yes. 
B: There’s a girl.  [inaudible].  The one that is the mother or the father, one of 
them.  [A asks B something].  There’s a girl here.  [inaudible conversation 
between A and B] Both parents.   
A: Both parents are deaf.   
 235 
 
 
Danielle: So do you see differences in how they perform if they have the deaf 
parents or if they have hearing parents? 
 D: They come with the sign language. 
 Danielle: So they are ready to learn? 
 D: Yes, and they do better than the other children 
 A: That girl [inaudible] she does very well. The sign was [inaudible] 
 B: [inaudible] 
17:17  
Danielle: I noticed some of them, there are a couple of twins or ones who have 
brothers and sisters, are they any different because they've had someone to talk 
to when they were younger...can you see any difference with them? 
 D: I have not had an experience  
C: [inaudible] mother! And they are also sign [inaudible].  Those boys, the one.  
E: Ah, Seth, he is in my class. 
C: They are all deaf. All boys. 
 E: [inaudible]  The one in the town.  [inaudible with gesture] 
18:08  
B: Ah yeah yeah, that boy, yes, and the sister. 
 E: [inaudible] 
 C: There are twins in P5. [inaudible]  
Danielle: I was wondering since they have another deaf person to communicate 
with when they are smaller, if that shows through at all when they come here or 
are they the same [no answer] You would say they are about the same? 
 D: They are about the same. 
 Danielle: Where do they leave the older person, the parent… 
 D: [inaudible] 
18:57  
E: [inaudible] private language 
 C: [inaudible] 
 E: [inaudible] 
 Danielle: So they were later in becoming [inaudible] 
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 E: [inaudible] yes 
 B: [inaudible] 
Danielle: Is there anything else that...Probably it is difficult, since you are 
always [inaudible].  Maybe if you want to tell me a bit about the school.  
[video ends]. 
 
 
